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Operating System Fault Tolerance Support  
for Real-Time Embedded Applications 
 
Abstract 
Fault tolerance is a means of achieving high dependability for critical and high-
availability systems. Despite the efforts to prevent and remove faults during the 
development of these systems, the application of fault tolerance is usually required 
because the hardware may fail during system operation and software faults are very 
hard to eliminate completely.  
One of the difficulties in implementing fault tolerance techniques is the lack of 
support from operating systems and middleware.  In most fault tolerant projects, the 
programmer has to develop a fault tolerance implementation for each application. 
This strong customization makes the fault-tolerant software costly and difficult to 
implement and maintain. In particular, for small-scale embedded systems, the 
introduction of fault tolerance techniques may also have impact on their restricted 
resources, such as processing power and memory size. 
The purpose of this research is to provide fault tolerance support for real-time 
applications in small-scale embedded systems. The main approach of this thesis is to 
develop and integrate a customizable and extendable fault tolerance framework into a 
real-time operating system, in order to fulfill the needs of a large range of dependable 
applications. Special attention is taken to allow the coexistence of fault tolerance with 
real-time constraints. The utilization of the proposed framework features several 
advantages over ad-hoc implementations, such as simplifying application-level 
programming and improving the system configurability and maintainability. 
In addition, this thesis also investigates the application of aspect-oriented 
techniques to the development of real-time embedded fault-tolerant software. Aspect-
Oriented Programming (AOP) is employed to modularize all fault tolerant source 
vi 
code, following the principle of separation of concerns, and to integrate the proposed 
framework into the operating system.  
Two case studies are used to evaluate the proposed implementation in terms of 
performance and resource costs. The results show that the overheads related to the 
framework application are acceptable and the ones related to the AOP implementation 
are negligible. 
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Suporte do Sistema Operativo à Tolerância a Falhas em Aplicações 
Embebidas de Tempo-Real  
 
Resumo 
Tolerância a falhas é um meio de obter-se alta confiabilidade para sistemas 
críticos e de elevada disponibilidade. Apesar dos esforços para prevenir e remover 
falhas durante o desenvolvimento destes sistemas, a aplicação de tolerância a falhas é 
normalmente necessária, já que o hardware pode falhar durante a operação do sistema 
e falhas de software são muito difíceis de eliminar completamente. 
Uma das dificuldades na implementação de técnicas de tolerância a falhas é a 
falta de suporte por parte dos sistemas operativos e middleware. Na maioria dos 
projectos tolerantes a falhas, o programador deve desenvolver uma implementação de 
tolerância a falhas para cada aplicação. Esta elevada adaptação torna o software 
tolerante a falhas dispendioso e difícil de implementar e manter. Em particular, para 
sistemas embebidos de pequena escala, a introdução de técnicas de tolerância a falhas 
pode também ter impacto nos seus restritos recursos, tais como capacidade de 
processamento e tamanho da memória. 
O propósito desta tese é prover suporte à tolerância a falhas para aplicações de 
tempo real em sistemas embebidos de pequena escala. A principal abordagem 
utilizada nesta tese foi desenvolver e integrar uma framework tolerante a falhas, 
customizável e extensível, a um sistema operativo de tempo real, a fim de satisfazer às 
necessidades de uma larga gama de aplicações confiáveis. Especial atenção foi dada 
para permitir a coexistência de tolerância a falhas com restrições de tempo real. A 
utilização da framework proposta apresenta diversas vantagens sobre implementações 
ad-hoc, tais como simplificar a programação a nível da aplicação e melhorar a 
configurabilidade e a facilidade de manutenção do sistema. 
Além disto, esta tese também investiga a aplicação de técnicas orientadas a 
aspectos no desenvolvimento de software tolerante a falhas, embebido e de tempo 
real. A Programação Orientada a Aspectos (POA) é empregada para segregar em 
viii 
módulos isolados todo o código fonte tolerante a falhas, seguindo o princípio da 
separação de interesses, e para integrar a framework proposta com o sistema 
operativo.  
Dois casos de estudo são utilizados para avaliar a implementação proposta em 
termos de desempenho e utilização de recursos. Os resultados mostram que os 
acréscimos de recursos relativos à aplicação da framework são aceitáveis e os 
relativos à implementação POA são insignificantes.  
 
ix 
Contents 
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................. iii 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................v 
Resumo .................................................................................................................vii 
Contents.................................................................................................................ix 
Figures ..................................................................................................................xv 
Tables...................................................................................................................xix 
List of Abbreviations..........................................................................................xxi 
Chapter 1................................................................................................................1 
Introduction ...........................................................................................................1 
1.1 Motivation..................................................................................................2 
1.2 Problem statement......................................................................................4 
1.3 Approach and contributions.......................................................................5 
1.4 Thesis organization ....................................................................................7 
Chapter 2................................................................................................................9 
Fault tolerance .......................................................................................................9 
2.1 Faults, errors and failures.........................................................................10 
2.2 Dependability and fault tolerance ............................................................12 
2.3 Basic techniques in fault tolerance ..........................................................14 
2.4 Redundancy..............................................................................................16 
2.5 Design diversity .......................................................................................16 
2.6 Hardware fault tolerance..........................................................................17 
2.7 Software fault tolerance ...........................................................................20 
2.8 Fault tolerance strategies..........................................................................21 
x 
2.8.1 Checkpoint and Restart ....................................................................21 
2.8.2 Recovery Blocks ..............................................................................22 
2.8.3 Distributed Recovery Blocks ...........................................................23 
2.8.4 N-Version Programming..................................................................26 
2.9 Fault-tolerant communication..................................................................27 
2.10 Fault tolerance software structures ......................................................29 
2.11 Fault tolerance application support ......................................................33 
2.11.1 FT-RT-Mach and DEOS..............................................................33 
2.11.2 Delta-4..........................................................................................34 
2.11.3 TMOSM and ROAFTS................................................................35 
2.11.4 Adaptive Fault Tolerance for Spacecraft .....................................37 
2.11.5 Fault Tolerant CORBA................................................................38 
2.12 Summary ..............................................................................................39 
Chapter 3..............................................................................................................41 
Aspect-Oriented Programming..........................................................................41 
3.1 Separation of concerns.............................................................................42 
3.1.1 Meta-level Programming .................................................................43 
3.1.2 Composition Filters..........................................................................43 
3.1.3 Aspect-Oriented Programming ........................................................44 
3.2 AspectC++ ...............................................................................................45 
3.2.1 Weaving ...........................................................................................46 
3.2.2 Join points, pointcuts and advices....................................................47 
3.2.3 The JoinPoint API............................................................................49 
3.2.4 Performance and memory footprint .................................................51 
3.3 AOP for the operating system..................................................................52 
xi 
3.4 AOP for the middleware ..........................................................................53 
3.5 Fault tolerance using AOP.......................................................................55 
3.6 Summary ..................................................................................................58 
Chapter 4..............................................................................................................59 
BOSS operating system.......................................................................................59 
4.1 Introduction..............................................................................................60 
4.2 Kernel services.........................................................................................62 
4.2.1 Task processing................................................................................62 
4.2.2 Synchronization ...............................................................................64 
4.2.3 Communication................................................................................66 
4.2.4 Utility classes ...................................................................................68 
4.2.5 Hardware interface and management...............................................68 
4.3 Middleware services ................................................................................70 
4.3.1 Message to message communication ...............................................71 
4.3.2 Message to thread communication...................................................73 
4.4 Middleware extensions ............................................................................75 
4.4.1 Message identification and discarding.............................................76 
4.4.2 External messages handling.............................................................77 
4.5 Summary ..................................................................................................80 
Chapter 5..............................................................................................................81 
Fault tolerance framework.................................................................................81 
5.1 Introduction..............................................................................................82 
5.2 Fault tolerance thread model....................................................................83 
5.3 Framework general description................................................................84 
5.3.1 Framework structure ........................................................................85 
xii 
5.3.2 Fault tolerance introduction .............................................................86 
5.3.3 Application-specific entities ............................................................87 
5.4 Framework general implementation ........................................................90 
5.4.1 Timing behavior...............................................................................90 
5.4.2 Class structure..................................................................................92 
5.5 FT strategies implementation...................................................................95 
5.5.1 Recovery Blocks strategy ................................................................95 
5.5.2 Distributed Recovery Blocks strategy .............................................99 
5.5.3 N-Version Programming strategy ..................................................105 
5.6 Discussion ..............................................................................................114 
5.7 Summary ................................................................................................115 
Chapter 6............................................................................................................117 
Applying AOP for fault tolerance....................................................................117 
6.1 Application-level fault tolerance............................................................118 
6.1.1 Code generation .............................................................................119 
6.1.2 AspectC++ restriction ....................................................................120 
6.1.3 AOP implementation .....................................................................122 
6.1.4 Discussion ......................................................................................127 
6.2 FT framework integration ......................................................................128 
6.2.1 Code generation .............................................................................129 
6.2.2 AOP implementation .....................................................................131 
6.2.3 Discussion ......................................................................................132 
6.3 Operating system fault tolerance ...........................................................133 
6.3.1 Semaphore error detection .............................................................134 
6.3.2 Code generation .............................................................................135 
xiii 
6.3.3 AOP implementation .....................................................................135 
6.3.4 Discussion ......................................................................................139 
6.4 Project configuration using AOP ...........................................................139 
6.5 Summary ................................................................................................141 
Chapter 7............................................................................................................143 
Case studies and evaluation..............................................................................143 
7.1 Development and test environment .......................................................144 
7.1.1 Target systems ...............................................................................144 
7.1.2 Host system....................................................................................145 
7.1.3 Porting BOSS to the target board...................................................146 
7.2 Case study I: sorting application............................................................146 
7.2.1 Testing configurations ...................................................................146 
7.2.2 Execution time measurements .......................................................149 
7.2.3 Runtime costs.................................................................................153 
7.2.4 Memory costs.................................................................................157 
7.2.5 FT scheduling tests ........................................................................159 
7.3 Case study II: radar filtering application ...............................................161 
7.3.1 Testing configurations ...................................................................162 
7.3.2 Fault tolerance implementations and testing..................................165 
7.3.3 AOP implementations....................................................................165 
7.3.4 Runtime costs.................................................................................166 
7.4 Evaluation ..............................................................................................167 
7.4.1 FT framework ................................................................................167 
7.4.2 Aspect-oriented implementation....................................................168 
7.5 Summary ................................................................................................169 
xiv 
Chapter 8............................................................................................................171 
Conclusions ........................................................................................................171 
8.1 Conclusions............................................................................................172 
8.2 Future work............................................................................................174 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................177 
 
xv 
Figures 
Figure 2.1: Faults, errors and failures. .........................................................................10 
Figure 2.2: Means to achieve dependable systems. .....................................................13 
Figure 2.3: Triple Modular Redundancy. ....................................................................18 
Figure 2.4: Self-checking modules. .............................................................................19 
Figure 2.5: RB execution. ............................................................................................22 
Figure 2.6: DRB execution. .........................................................................................24 
Figure 2.7: Xu,Randell, Rubira-Calsavara and Stroud´s framework example. ...........29 
Figure 2.8: Tso, Shokri, Tai and Dziegiel´s class diagram for the RB technique. ......30 
Figure 2.9: Reliable Hybrid pattern class diagram. .....................................................31 
Figure 2.10: The Generic Software Fault Tolerance pattern class diagram. ...............32 
Figure 3.1: Code tangling and code scattering.............................................................42 
Figure 3.2: AspectC++ weaving process. ....................................................................46 
Figure 3.3: AspectC++ program example....................................................................48 
Figure 3.4: Example of source code transformation by AspectC++............................50 
Figure 4.1: Task processing related classes. ................................................................62 
Figure 4.2: Thread states..............................................................................................63 
Figure 4.3: Synchronization related classes.................................................................65 
Figure 4.4: Communication related classes. ................................................................67 
Figure 4.5: BOSS utility classes. .................................................................................68 
Figure 4.6: BOSS basic architecture. ...........................................................................69 
Figure 4.7: Kernel/HDL interface................................................................................70 
Figure 4.8: Message class diagram. .............................................................................71 
Figure 4.9: NameServer data structure.........................................................................72 
xvi 
Figure 4.10: Middleware message distribution............................................................72 
Figure 4.11: IncommingMessageAdministrator class diagram....................................74 
Figure 4.12: IncommingMessageAdministrator sequence diagram.............................74 
Figure 4.13: TMR configuration..................................................................................75 
Figure 4.14: NameServer extension for discarding duplicate messages......................76 
Figure 4.15: Middleware extensions class diagram. ....................................................77 
Figure 4.16: External messages processing. ................................................................79 
Figure 4.17: External message packet description.......................................................79 
Figure 5.1: Fault tolerance thread model. ....................................................................83 
Figure 5.2: Example of candidate thread for FT implementation................................84 
Figure 5.3: Simplified FT framework class diagram. ..................................................85 
Figure 5.4: Example of FT application thread. ............................................................87 
Figure 5.5: RB execution timing example. ..................................................................91 
Figure 5.6: RB execution activity diagram. .................................................................92 
Figure 5.7: FT strategy execution class diagram. ........................................................92 
Figure 5.8: MiddewareScheduler thread sequence diagram. .......................................94 
Figure 5.9: RB strategy class diagram. ........................................................................96 
Figure 5.10: RB strategy execution. ............................................................................97 
Figure 5.11: RB timing example..................................................................................98 
Figure 5.12: Stateless RB threads configuration example. ..........................................99 
Figure 5.13: DRB strategy class diagram. .................................................................100 
Figure 5.14: DRB strategy execution.........................................................................101 
Figure 5.15: DRB strategy configuration example. ...................................................104 
Figure 5.16: DRB timing diagram. ............................................................................104 
Figure 5.17: NVP strategy class diagram. .................................................................106 
xvii 
Figure 5.18: NVP strategy execution.........................................................................107 
Figure 5.19: NVP state initialization example. ..........................................................108 
Figure 5.20: Voting configurations............................................................................109 
Figure 5.21: VoterThread class diagram....................................................................110 
Figure 5.22: Voting execution diagram. ....................................................................112 
Figure 5.23: Master election state diagram................................................................113 
Figure 5.24: Master voter failure worst scenario. ......................................................114 
Figure 6.1: Example of thread source code before fault tolerance introduction........118 
Figure 6.2: Example of thread source code after fault tolerance introduction...........119 
Figure 6.3: Code generation process using AOP at the application level..................120 
Figure 6.4: AspectC++ base class introduction example...........................................121 
Figure 6.5: FT framework modified for AOP application.........................................122 
Figure 6.6: DRB strategy abstract aspect...................................................................123 
Figure 6.7: DRB strategy concrete aspect example. ..................................................124 
Figure 6.8: NVP strategy with StdVoter abstract aspect. ..........................................125 
Figure 6.9: NVP strategy with StdVoter concrete aspect example. ...........................126 
Figure 6.10: Code generation process when using AOP at the OS level...................129 
Figure 6.11: Alternative code generation process with double weaving. ..................130 
Figure 6.12: MiddlewareScheduler activation aspect. ...............................................131 
Figure 6.13: Aspect for introducing FT attributes and methods in the Thread class.132 
Figure 6.14: Semaphore error detection aspect for the first predicate. ......................135 
Figure 6.15: Semaphore error detection aspect for the second predicate. .................137 
Figure 6.16: Synchronization aspect applied to the Semaphore class. ......................138 
Figure 6.17: Semaphore enter method sequence diagram. ........................................139 
Figure 7.1: Test environment. ....................................................................................145 
xviii 
Figure 7.2: Case study I - non-FT or RB configuration.............................................147 
Figure 7.3: Case study I - DRB configuration. ..........................................................147 
Figure 7.4: Case study I  - NVP configuration. .........................................................148 
Figure 7.5: Case study I - no-failure condition. .........................................................151 
Figure 7.6: Case study I – comparison between no-failure and variant 1 failure 
conditions. ..........................................................................................................152 
Figure 7.7: Case study I - comparison between no-failure and one node failure 
conditions. ..........................................................................................................153 
Figure 7.8: Case study I - CPU utilization configuration. .........................................154 
Figure 7.9: Case study I - CPU utilization results. ....................................................155 
Figure 7.10: CPU utilization comparison for AOP and FT scheduling versions.......156 
Figure 7.11: Comparison of FT and non-FT memory footprints...............................158 
Figure 7.12: Case study I - detailed comparison of memory footprint. .....................158 
Figure 7.13: Case study II - non-FT configuration. ...................................................162 
Figure 7.14: Case study II - PSP configurtion. ..........................................................162 
Figure 7.15: Case study II - TMR configuration. ......................................................163 
Figure 7.16: Case study II - display output example. ................................................164 
Figure 7.17: Case study II – CPU utilization results. ................................................166 
 
 
xix 
Tables 
Table 3.1: AspectC++ pointcut functions. ...................................................................48 
Table 5.1: Multiple version strategies requirements....................................................88 
Table 5.2: Single version strategies requirements. ......................................................88 
Table 5.3: Voter requirements. ....................................................................................89 
Table 7.1: Case study I - local execution time...........................................................149 
Table 7.2: Case study I - total execution time. ..........................................................150 
Table 7.3: Case study I - time settings. ......................................................................150 
Table 7.4: Memory footprint results. .........................................................................157 
Table 7.5: Additional memory costs for AOP and FT scheduling versions. .............159 
Table 7.6: FT scheduling test configurations.............................................................160 
Table 7.7: FT scheduling test results. ........................................................................161 
 
 

xxi 
List of Abbreviations 
AFT Adaptive Fault Tolerance 
AOP Aspect-Oriented Programming 
AOSD Aspect-Oriented Software Development 
API Application Programming Interface 
AT Acceptance Test 
CORBA Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
CPM Communication Processor Module 
DRB Distributed Recovery Blocks 
EJB Enterprise Java Beans 
FIFO First In First Out 
FT Fault Tolerance or Fault-Tolerant 
FTRMS Fault-tolerant RMS 
GSFT Generic Software Fault Tolerance 
HDL Hardware Dependent Layer  
I2C Inter-Integrated Circuit 
ISR Interrupt Service Routine 
MIPS Million Instructions per Second 
MOP Meta-object Protocol 
MS MiddlewareScheduler  
NMR N-Modular Redundancy 
NVP N-Version Programming 
NAC Network Attachment Controller 
OOP Object-Oriented Programming 
xxii 
OS Operating System 
OSI Open Systems Interconnection 
PC Personal Computer 
PCMCIA Personal Computer Memory Card International Association 
PSP Pair of Self Checking Processors 
RB Recovery Blocks 
RISC Reduced Instruction Set Computing 
RMI Remote Method Invocation 
RMS Rate Monotonic Scheduling 
ROAFTS Real-Time Object-Oriented Adaptive Fault Tolerance Support 
RPC Remote Procedure Call 
RPM Revolutions per Minute 
SIU System Interface Unit 
SPI Serial Peripheral Interface 
STU Single Translation Unit 
TMO Time-triggered Message-triggered Object  
TMOSM TMO Support Middleware 
TMR Triple Modular Redundancy 
TTP Time-triggered Protocol 
WPT Whole Program Transformation 
WTST Watchdog Timer and Scheduler Thread 
 
 
 
1 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter initially describes the thesis motivation and the main topics 
related to this work. The definition of the research problem and the 
formulation of the research questions are addressed next. Finally, the 
approach and contributions of this work are stated.  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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1.1 Motivation 
Embedded systems have a widespread use in several domains, such as consumer 
electronics, home/office automation, and the automotive industry.  A precise 
definition of the term embedded system does not exist. In general, embedded systems 
are defined as hardware-software systems that perform a specific function, usually 
being part of a larger system, which explains the “embedded” denomination. Besides 
being designed to execute a predefined function, as opposed to a general purpose 
computing system (mainframe, desktop, notebook, and so on), embedded systems 
usually have a particular method of software development called cross-platform 
development [96], in which the software is generated in other platform and then it is 
transferred to the embedded device.  
Most embedded systems have to react to the system environment in a timely 
fashion. Real-time systems must satisfy timing constraints, and therefore the correct 
response depends also on the time that it is produced. Examples of real-time 
embedded systems include portable media players and control systems. The 
consequences of not satisfying a timing constraint are severe in hard real time 
systems, in contrast with soft real time systems, in which there is some degree of 
tolerance to timing violations.  
Some embedded systems demand high reliability, availability or safety, as a 
system failure may endanger human lives or compromise the success of the entire 
system operation.  These are classified as safety-critical and mission-critical systems, 
respectively. Examples of these critical systems include drive-by-wire systems in 
automobiles, fly-by-wire systems in avionics, missile control systems and autonomous 
space systems.   
Critical systems are also termed high-dependability systems. Dependability is a 
wider concept that includes several attributes, such as reliability, safety, 
maintainability and security.  The reliability of high-dependability systems can be 
several orders of magnitude higher than for commercial systems. For instance, civil 
transport airplane critical equipments are designed to have less than 10-9 catastrophic 
failures per hour of operation (a failure in 114 thousand years) [71]. Similar 
requirements are applied in railway control systems. High-dependability systems are 
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also needed in satellites and space missions because most of these systems must 
operate without any maintenance at all.  
As critical embedded systems are composed by hardware and software, there is a 
strong need to reduce the number of failures related to these two domains. Hardware 
reliability has been constantly increasing over time. However, transient and 
permanent hardware faults may still occur, especially in environments subjected to 
high energy particles and radiation, such as space systems. In relation to software 
faults, the ever increasing functionality of the computer systems has a direct impact in 
the software complexity, which is the main cause of design faults in software. Despite 
the efforts taken at the several phases of software development, including the testing 
phase, various software faults are likely to remain unpredicted and undetected.  
Therefore, fault tolerance (FT) techniques are needed in order to maintain the system 
operational in the presence of hardware and software faults.     
Several fault tolerance techniques have been proposed in the last 30 years. 
However, the application of these techniques is expensive, in terms of resources and 
costs, and therefore they are normally only used in safety or mission-critical systems.  
Fault tolerance is usually applied by means of redundancy and diversity. 
Redundant hardware implies the establishment of a distributed system executing a set 
of fault tolerance strategies by software, and may also employ some form of diversity, 
by using different variants or versions for the same processing. Redundant hardware 
involves extra software coordination, which makes the software system more complex 
and error-prone. Software fault tolerance may be implemented by software re-
execution or multiple versions techniques, which also requires the application of 
additional control mechanisms. 
In many fault tolerant projects, the programmer has to address both application-
dependent and fault tolerance related concerns. This strong customization requires 
highly specialized design teams, thus making realistic fault-tolerant software costly 
and difficulty to implement and maintain. Therefore, there is an urgent need to 
provide a flexible support for fault-tolerant applications that is able to deliver some 
degree of transparency for the application developer and at the same time that 
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4 
facilitates customizability across a broad range of applications, as well as diverse 
reliability requirements.  
One of the difficulties in implementing fault tolerance techniques is the lack of 
support from operating systems and middleware.  Operating systems are not designed 
with fault tolerance support in mind and even those that were extended to include 
some basic fault tolerance mechanisms did not provide support for a full fault tolerant 
implementation.  The same happens to middleware implementations, such as CORBA 
[90], which were meant originally to solve the distribution problem, and only a few 
years ago have specified basic mechanisms of fault tolerance [88].   
Another problem regarding the fault tolerance implementation is that it has a huge 
impact in the real-time behavior of an application. A fault tolerance implementation 
normally demands additional computations for fault detection, alternative 
implementations and replica coordination. These mechanisms change the application 
timing behavior and often violate real-time constraints. As an example of this issue, it 
can be mentioned the incompatibility of the FT-CORBA [88] and RT-CORBA [89] 
specifications [48, 85]. 
In particular, for small-scale embedded systems, the introduction of fault 
tolerance techniques may have impact on the restricted resources of these systems, 
such as processing power, memory size, power consumption, physical size and 
weight. These restrictions are considered in the requirements of many embedded 
projects, such as satellite systems. Most fault tolerance research developed so far 
focus on large-scale systems with no resource constraints, such as navy command and 
control systems and airline reservation systems. Most solutions proposed to that kind 
of systems are not applicable to small-scale embedded systems.  
1.2 Problem statement 
The purpose of this research is to provide fault tolerance support for real-time 
embedded applications by extending a real-time operating system. The focus of this 
research is on small-scale distributed embedded systems connected by local area 
networks or field buses. The emphasis of fault tolerance is on the computation (fault-
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tolerant computing) and not in the communication between nodes, which is assumed 
to be reliable. 
The main research questions are:  
• Is the approach described above feasible and acceptable in terms of performance 
and resource costs?  
• What benefits and drawbacks this approach brings to the embedded software 
development process? 
• Can Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) [62], a new technique for advanced 
separation of concerns [36, 91], be applied at the operating system and application 
level to support the implementation of embedded fault-tolerant systems? If so, 
what are the benefits? 
The operating system employed in this research was the BOSS operating system 
[81], developed by Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Architecture and Software 
Technology (FIRST). This operating system was written in C++, uses object-oriented 
technology extensively, and it includes a middleware for communication support 
based on a publish-subscriber protocol.  The BOSS operating system targets real-time 
high-dependability applications, such as satellite and medical systems.     
1.3 Approach and contributions 
The main approach taken in this research was to develop and integrate a 
customizable and extendable fault tolerance framework into a real-time operating 
system, in order to fulfill the needs of a large range of dependable applications.  This 
FT framework defines a set of collaborations between operating system basic classes 
and fault tolerance support classes in order to implement fault tolerance techniques 
with maximum transparency the application-level threads. Additionally, AOP was 
employed to provide a full modularization of the fault tolerance implementation. 
The contributions of this research are listed as follows: 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
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• The proposal of a framework for developing real-time embedded fault-tolerant 
software. In contrast with previous works, we target the application thread level, 
based on a thread model which allows both state and stateless threads.  
• The development of several fault tolerance strategy implementations using the 
proposed framework in order to cover a wide range of fault tolerance 
requirements, supporting both hardware and software fault tolerance. 
• The development of new mechanisms for the BOSS middleware, namely for 
message identification, duplicate messages discarding and external messages 
handling. 
• The application of aspect-oriented techniques to the development of real-time 
embedded fault-tolerant software. In contrast with previous works, we applied 
AOP in order to provide fault tolerance to application threads. Additionally, we 
employed AOP to integrate the proposed FT framework into the original 
operating system and to implement fault tolerance mechanisms at the operating 
system level. 
• The evaluation and comparison of the proposed fault tolerance framework and the 
AOP implementation in terms of performance and resource costs based on two 
case studies: a sorting application and a radar filtering system. These case studies 
were developed using a PowerPC 823 based target board, in a similar 
configuration employed in a satellite computer system. Performances based on 
execution time, plus costs related to runtime overhead and memory footprint were 
measured for several FT configurations and implementations. 
• The evaluation of the proposed framework and the AOP implementation in terms 
of benefits to the embedded software development process, including 
maintenance and reusability issues.  
The approaches and contributions described in this thesis have been succinctly 
presented in research papers published by international conferences and workshops 
related to real-time systems, industrial embedded systems and aspect-oriented 
software development [2-6]. 
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1.4 Thesis organization 
This thesis is divided in eight chapters. The remaining chapters are described as 
follows: 
• Chapter 2 introduces the main definitions and concepts related to fault tolerance. 
It also presents the fault tolerance techniques applied in this work and reviews the 
related work about fault tolerance. 
• Chapter 3 presents the main concepts related to Aspect-Oriented Programming, 
describes the AspectC++ language extension and reviews the research results 
regarding the application of AOP in operating systems, middleware and fault-
tolerant systems.  
• Chapter 4 describes the main features of the BOSS operating system, including 
its kernel and middleware. A brief introduction about BOSS principles, history 
and applications is presented, followed by a detailed description of the kernel and 
the middleware. The middleware extensions developed for handling external 
messages are also described. 
• Chapter 5 describes the fault tolerance framework developed for supporting 
application-level fault tolerance, as an extension to the BOSS operating system 
and its middleware. The framework objectives and constraints are presented, as 
well as the thread model for FT introduction. The implemented fault tolerance 
strategies are described in detail. This chapter also discusses the benefits and 
drawbacks of the proposed FT framework. 
• Chapter 6 presents how AOP was applied to support the implementation of fault 
tolerance. It covers the application of AOP for three different purposes: (1) 
modularize the fault tolerance code at the application level; (2) integrate the FT 
framework into the operating system; and (3) implement fault tolerance at the 
operating system level. This chapter also discusses the benefits and drawbacks of 
the AOP application. 
• Chapter 7 presents the development and test environment applied in this work 
and describes the case studies developed to test the proposed FT framework, 
comparing performance and costs of several configurations and implementations.  
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• Chapter 8 concludes this thesis and indicates possible future directions for this 
research topic. 
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Chapter 2 
Fault tolerance 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces the main definitions and concepts related to fault 
tolerance. Besides, the main techniques and approaches to build fault-
tolerant systems are presented, as well as the related work regarding fault 
tolerance. 
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2.1 Faults, errors and failures 
In this section, the basic terminology in fault tolerance is introduced by explaining 
the difference between faults, errors and failures. These terms are frequently 
combined with others to classify fault tolerance concepts and techniques, and 
therefore a precise definition of these terms is required1.  
A failure is an event that ocurrs when a system’s delivered service deviates from 
the correct service [20]. The correct service is the one described in the system 
specification. An error is a part of the system state that may cause a subsequent 
failure. A fault is the cause of an error. 
Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between faults, error and failures in a multi-
component system [117]. A fault is active when it produces an error, otherwise it is 
dormant. A dormant fault may be activated (generates an error) after a system input or 
computational process. The failure of a component represents a fault for the system, 
and it can further generate a system error. Errors can propagate within a component or 
system. An error that has not been detected is a latent error. A system failure occurs 
when the error propagates to the system interface. In summary, a fault is a defect, an 
error is a corrupted state, and a failure is the event that we want to avoid.  
system
component
fault
error
failure
dormant fault
active fault
 
Figure 2.1: Faults, errors and failures. 
                                                 
1 For instance, error detection and error handling have a completely different meaning than fault 
detection and fault handling. 
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Faults can be classified according to many criteria. In relation to the domain, there 
are hardware or software faults. Design faults occur much more frequently in software 
than in hardware because of the difference in complexity of these two domains. This 
difference is explained by the fact that hardware machines have usually a smaller 
number of internal states than software programs [98].  
In relation to persistence, faults can be classified in permanent or transient. 
Hardware faults can be permanent or transient, but a software fault is always 
permanent. Apparent transient software faults are in fact permanent software faults 
with complex activation patterns. The ability to identify the activation pattern of a 
fault determines the fault activation reproducibility.  Faults can be categorized 
according their activation reproducibility as solid (or hard, or bohrbugs [49]), and 
elusive (or soft, or heisenbugs [49]). The activation of elusive faults is not 
systematically reproducible. Elusive faults activation can depend, for instance, on 
unusual combinations of internal states and external requests, system load, and timing. 
Most residual design faults in large and complex software are elusive faults. The 
similarity of the manifestation of elusive development faults and of transient physical 
faults leads to both classes being grouped together as intermittent faults. Errors 
produced by intermittent faults are termed soft errors [20].  
Failures can be classified in relation to the domain as content failures and timing 
failures. Content failures, also called value failures, present a deviation in the content 
of the information delivered by a system in regard to the system specification. In 
timing failures, the deviation is related to the arrival or duration of the information 
delivery. A failure can also be consistent or inconsistent. Consistent failures are 
perceived identically for all system users, while inconsistent failures are perceived 
differently by one or more users. Inconsistent failures are also called Byzantine 
failures.  
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2.2 Dependability and fault tolerance 
The dependability of a computer system is the ability to avoid system failures that 
are more frequent and more severe than acceptable [20]. The concept of dependability 
is strong connected with the concept of trust, and comprises the following attributes: 
• Reliability: continuity of the correct service. Reliability is the probability that a 
system will perform its intended function satisfactorily, for a specified period of 
time. It is usually expressed in terms of failure rate (λ), or its inverse, the mean 
time to failure (MTTF) [71]. The system reliability is dependent on the system 
environment. For instance, the activation of some types of faults can be triggered 
by specif input sequences [111]. A system can have many faults but still be 
reliable if the environment does not trigger any fault activation in its normal 
operation. 
• Availability: readiness for correct service. Availability is the probability that a 
system is performing its required function at a given point in time. To calculate 
the system availability it is necessary to include information about the mean time 
to repair (MTTR).  
• Safety: absence of catastrophic consequences on the user and the environment. A 
fail-safe system is one that cannot cause harm when it fails. A system can be fail-
safe but unreliable and vice-versa. For many systems, the fail-safe property 
cannot be guaranteed as, for instance, in airplane flight control systems [108]. 
Safety can also be defined as the reliability with respect to catastrophic failures.    
• Confidentiality: absence of unauthorized disclosure of information. 
• Integrity: absence of improper system state alterations. 
• Maintainability: the ability to undergo repairs and modifications. 
There are four basic means to achieve dependability: fault prevention, fault 
removal, fault forecasting and fault tolerance [20]. These techniques are described as 
follows: 
• Fault prevention:  to avoid or prevent the introduction of faults in the system 
design. Examples of software fault prevention include software design methods, 
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modularization and reusability. Many design faults are introduced because of an 
incorrect or incomplete system specification. 
• Fault removal: to detect and eliminate faults from system, both at development 
and operational phases. It includes verification, diagnosis and correction. 
Verification can be static, using for instance inspections and formal methods, or 
dynamic, with the application of fault injection and testing. 
• Fault forecasting: to predict and estimate the presence and activation of faults as 
well as their consequences. Fault forecasting techniques include failure mode and 
effects analysis (FMEA), Markov chains and fault-trees. Fault forecasting 
techniques may indicate the need for modifications in system design and the 
application of fault tolerance.  
• Fault tolerance: to preserve the delivery of a correct system service in the 
presence of active faults.  Fault tolerance is intended to prevent active faults from 
becoming failures. In order to achieve fault tolerance, the system must react to 
errors before they reach its boundaries. 
Figure 2.2 shows the relationship among the four means to achieve dependable 
systems. As represented in this figure, faults may be still present after system 
development and validation, when fault prevention and fault removal techiques are 
applied. The remaining faults must be taken care at operation time, by using fault 
tolerance techniques. Fault forecasting may be applied in all phases of the system 
lifecycle, using both prediction and estimation techniques regarding faults and 
failures.   
Fault
prevention
Fault
removal
Fault
 tolerance
Fault
forecasting
faults faults
fault/failure
prediction
fault/failure
estimation
fault/failure
estimation
development validation operation
 
Figure 2.2: Means to achieve dependable systems. 
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In particular, software design faults are very hard to eliminate completely through 
fault prevention and removal. Besides, hardware faults, either permanent or transient, 
may happen during system operation. Therefore, only fault tolerance can cope with 
software residual faults and hardware operational faults. 
Fault tolerance is directly related to system reliability, as its application increases 
the time between failures. Increasing system reliability will also result in larger 
system availability and safety. 
Fault-tolerant systems may be classified as follows [104, 111]: 
• Critical systems: require a high degree of reliability and safety. This category 
includes safety-critical systems, in which a failure can cause loss of lives, and 
mission-critical systems, in which a failure can cause damage in equipment, or the 
loss of efforts and the mission failure. Some safety-critical systems examples are 
flight control systems, nuclear plants and railway control systems. Commercial 
fly-by-wire systems, for instance, require a probability of failure per hour not 
greater than 10-9, considered as ultra-high reliability [71]. 
• Long life systems: require that a computer operates as intended when the time 
between maintenance is large or even without any maintenance at all. This 
includes, for instance, satellites and space systems. 
• High-availability systems: demand a very high probability that the system will 
be ready to provide the intended service when required, such as airline reservation 
systems. 
• General purpose systems: are the less demanding in terms of fault tolerance, 
generally providing only error detection capabilities. 
2.3 Basic techniques in fault tolerance 
Fault tolerance is implemented by means of error detection and system recovery. 
Error detection aims to spot errors within the system. Several methods may be applied 
to detect errors, such as replication checks, timing checks, reasonableness checks and 
structural checks [57]. System recovery must apply error handling for eliminating 
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the error from the system state and, additionally, may apply fault handling for 
diagnosing the fault and preventing it from being activated again. There are three 
general techniques for error handling: rollback, rollforward and compensation. 
In the rollback technique, also called backward recovery, the system is restored 
to a previous assumed error-free state.  This technique requires that the system state is 
stored periodically in predetermined recovery points, in a process called 
checkpointing. It is effective against transient faults because these faults may have 
disappeared after restarting from the last checkpoint.  For permanent faults, the use of 
rollback mechanisms must be associated with other techniques as, for instance, 
changing the algorithm in case of software faults. 
In the rollforward technique, also called forward recovery, the system is taken to 
a new state without errors. Using this technique, the system tries to make corrective 
actions to remove the error from the system state.  Therefore, it requires precise 
information about the error nature and extent. This diagnosis is application and system 
dependent.   
 In the compensation technique, the erroneous state contains enough redundant 
information to enable error elimination. Corrections codes such as Hamming code and 
multiple executions of the same computation are examples of error compensation. rror 
Compensation does not depend on error detection, and so it can be executed 
continuously.  This form of recovery is called fault masking. Alternatively, 
compensation can be executed only after some error detection. 
Error handling techniques eliminate errors from the system state, but they do not 
prevent new errors from occurring. For this reason, fault handling is needed. Fault 
handling involves four steps: 
• Fault diagnosis: identifies the fault type and location. 
• Fault isolation: performs physical or logic exclusion from future participation in 
service delivery. 
• System reconfiguration: switches to a spare component or task. 
• System reinitialization: updates system state and configuration information. 
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Some components and systems are designed to fail only in specific modes that 
preserve safety (fail-safe) or that do not produce incorrect results that may affect 
further processing (fail-silent).  Additionally, a system can be designed to provide a 
degraded functionality in case of failure, returning to full functionality after a system 
reconfiguration and reinitialization. These systems are termed failure-controlled 
systems. 
2.4 Redundancy 
 Fault tolerance implementation depends heavily on redundancy. Redundancy is 
the utilization of additional resources that are not required for normal system 
operation. 
 Hardware redundancy includes replicated and supplementary hardware to support 
fault tolerance, and is the most used form of redundancy in fault-tolerant systems. 
Software redundancy includes additional programs, modules and objects to support 
fault tolerance [94]. Information redundancy is the use of additional information with 
the aim of detecting or tolerating faults. Examples of information redundancy include 
the use of parity bits and error correcting codes. Temporal redundancy involves 
additional time for providing fault tolerance as, for instance, using multiple sequential 
computations, but it is only effective with transient faults.  
2.5 Design diversity 
Redundancy is not sufficient for tolerating solid design faults. A replicated 
hardware or software will fail identically for these faults, as they have the same 
design.  In order to tolerate solid design faults, it is necessary to make use of design 
diversity, which means the redundancy of design. 
Design diversity can be used in all forms of redundancy. In hardware systems it 
would involve using modules of different hardware design, whereas in software it 
would require different programs to implement the same function. For information 
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redundancy, diversity can be implemented by using different data structures and not 
just simple data copies.   
Design diversity may be applied in all phases of the software development, such 
as system requirements, design and implementation. Diverse specifications, 
programming languages, algorithms and software teams can contribute to increase the 
design diversity and therefore to reduce failures related to design faults.  
2.6 Hardware fault tolerance 
Hardware fault tolerance is generally defined as the kind of fault tolerance for 
dealing with hardware faults. Hardware faults were a main issue in the early ages of 
computing. Although the reliability of hardware systems has been improving steadily, 
hardware faults are still a problem for dependable systems. 
 Hardware faults can be permanent or transient. Transient hardware faults may be 
produced, for instance, by high energy subatomic particles, electromagnetic radiation 
and power fluctuations.  Bursts of radiation are responsible for permanent and 
transient failures in satellites.    
Hardware fault tolerance can be implemented by using hardware or software 
mechanisms. The application of extra hardware to detect and correct errors was the 
first successful method for achieving fault-tolerant systems and it is still applied in 
memories, disks and microprocessors. The Leon [45] and PPC-750FX boards [54], 
applied in high-dependability applications as aerospace, use multiple circuits in the 
processor to recover from hardware failures.  
The utilization of software techniques to recover from hardware failures is usually 
called software-based hardware fault tolerance [117].  In these systems, the system 
software is modified to implement error detection and handling in single or multiple 
computing units. Multiple computers are necessary to tolerate permanent hardware 
faults. 
Some software mechanisms designed for handling hardware transient faults, such 
as backward recovery, are also effective against software elusive faults. The study in 
Chapter 2. Fault tolerance 
18 
[49] relates an experiment in which only 1 out of 132 elusive software faults have 
manifested again after a second run.  
Hardware redundancy can be implemented in static, dynamic or hybrid 
configurations. Static redundancy techniques use compensation or masking to avoid 
system failures. A typical example is Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR), represented 
in Figure 2.3, in which three output channels (generated by hardware or software) are 
subjected to majority voting and consequently an error in one channel is tolerated. 
Static redundant systems are fast and simple to implement, but demand more 
hardware than other configurations. N-Modular Redundancy (NMR) is an extension 
of the TMR technique using “n” redundant modules, which are able to tolerate (n-1)/2 
faulty modules.  
Module 1
Module 2
Module 3
Voter
input output
 
Figure 2.3: Triple Modular Redundancy. 
Dynamic redundancy techniques use error detection followed by fault handling to 
isolate the faulty components. Two examples of dynamic redundancy are shown in 
Figure 2.4 [87]. In Figure 2.4(a) two self-checking modules are used, and the final 
output is chosen based on the error signals. In Figure 2.4(b), a self-checking unit is 
built by two modules that have their results compared. Other example of dynamic 
redundancy is the usage of standby sparing (hot, warm or cold). 
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Figure 2.4: Self-checking modules. 
Hybrid redundancy techniques combine elements of both static and dynamic 
redundancy as, for instance, the substitution of the faulty unit by a spare in the TMR 
technique.  
The additional functionality needed to implement static, dynamic or hybrid 
hardware redundancy (e.g. voters and comparators) can be provided by hardware or 
software mechanisms. A common architecture based on software mechanisms 
consists of a multi-computer system connected by a communication network, 
commonly referred as a distributed system.  
In distributed systems terminology, replication means the use of multiple 
hardware and software. The main replication techniques are: 
• Active replication (also termed the state machine approach). In this technique all 
replicas process the inputs and send the results concurrently.  This technique 
assumes that all replicas are deterministic and will reach the same results. For 
fail-silent nodes, the destination nodes are supposed to discard duplicated 
messages. The active replication technique may be extended to tolerate value 
failures [92], as TMR does, and even Byzantine failures [72] . 
• Passive replication (also termed the primary-backup approach). It is a centralized 
technique equivalent to standby sparing. In this technique all inputs are sent to a 
primary replica, which processes them and replies, updating the state of the 
backup replicas. If the primary replica fails, one of the backup replicas assume as 
primary. Passive replication can only be applied in fail-silent nodes.    
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2.7 Software fault tolerance 
Complexity is the root cause of software faults in computer systems [81, 111]. 
Software fault tolerance is needed because of our inability to produce error-free 
software. Fault tolerance can be applied to different software layers and software 
elements, such as at the operating system level, the application level, the process 
level, object level and function/method level.  
Software fault tolerance can be divided in two groups: single version or multiple 
version software techniques. Single version techniques aim to tolerate software faults 
with a single software implementation, or version. To accomplish this, single version 
software can use rollback and rollforward techniques, as well as time and information 
redundancy. Examples of single versions techniques include error detection, 
checkpoint and restart, exception handling, and input data re-expression. Although 
single version techniques such as exception handling cannot fully recover from errors, 
they can be used to produce fail-controlled systems. 
 In contrast, with multiple version techniques, two or more software versions are 
executed sequentially or concurrently. These versions are created using some kind of 
design diversity, such as different programming teams or different algorithms, in 
order to avoid design faults. Several strategies have been proposed to implement fault 
tolerance with multiple version software, although most of them use the same 
architectural principles used in hardware fault tolerance.   
Multiple version software is in general very expensive, but it has been used in 
safe-critical systems such as flight control systems, e.g. Airbus A340 [25], transport 
systems, e.g. Elektra Railway Signaling System [58], and space systems, e.g. NASA 
Space Shuttle [104]. The degree of design diversity utilization is variable. Full diverse 
software may use even different specifications for each software team, while in the 
other extreme diversity may be implemented by a single programmer, using different 
algorithms for each software version. 
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2.8 Fault tolerance strategies 
This section presents several fault tolerance strategies, both for hardware and 
software fault tolerance. A fault tolerance strategy, also termed technique or scheme, 
is usually a pattern for fault tolerance implementation, using a set of error detection, 
error handling, fault handling, redundancy and diversity mechanisms.  
2.8.1 Checkpoint and Restart 
The application of the Checkpoint and Restart technique started with computers in 
the late 1950´s [50]. As the reliability and availability of these systems were very low, 
it was common to save the state of a task in stable storage to avoid losing all the work 
after a system failure.  
Checkpoint and Restart is a strategy based on backward recovery [93]. After 
detecting an error, a system or component tries to reach a previous error-free state and 
then restarts processing again. Checkpointing can be taken periodically or at 
previously determined points as, for instance, before executing some operation. 
The application of Checkpoint and Restart is effective against transient hardware 
faults and elusive software faults because they probably will not be activated in a 
second execution under a slightly different context. Randell [98] states the following 
about the use of checkpointing mechanisms: “fault tolerance does not necessarily 
require diagnosing the cause of the fault, or even deciding whether it arises from the 
hardware or the software.” 
A checkpoint can be saved in memory or in stable storage, and is generally 
discarded after the next checkpoint is executed. Other mechanisms of recovery points 
include recovery cache and audit trail. In the recovery cache mechanism, only states 
that will be changed are saved. In contrast, in the audit trail mechanisms, all state 
changes are saved. 
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2.8.2 Recovery Blocks 
The Recovery Blocks (RB) strategy [55, 98] is an extension of the Checkpoint 
and Restart strategy for multiple version software. In this technique, two or more 
software variants are implemented. The main software variant, also called primary 
alternate, is executed first and then an acceptance test (AT) is performed. The AT is 
an application-dependent error detection mechanism, such as a reasonableness check.  
If the acceptance test detects an error, alternate versions are executed sequentially 
until one of them is successful. If all variants fail, the recovery block strategy ends in 
a failure condition, and the error must be treated using forward recovery.  
The general implementation of Recovery Blocks is shown in Figure 2.5. A 
checkpoint or other kind of recovery point is taken before starting the execution of 
alternates. After executing an alternate, an acceptance test is run and, in case of 
success, the checkpoint is discarded and the recovery block ends normally. If 
otherwise the acceptance test fails, the checkpoint is restored and a new alternate is 
executed, unless no alternates are available, which represents a failure. 
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Figure 2.5: RB execution. 
Recovery Blocks may optionally use watchdog timers for establishing deadlines 
for the variants execution, as a way to detect an anormal behavior, such as infinite 
loops.  A watchdog timer may be configured with the worst case execution time of the 
alternate, before its execution. The watchdog timer activation acts as an exception 
signal to the execution control of the recovery blocks strategy. 
Typically, for primary alternate it is selected the more effective software version. 
For the second or further alternate versions, a degraded functionality may be 
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provided, as the primary version is expected to run correctly in future activations. The 
degree of diversity in recovery blocks is restricted to different algorithms because 
each alternate is implemented as a function or class method.  
The Recovery Blocks construct can be nested. This means that inside one 
alternate it should be possible to start another RB, and so several levels of recovery 
block could be running at the same time.  However, this feature demands a more 
complex checkpoint and control implementation.  
Most implementations of Recovery Blocks try to make the recovery point 
mechanism automatic, as for instance using recovery caches, either in hardware or 
software. Recovery caches save only global data accessed by alternates. However, in 
order to restore the previous state after an error has been detected by the acceptance 
test, all the operations taken by the software alternated have to be reverted. If an input 
or output has occurred after the last checkpoint, as for instance, by sending or 
receiving a message, this operation has to be reverted. Therefore, the implementation 
of recovery blocks in concurrent systems must take in account the coordination 
between recovery points in different processes or nodes to prevent system 
inconsistencies and the domino effect [98]. 
The acceptance test is unique for all alternates and it does not include any fault 
tolerance. Consequently it must be simple, effective and free from design faults. 
Besides, a complex acceptance test can introduce too much runtime overhead.  
An experiment using the RB strategy in a Naval Command and Control System 
showed a failure coverage of over 70% [97]. The cost of the fault-tolerant software 
was 60% greater than the original software cost, and the system presented a 40% 
runtime overhead. These apparent high costs were considered acceptable in face of the 
improvement in system reliability.  
2.8.3 Distributed Recovery Blocks 
The Recovery Blocks strategy does not establish any procedure for execution in 
distributed environments. The Distributed Recovery Blocks (DRB) strategy [64] 
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combines the Recovery Blocks concept with distributed processing in dual nodes to 
provide additional fault tolerance for permanent hardware faults.  
Figure 2.6 shows a block diagram of a DRB computing station. This scheme uses 
two computing nodes, two software variants (try blocks), and a common acceptance 
test. One of the nodes works as a primary node and the other as a shadow node.  
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Figure 2.6: DRB execution. 
In normal operation, only the primary node sends outputs to other computing 
stations. The nodes act in a two-phase mechanism. In the first phase, an input is 
selected for running, and in the second phase, an output is produced. The DRB 
operation is executed as follows. After an input selection, the two nodes start running 
different try blocks: the primary node runs try block A, while the shadow node runs 
try block B. After executing each try block, an acceptance test is performed. If the 
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primary node succeeds in try block A, it sends a message to the shadow node 
notifying its success and then outputs its results to the next computing station. 
However, if the primary node fails and the shadow node passes its test, the shadow 
node assumes the role of primary and sends its results. If both the primary and the 
shadow fail in the first try block, they try to execute the remaining try block. A correct 
execution of the second try block (A) in the shadow node will be a valid output. A 
correct execution of the second try block (B) in the primary node is necessary to keep 
state consistency between the nodes. 
The DRB strategy also depends on a recovery point mechanism as the RB 
strategy does, and can also have watchdogs to control the try blocks execution. A 
failure in keeping the try block deadline is considered a failure in a time acceptance 
test.  
The DRB strategy has the following major useful characteristics [66]:  
• Provides a uniform treatment for hardware and software faults.  
• The recovery time is reduced because concurrency is exploited between the 
primary and the shadow nodes. However, the timeout for failure detection of the 
primary node can affect this recovery time.  
•  In normal operation (no errors), the increase in processing time for the primary 
node is minimal because it does not have to wait for any message from the 
shadow node, although it has to send the AT success notification to the shadow 
node. 
• It is cost effective because only two software variants are needed and the second 
version can be simpler and provide a degraded functionality.  
The drawbacks of DRB are related to node coordination. First, it needs some 
mechanism for ensuring input data consistency, otherwise the two nodes will work in 
different computations and their state will become inconsistent. Second, it requires the 
communication of acceptance test results between the primary and the shadow node. 
A delay in receiving this result would make the shadow node change its role to 
primary, presuming it has failed. If that was not the case, both nodes would send their 
results and two primaries nodes would be active. Finally, a mechanism for detecting 
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role inconsistencies between nodes is required to avoid two primaries or two shadows 
at the same time (e.g. when both nodes fail in the try blocks).  
The DRB strategy assumes that the communication network is reliable [66].  Fault 
values messages are negligible by incorporating error correcting schemes. However, 
acknowledge messages by successor computing stations may be required to assure 
reliable communication. 
Some extensions to the DRB strategy have been proposed. The Extended 
Distributed Recovery Block (EDRB) [51] includes a supervisor station for confirming 
node crashes and misjudgments by DRB nodes about their partners. It also defines 
two networks: one for supervision and the other for working nodes communication.  
An approach for extending the DRB strategy for using more than two nodes and 
more than two try blocks is described in [65]. This approach is called Recursive 
Shadowing [66] because each additional shadow node interfaces with the previous 
DRB station which is considered as a primary for the new configuration. 
A Pair of Self-checking Processing Nodes (PSP) [70] consists of an 
implementation of a DRB station using only one software version.  It combines the 
application of the Checkpoint and Restart strategy with two self-checking units. This 
configuration does not tolerate solid software faults. 
2.8.4 N-Version Programming 
The N-Version Programming (NVP) strategy [27] combines the use of software 
design diversity with the compensation technique. It is equivalent to static redundancy 
(e.g. TMR) in hardware software tolerance. In NVP, two or more functionally 
equivalent programs are executed either concurrently or sequentially and their outputs 
are compared by a decision mechanism implemented by software. If only two 
versions are used, the comparison of results is called matching, and can only detect 
errors. If more than two versions are used, the comparison of results is called voting, 
and errors can be detected and corrected by masking.  
NVP includes a methodology for developing software versions with a high level 
of diversity, based on a common specification that should include all necessary 
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information for independent software teams [19]. It recommends the utilization of 
different algorithms, programming languages and compilers. The level of NVP 
application can be the entire program or single modules or functions. 
The decision mechanism is the most critical element of the NVP strategy, as only 
a single version is provided. Differently from the exact voters used in hardware, NVP 
voters often must deal with inexact values, generated by different algorithms and 
programming languages. Besides, the voter design is application-specific, similarly to 
the acceptance test in Recovery Blocks. Several types of voters exist as majority, 
mean, consensus and dynamic voters [94]. 
In comparison with Distributed Recovery Blocks, concurrent NVP has the 
advantage of not requiring checkpoint mechanisms and the acceptance test. However, 
it demands more hardware and software versions for tolerating the same number of 
faults. 
2.9 Fault-tolerant communication 
A distributed fault-tolerant system depends heavily in fault-tolerant 
communications. Fault tolerance strategies have to rely on network facilities to deliver 
inputs and outputs to and from software variants, and to allow the coordination in 
strategy execution. Furthermore, for systems with global state, missing an input 
message will lead to state inconsistency among distributed variants.       
 In order to obtain a fault-tolerant communication system, the following methods 
are used [117]: 
• Spatial masking – sending the same message by multiple links. 
• Temporal masking – sending the same message multiple times. 
• Detection/recovery – using acknowledgements, timeouts and retransmissions. 
The detection/recovery method may use positive or negative acknowledgements. 
In the positive acknowledgement method, if a receiver does not send an 
acknowledgment after a timeout, the message is retransmitted. This may be repeated 
for a fixed number of times. In the negative acknowledgement method, the receiver is 
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responsible to detect that a message was lost (or is corrupted) and to ask for 
retransmisson. This may be implemented by using sequence numbers, or by using a 
time-triggered technique. 
Multicast message transmission can use broadcast/multicast network facilities, or 
even point-to-point messages, where the same message is sent individually to all 
recipients. In that context and regarding sender resilience, multicast can be classified 
as [117]:  
• Unreliable multicast: no effort is made to overcome link failures. 
• Best-effort multicast: the sender makes some effort to deliver the message, such 
as performing retransmissions, but if the sender fails before delivering the 
message to all recipients no reliability can be guaranteed.  
• Reliable multicast: the participants coordinate to ensure that the message is 
delivered to all recipients, as long as it is delivered to at least one recipient.  
Even using broadcast/multicast network facilities, the sender may fail before the 
message is correctly received by all receivers. Possible reasons are electric noise or 
the lack of buffering space at the receiving node [61]. However, the implementation 
of reliable multicast involves several rounds of communication and large use of 
buffering, in order to guarantee atomicity in worst case scenarios. This high latency 
makes this method unsuitable for hard real-time systems. Therefore, many real time 
architectures use the best-effort approach, such as the Time-triggered Protocol (TTP) 
[71] and the Time-triggered Message-triggered Object Support Middleware 
(TMOSM) [70].   
Besides reliable communication, some distributed fault tolerance strategies such 
as DRB and NVP also demand input data consistency. Some communication systems 
are able to guarantee the delivery of messages in the same order for all receivers. If 
that is not the case, the fault tolerance strategy must include a mechanism for input 
synchronization. 
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2.10 Fault tolerance software structures 
In order to reduce the complexity of the fault-tolerant software and promote 
software reuse, several object-oriented patterns and frameworks have been proposed. 
These software structures generally translate fault tolerance concepts as variants and 
decision algorithms (also called abjudicators) into abstract classes that define 
interfaces for the implementation of fault tolerance techniques. A common approach 
is to separate the fault tolerance functionality from the application software, making it 
reusable. Additionally, the applications program becomes a user of the fault tolerance 
software, reducing system complexity. 
Xu, Randel, Rubira-Calsavara and Stroud [119] proposed an object-oriented 
structure for dealing with software fault tolerance. They suggested the application of 
idealized components with diverse design using classes to implement the control 
algorithm, the software variants and the abjudicator, as shown in the example of 
Figure 2.7.  
Controller
- pa:  Abjudicator *
- pv1:  Variant *
- pv2:  Variant *
- pv_n:  Variant *
+ recoveryBlocks(Abjudicator *, Variant **, ...) : status
+ nVersionProgramming(...) : status
Abjudicator Variant
Voter AT Variant1 Variant2 Variant_n
1*1
1
 
Figure 2.7: Xu,Randell, Rubira-Calsavara and Stroud´s framework example. 
Each fault tolerance technique is implemented by a method of the Controller 
class, using one Abjudicator and several Variant objects passed as arguments by the 
application program. In this architecture, the inclusion of a new fault tolerance 
strategy demands the addition of a new method to the Controller class. There is no 
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definition on how input data is passed for the variants and how the results are 
returned, but a general solution must be adopted, otherwise the Controller class would 
not be reusable.  Specialized abjudicators can be defined by deriving the Voter and 
AT classes.  
Variant classes can achieve design diversity by using diverse algorithms and 
internal data structures. This is termed class-level design redundancy. However, some 
mechanism must be provided for maintaining state consistency among Variant objects 
if they maintain their state between activations. Less general solutions to variant 
diversity include object-level design redundancy, in which variant objects belong to 
the same class but are initialized with slightly different data, and operation-level 
design redundancy, in which variant classes have diverse implementation algorithms 
but no class data.  
Tso, Shroki, Tai and Dziegiel [115] developed and implemented a framework of 
software tolerance components. Figure 2.8 shows the class diagram for their 
implementation of the Recovery Blocks technique.   
RBscheme
Executive
TryBlock
CheckPointMechanism
AcceptanceTest
SingleProcess Concurrent
SRB DRB PTC Conversation
Primary Alternate
CheckPoint RecoveryCache AuditTrail
Timing Reasonable
 
Figure 2.8: Tso, Shokri, Tai and Dziegiel´s class diagram for the RB technique. 
The RBscheme class is responsible for implementing the Recovery Blocks 
technique. It delegates the control algorithm to an Executive object, which is 
specialized by inheritance to cover several execution schemes, using single and 
concurrent processes. Primary and alternate variants are implemented as classes 
derived from the TryBlock class. Acceptance tests algorithms are defined by classes 
that inherit from the AcceptanceTest class. Checkpointing mechanisms, as recovery 
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caches and audit trails, are implemented by classes derived from the 
CheckPointMechanism class.  
The main drawback of this framework, comparing to Xu et al. framework, is the 
definition of a different class structure for each fault tolerance scheme. For instance, 
voter classes are added for NVP and data re-expression classes are added for data 
diversity techniques, such as Retry Block and N-Copy Programming [11].  
Daniels, Kim and Vouk [35] proposed the Reliable Hybrid pattern, which targets 
the design of fault tolerance applications. The focus of this pattern is on the decision 
mechanism, which can combine acceptance tests and voters in hybrid strategies, such 
as Concensus Recovery Blocks [102] and Acceptance Voting [18].  Figure 2.9 
presents the Reliable Hybrid pattern structure. 
Master
+ request()
Version
+ request()
Abjudicator
+ getResult()
Version1
+ request()
Version2
+ request()
Version_n
+ request()
Voter
+ getResult()
- vote()
AT
+ getResult()
- accTest()
Hybrid
+ getResult()
VoterImplem1
+ getResult()
- vote()
VoterImplem2
+ getResult()
- vote()
ATImplem1
+ getResult()
- accTest()
ATImplem2
+ getResult()
- accTest()
 
Figure 2.9: Reliable Hybrid pattern class diagram. 
The Reliable Hybrid pattern has a class diagram that is similar to Xu et al. 
framework. The improvement is related to the abjudicator, which includes the Hybrid 
class and implements the Composite pattern [47]. The Master class has a single 
association with one Abjudicator object, which may be a Voter, an AT or a Hybrid 
object. The Hybrid class possesses a list of Abjudicator objects (Voters, AT objects 
and other Hybrid objects) and its getResult method calls each Abjudicator object 
sequentially until a successful result is obtained.  
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In this pattern, the fault tolerance strategy is performed by the Master class, which 
calls the several Version objects and sends their results to the Abjudicator object. 
However, no specific mechanism is devised to change the control algorithm. 
Xu and Randell improved their previous framework and published it as the 
Generic Software Fault Tolerance (GSFT) pattern [121]. This pattern class diagram is 
shown in Figure 2.10.   
ExternalInterface
+ request()
FTObject
+ request()
GenericFTinterface
+ request()
FTController
NVPRB Other
Variant
+ request()
Variant1
+ request()
Variant2
+ request()
Variant_n
+ request()
Abjudicator
+ getResult()
Voter
+ getResult()
AT
+ getResult()
Combined
+ getResult()
 
Figure 2.10: The Generic Software Fault Tolerance pattern class diagram. 
A fault-tolerant class (FTObject) must implement ExternalInterface to conform to 
the interface characteristics of an idealized component. The FTObject class passes the 
user requests to the GenericFTInterface class, which actually executes the fault- 
tolerant processing, using FTController subclasses to implement the control 
algorithm. The abjudicator is implemented similarly to the Reliable Hybrid Pattern, 
including a Combined class that behaves as the Hybrid class in that pattern. The main 
difference of this pattern to the original framework proposed by the authors is the 
inclusion of the FTController hierarchy that implements the control algorithm by 
applying the Strategy pattern [47], similarly to the Tso et al. framework (Figure 2.8). 
The GSFT pattern is, to our knowledge, the most comprehensive framework for 
fault tolerance ever presented. However, it leaves undefined many issues. One is 
regarding data passing between variants, abjudicators and the user application. 
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Another issue is how to implement this pattern using processes or threads as units of 
fault tolerance. In Chapter 5 we propose a fault tolerance framework that addresses 
these issues.  
2.11 Fault tolerance application support 
Fault tolerance can be supported at different software layers, such as the operating 
system, the middleware and the application level. This section presents the related 
work in support fault tolerance at the application level. 
2.11.1 FT-RT-Mach and DEOS 
The FT-RT-Mach project of the FORTS group at University of Pittsburgh [44]  
consisted of the implementation of fault tolerance support for the RT-Mach, an 
operating system developed by the Carnegie Mellon University [110]. The project 
purpose is to tolerate transient faults by thread re-execution in case of error detection 
without modifying the original Rate Monotonic Scheduling (RMS) of periodic 
threads, using the Fault-Tolerant RMS (FTRMS) algorithm [40].  The algorithm 
affects the thread admission control of real-time periodic threads, as it takes into 
account the time needed for thread recovery [37]. A thread in FT-RT-Mach has its 
context information cleared at the end of each execution.  A fault flag is provided for 
each thread and it can be set by exception handlers or by application threads. This flag 
is tested at the end of each thread execution and may trigger error recovery 
mechanisms, such as Checkpoint and Restart or Recovery Blocks. Checkpointing in 
FT-RT-Mach is not provided by the operating system; therefore, it must be 
implemented by the application threads.  
The same mechanisms used in FT-RT-Mach were applied in the DEOS operating 
system, a commercial avionics operating system developed by Honeywell [37]. The 
FTRMS algorithm and the fault tolerance support were adapted to this operating 
system, which presents several differences in relation to FT-RT-Mach.  Threads in 
DEOS never have their context information cleared, and they usually run in an infinite 
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loop, calling a function to suspend itself after each execution. Additionally, periodic 
threads must be harmonic. Two periodic threads are harmonic if the larger period is an 
integer multiple of the smaller. The checkpoint mechanism is performed by the 
operating system, by defining and managing a backup state memory for each thread. 
However, in order to reduce the time and memory overhead, the application 
programmer has to define the set of variables that are considered as state information. 
Only those variables are saved by the operating system.  
2.11.2 Delta-4 
The Delta-4 [21, 92] was a collaborative project developed by a multinational 
team of companies and academic researchers. It started in 1986 and terminated in 
1992, aiming the definition of dependable distributed system architecture for real-time 
systems areas, such as computer integration manufacture. The system is meant to be 
used on local area networks communicating by message-passing between nodes. The 
architecture separates each node into a host computer and communication hardware 
called Network Attachment Controller (NAC). NACs use built-in hardware self-
checking to be fail-silent and are capable of reliable multi-point communication using 
an atomic multicast protocol. This protocol, implemented at the data-link layer of the 
Open System Interconnection (OSI) model, guarantees atomicity and ordering to all 
messages. As messages can be lost, it uses a message retry mechanism that tolerates a 
pre-defined number of successive omission failures. Replicas are application objects 
(processes) that can communicate using synchronous (equivalent to Remote 
Procedure Call - RPC) or asynchronous messages.  
Delta-4 supports the following fault-tolerant strategies: 
a) For hardware fault tolerance: 
• Active replication. 
• Passive replication. 
• Semi-active replication. 
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b) For software fault tolerance: 
• Recovery Blocks. 
• N-Version Programming. 
In the implementation of active replication, a system supplied voting mechanism 
may be used to compare message signatures and select the correct output. In NVP, the 
voting algorithm is application-dependent, as different software versions can find 
different correct answers.  
The system has mechanisms for cloning a new replica in order to replace a failed 
one. The cloning mechanism depends on whether the replica is stateless or not. 
Stateless replicas only require a standard initialization while state replicas require 
some form of acquiring the current state from other replicas via a standard interface.   
Unfortunately, the architecture proposed by Delta-4 was not applied in many field 
applications and in research area, probably because it needs a special hardware for the 
NAC.  
2.11.3 TMOSM and ROAFTS 
The DREAM laboratory at University of California - Irvine [38] has been 
working on real-time and fault tolerance computing in object-oriented distributed 
architectures.  Their work is based on the Time-Triggered Message-Triggered Object 
(TMO) structuring scheme, or model, formerly named RTO.k object scheme [67]. In 
this model, a real time object has both time-triggered methods, which are activated at 
predefined times and message-triggered methods, which are asynchronous and non-
blocking. Message-triggered methods have lower priority and are not allowed to 
execute if they can interfere with time-triggered methods. For both kinds of methods 
deadlines can be established and monitored.   
The execution of TMO objects is controlled by the TMO Support Middleware 
(TMOSM) [69].  This middleware has been ported to several operating systems as 
Windows NT, Solaris, Windows XP, Windows CE and Linux. The middleware 
requires clock synchronization between nodes and an operating system clock tick 
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service for triggering a top priority thread, called Watchdog Timer and Scheduler 
Thread (WTST). This thread is responsible for scheduling other middleware threads 
and the pool of threads that effectively run the TMO application methods. WTST 
reserves one time slice in three for the exclusive execution of application threads, 
while the other time slices are scheduled for middleware threads. For instance, in the 
Windows NT implementation described in [69], the time slice is set to 3 ms and, 
therefore, an application thread is scheduled to run freely for 3 ms in a 9 ms cycle. 
This mechanism is designed to reserve a minimum amount of CPU utilization for 
application threads. Additionally, unused time periods attributed to middleware 
threads are spent by application and operating system threads. In a defense prototype 
case study it was observed that deadlines of 20 ms were met for about 99.9 % of time. 
The failure in accomplishing the deadlines is reputed to overheads introduced by 
operating system threads that could not be disabled. 
Communication between TMO objects uses the concept of Data Field Channels 
that are logical multicast channels based on some ID, called content code. It supports 
two types of messages: state messages and event messages. State messages carry 
information to be stored at fixed memory locations and messages can overwrite data 
before being read by some process. Event based messages are normal messages that 
are stored in a buffer after being received.  
Fault tolerance was introduced by means of the Primary-Shadow RTO.k 
replication (PSRR) scheme [67], which executes TMO objects replicas using the DRB 
or PSP fault tolerance techniques.  In this scheme, the shadow node is supposed to 
receive several messages from the primary node, such as the acceptant test result and 
an output success confirmation. The PSRR scheme has later evolved to implement 
adaptive fault tolerance by means of the Real-Time Object-Oriented Adaptive Fault 
Tolerance Support (ROAFTS) middleware [68], which is able to switch between three 
basic modes: DRB/PSP (or parallel redundant mode), RB (or sequential backward 
recovery mode) and exception handling (or sequential forward recovery mode). The 
decision about changing FT modes is based on equipment availability, criticality and 
recovery time. The middleware configuration includes network surveillance and 
reconfiguration services in order to detect and confirm failures in working nodes. 
ROAFTS has been ported to the Solaris operating system and CORBA, using 100 ms 
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as time slice and satisfying deadlines from 40 to 100 ms [103].  The development of 
ROAFTS is still in early phases and no implementation is publicly available as occurs 
with the TMOSM [38]. 
2.11.4 Adaptive Fault Tolerance for Spacecraft 
Adaptive Fault Tolerance (AFT) for Spacecraft [52] is a middleware designed for 
space applications which can change the application fault tolerance configuration 
based on the mission phase, the failure history and the environment. It aims to cover 
hardware physical faults, rare conditions in software and unusual environment effects. 
It is based on a dual redundant system architecture which runs atop the VxWorks 
operating system. Tasks in this system are classified into critical and non-critical, 
periodic and aperiodic. The objective of the adaptive fault tolerance mechanism is to 
match redundancy and resource consumption with the mission phases and reliability 
requirements. The system runs in one of 8 possible modes, differing in node processor 
speeds and in the responsibilities of critical and non-critical tasks execution. Some 
modes involve replication of critical tasks only, others the replication of all tasks, and 
others no replication at all. For non-replication modes, transient faults can be detected 
and tolerated by using acceptance tests and backward recovery mechanisms. 
Replicated nodes use DRB or a Primary/Backup architecture using active replication. 
Non-replicated modes use exception handling and Recovery Blocks. 
The communication between nodes uses TCP or UDP socket primitives. 
Messages can be sent to logical channels and multicast. Each task can join or leave a 
channel dynamically. Both reliable and unreliable communications are provided. For 
reliable logical channels, the delivery mechanism is based on the concept of negative 
acknowledgement. Additionally, period cross-check messages circulate among the 
replicated processes to ensure that any broadcast or multicast message has not been 
lost. 
In redundant strategies, the middleware is responsible for checking the heartbeat 
of both replicas and to ensure that they have a consistent state. The replicated data 
management maintains consistent (synchronized) state data among replicated objects 
using several strategies such as processing input with uniformity (state updates 
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associated to incoming messages are made to all processes before a response is 
generated), processing without uniformity (a response is generated without ensuring 
that all processes have updated their state data) and periodic update (state update is 
sent by the primary process on a periodic basis). 
The middleware has a node state restoration service to restart a failed node or 
shutdown node and provide the startup configuration. State restoration can be 
performed as a single event or incrementally. The system does not need clock 
synchronization between computers. 
2.11.5 Fault Tolerant CORBA 
The Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA) is a remote method 
invocation based middleware defined by the Object Management Group (OMG) [90]. 
It offers transparency in relation to objects location and programming language in 
which they are implemented, and hides operating systems, platforms, networks and 
protocols details from application programs. The Fault Tolerant CORBA (FT-
CORBA) specification [88] is part of the formal CORBA architecture that aims to 
provide fault tolerance support for applications that require high level of 
dependability. The fault tolerance mechanisms provided by FT-CORBA are based on 
entity redundancy, or the replication of CORBA objects. Besides, the specification 
defines mechanisms for error detection and recovery. The following replication styles 
are supported in FT-CORBA: 
• Stateless: the replicated objects maintain no state data and therefore no state 
consistency mechanism is performed. 
• Cold Passive Replication: only the primary replica responds to client requests. If 
the primary fails, then backup replica is selected and the state of the failed 
primary is loaded from a logging system.  
• Warm Passive Replication: similar to Cold Passive Replication, but the state of 
the primary is transferred periodically to the backup replicas during normal 
operation. This type of recovery provides faster recovery than Cold Passive 
Replication. 
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• Active Replication: all replicas execute the request simultaneously but only one 
reply is sent to the client. Duplicate messages are discarded automatically by the 
infrastructure. This mechanism provides faster recovery from failures, but 
requires replica determinism and total order message delivery to maintain state 
consistency among replicas. 
• Active Replication with Voting: this is a planned extension to the existing 
specification and adds a mechanism of exact majority voting before sending a 
reply to the client.   
The present FT-CORBA specification provides only fault tolerance to crash 
failures. Faulty objects are supposed to stop working without generating incorrect 
results. The fault detection mechanisms supported by FT-CORBA are based in 
heartbeats and timeouts only. The implementation of FT-CORBA requires the 
utilization of objects working as Replication Managers, Fault Detectors and Fault 
Notifiers. The creation and management of objects and object groups can be 
implemented by the FT-CORBA infrastructure or by the application program. 
The application of FT-CORBA in real-time system is limited because it can spend 
an unpredictable amount of time detecting faults and recovering from them [48]. In 
Passive Replication the recovery time needed to switch to a backup replica can be 
unacceptable for a real-time application and when using Active Replication too much 
time can be spent providing totally ordered reliable multicast. The Real-Time 
CORBA specification [89] targets systems with real time requirements, but this 
specification is not compatible with FT-CORBA [48, 85]. 
Several projects aimed the implementation of fault tolerance in CORBA, such as 
Aqua [99], DOORS [86] and MEAD [85].  
2.12 Summary 
Fault tolerance is a means of achieving high dependability for critical, long life 
and high-availability systems. Despite the efforts to prevent and remove faults in 
systems development, the application of fault tolerance is usually required because the 
hardware may fail during system operation and the software is rarely fault free.  
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The implementation of fault tolerance involves the application of error detection 
and system recovery. System recovery aims to eliminate the error from the system 
state, and additionally may diagnose the fault and preventing it from being activated 
again. Fault tolerance implementation depends on redundancy, the utilization of 
additional resources, and in design diversity in order to tolerate design faults. 
Several fault tolerance techniques have been described, both for hardware and 
software fault tolerance, using single or multiple version software. The emphasis was 
to present FT strategies that are applied in this work, such as RB, DRB and NVP. 
Fault-tolerant communication concepts have also been introduced.  
 The related work regarding software structures for fault tolerance have been 
presented. This includes frameworks and design patterns proposed by the research 
community in order to reduce the complexity of the fault-tolerant software and 
promote software reuse.  
Finally, the related work regarding application-level fault tolerance support has 
been presented. Some works introduce fault tolerance support by the operating 
system, e.g., FT-RT-Mach, while others by the middleware, such as ROAFTS and 
FT-CORBA.    
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Chapter 3 
Aspect-Oriented Programming 
 
 
 
 
 
Aspect-Oriented Programming (AOP) is a new programming technique 
that targets the modularization of crosscutting concerns. This chapter 
introduces the main concepts related to AOP, describes the AspectC++ 
language extension and presents the related work regarding the application 
of AOP in operating systems, middleware and fault-tolerant systems. 
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3.1 Separation of concerns 
Separation of concerns is a concept that has been applied in software engineering 
for a long time [36, 91] and involves the division of the software application in 
smaller functionalities or concerns. Separation of concerns leads to the development 
of systems in modules that could be developed largely independently from each other, 
reducing the system complexity and improving its reusability. The usage of 
procedural programming is the initial step into separation of concerns. Later, the 
concept of information hiding was introduced and contributed to Object-Oriented 
Programming (OOP) as a new mechanism of separation of concerns. 
The lack of separation of concerns in a system can be detected by inspecting its 
source code and looking for the existence of code tangling and code scattering. Code 
tangling happens when a module handles multiple concerns. For instance, the same 
source code can be dealing with business logic, persistence and distribution concerns. 
Code scattering happens when a concern implementation is spread in multiple 
modules. Figure 3.1 shows examples of code tangling and code scattering. 
 
Distribution
Persistence
Business logic
Distribution
Persistence
Business logic
Business logic
Distribution
Distribution
Distribution
(a) tangling (b) scattering  
Figure 3.1: Code tangling and code scattering. 
Some concerns are very hard to separate from others. The implementation of 
these concerns is often tangled with other concerns and is scattered throughout the 
code. Therefore, they are called crosscutting concerns. Examples of crosscutting 
concerns are distribution, fault tolerance, and security. Crosscutting concerns are also 
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called non-functional, as opposed to the functional concerns that implement the 
system’s main functionality.  
New mechanisms to provide advanced separation of concerns have been 
proposed. The work in [56] identifies and analyses some mechanisms for 
modularizing crosscutting concerns, such as Meta-level Programming [77] and 
Composition Filters [8].  
3.1.1 Meta-level Programming 
Meta-level Programming is based on meta-object protocols (MOP), which enable 
the modification of the language semantics and implementation. Meta-object 
protocols are the interface between the base-level program and the meta-model 
program. By intercepting the activation of methods in the base-level program, meta-
objects have the opportunity to execute other concerns. However, there is no special 
mechanism to separate crosscutting concerns from each other. An example of MOP 
for the C++ programming language is OpenC++ [28]. In OpenC++, the complete 
syntax tree is visible on the meta-level and arbitrary transformations are supported.  
The work in [120] evaluated OpenC++ to implement software fault tolerance 
techniques, such as RB and NVP, in a distributed sorting application. They concluded 
that the meta-object approach provides a cleaner and simpler interface to applications 
comparing with standard object-oriented implementations. Moreover, they measured a 
runtime overhead factor of about two between calling an OpenC++ operation and 
calling a C++ operation, but this overhead was considered small in comparison with 
the overhead imposed by the fault tolerance mechanism. 
3.1.2 Composition Filters 
Composition Filters extend object-oriented programming by adding filter classes. 
Messages between objects are processed by filters both before and after the normal 
method execution. More than one filter may be applied to a single message. 
Separation of concerns is achieved by defining a filter class for each crosscutting 
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concern. No research work concerning the application of Composition Filters to fault 
tolerance has been reported yet. The TRESE group at the University of Twente [114] 
has available implementations of Composition filters for C# and Java.  
3.1.3 Aspect-Oriented Programming 
Aspect-Oriented Programming is a programming technique proposed in [62].  In 
AOP, components are defined as properties of a system, for which the implementation 
can be cleanly encapsulated. In contrast, aspects are properties for which the 
implementation cannot be cleanly encapsulated in a generalized procedure. Aspects 
and components crosscut each other in the implementation of a system. The goal of 
AOP is to support the programmer in cleanly separating components and aspects from 
each other, by providing mechanisms that make it possible to abstract and compose 
them to produce the overall system. 
The process of composing components and aspects is performed by the aspect 
weaver. Essential to the weaver operation is the concept of join points, which are the 
elements of the components’ static structure or dynamic behavior that aspect 
programs are able to coordinate with. Join points can be method calls, variable 
accesses or any other point in the execution of a program where additional behavior 
can be attached. The kind of join points allowed for a given AOP implementation 
defines its join point model. The behavior introduced in a join point is named advice. 
A pointcut defines a set of join points. 
A difference between AOP and other separation of concern approaches is the 
definition of different abstraction and composition mechanisms for components and 
aspects [62]. The work in [42] proposes that the distinguishing properties of AOP are 
quantification and obliviousness. Quantification is the capacity of writing unitary 
and separate statements that have effect in many non-local places in a programming 
system. A quantification mechanism allows reaching several join points of the code 
with one declarative statement. Obliviousness means that the component code does 
not need to be prepared or aware of the additional behavior introduced by aspects. 
Therefore, programmers in the components side (or base code) do not have to expend 
any additional efforts to make the AOP mechanisms work.  
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Another definition of AOP was presented in [42]: 
“In program P, whenever condition C arises, perform action A”. 
In this definition, the program P represents the base component code. The 
condition C is defined by a pointcut in the aspect code, and the action A is the advice 
executed at the join points. The condition defined by C can be evaluated at compile-
time based on the static structure of the base code (e.g. method execution) or at 
runtime, based on the dynamic behavior of the program (e.g. calls to method X in the 
execution context of method Y). A single aspect usually defines a set of pairs (C, A).  
Most criticism against AOP is related to the obliviousness property. The base 
code can evolve and the original join points used by aspects can be modified. So, 
aspects can miss the desired join points or capture undesired join points. This problem 
has been called the AOSD (Aspect-Oriented Software Development) Evolution 
Paradox [112]. The inexistency of an explicit interface between the base code and the 
aspect code compromises the independent evolvability of the base code. On the other 
hand, the use of explicit interfaces in the base code (e.g. annotations) reintroduces the 
scattering that AOP was supposed to avoid [107]. Despite this and other drawbacks 
[34, 84], the acceptance of AOP by the researchers from academia and industry is 
high, possibly because AOP is very powerful and can solve real problems related to 
crosscutting concerns.  
The same team that proposed AOP has developed its first and most popular 
implementation to date: AspectJ [17]. The two existing implementations of AOP for 
C++ are AspectC++ [16] and XWeaver [122]. The AspectC++ implementation was 
applied in this work, and it will be described in the next section. 
3.2 AspectC++ 
AspectC++ is a general-purpose aspect-oriented language extension to C++ [16] 
[106]. It has been strongly influenced by the AspectJ language model, but supports 
additional concepts that are unique to the C++ domain. A primary design goal of 
AspectC++ was to keep the low runtime overhead of the C++ programming language, 
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aiming its application in resource-constrained environments such as embedded 
systems. 
3.2.1 Weaving 
The AspectC++ weaver composes the C++ base code and the aspect code in a 
source-to-source transformation, as shown in Figure 3.2. After the weaving process, 
the resulting source code can be compiled by any C++ compiler.  
 
Base code Aspects
AspectC++ 
weaving
Transformed 
source 
code
Compilation 
& linking
Executable 
code
 
Figure 3.2: AspectC++ weaving process. 
 Two weaving modes are available: Whole Program Transformation (WPT) and 
Single Translation Unit (STU). WPT transforms all files (header files and translation 
units) in the project directory tree and saves them in a new directory tree. The aspect 
code, normally using the “.ah” file extension, is also transformed and saved in the new 
directory tree. In the STU mode, the weaver transforms one file at a time, making 
easier to integrate the weaver with makefiles and Integrated Development 
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Environments (IDE). In this mode, all header files directives are expanded and saved 
together with the transformed translation unit.  
3.2.2 Join points, pointcuts and advices 
The following types of advices are supported in AspectC++: 
• Code advices: define a computation that can be executed before, after or around 
(instead of) a given join point. 
• Introductions: define new attributes, methods and parent classes to existing 
classes. 
• Order definitions: establish the order of application among aspects. 
Two types of join points are supported in AspectC++: name join points and code 
join points.  Name join points (or static join points) are named instances in the static 
program structure, such as a class name, function name or namespace. Code join 
points (or dynamic join points) represent events that happen during program 
execution, such as the calling or execution of a function. Code join points result from 
the application of pointcut functions to name join points. Four basic types of code 
join points exist: call, execution, construction and destruction. Call and execution join 
points are related to methods; construction and destructions join points are related to 
classes.  
Figure 3.3 presents a very simple example program using AspectC++ designed to 
debug some method activations in the base code. In this program, the aspect 
DebugClasses contains one pointcut (debug) and one code advice (a before advice). 
The debug pointcut is defined by a pointcut expression that combines an execution 
pointcut function with a call pointcut function using the algebraic “or” operation. The 
execution pointcut function will select the join points related to the execution of all 
methods of ClassA. If for instance this class has three methods, then three join points 
will be selected. The call pointcut function will select the join points related to the 
calling of ClassB methods whose names begin with the “set” string.  If, for instance, 
ClassB has only one method that matches this expression, the number of selected join 
points will depend on how many places this method is called in the entire application 
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code. The before advice defined in DebugClasses will be executed always before the 
selected join points. In this case, the advice code just prints the method signature (e.g. 
“void ClassA::methodA(int,short int)”), provided by AspectC++.  
aspect DebugClasses { 
   
  pointcut debug() = execution(“ClassA”) || 
                     call(“% ClassB::set%(...)”); 
   
  advice debug() : before() { 
    printf(“debug:before %s \n”, JoinPoint::signature() ); 
  } 
}; 
Figure 3.3: AspectC++ program example. 
In addition to the four pointcut function previously discussed, other pointcut 
functions are provided in order to filter or select join points with specific properties.   
A summary of AspectC++ pointcut functions is presented in Table 3.1.º  
Table 3.1: AspectC++ pointcut functions. 
Pointcut function Kind Application 
call(pointcut) function Selects calls to functions described by the 
pointcut parameter. 
execution(pointcut) function Selects functions implementations described by 
the pointcut parameter.  
construction(pointcut) class Selects class construction implementations 
described by the pointcut parameter. 
destructor(pointcut) class Selects class destruction implementations 
described by the pointcut parameter. 
within (pointcut) scope Filters all join points that are within the 
functions or classes in the pointcut. 
cflow(pointcut) ctrl flow Filters all join point inside the dynamic context 
of joint points in the pointcut. 
base(pointcut) type Returns all base classes of classes defined by the 
pointcut. 
derived(pointcut) type Returns all classes in the pointcut and all classes 
derived from them. 
that(type pattern) context Returns all join points where the C++ this 
pointer is related to the type pattern. 
target(type pattern) context Returns all join points where the target object of 
a call is related to the type pattern. 
result(type pattern) context Returns all join points where the result object of 
a call/execution is related to the type pattern. 
args(type pattern,…) context Returns all joint points which match the 
provided argument signature. 
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In Table 3.1 we can see that besides the normal pointcut functions related to 
functions and class construction/destruction, there are others related to scope, 
dynamic control flow, base and derived types and context matching. The type patterns 
defined as parameters of the that, target, result and args pointcut functions can be 
used to convey context information to code advices.  
Like C++ classes, aspects can have data members, constructors and member 
functions, and derive from classes or from other aspects. Pointcuts can be defined as 
virtual or pure virtual, which allows its redefinition in derived aspects. Aspects that 
contain pure virtual member functions or pure virtual named pointcuts are called 
abstract aspects. An aspect that inherits from an abstract aspect and defines all 
pending virtual member functions and virtual pointcuts is called a concrete aspect. 
Aspects can inherit only from ordinary C++ classes and abstract aspects. 
3.2.3 The JoinPoint API 
The aspect weaver creates a unique class for each join point affected by a code 
advice that needs context information.  This class is called the JoinPoint structure or 
JoinPoint API and provides the context information to the code advice, such as 
method parameters types and values, and method return type and value.  It also 
provides context information about calling and target objects, and other useful 
information as the method signature and the number of arguments. For each affected 
join point only the necessary context information is included in the JoinPoint 
structure. This feature is very important to keep a low memory footprint in embedded 
systems. 
If context information is needed, an object of the JoinPoint structure is created in 
each affected join point, and a pointer to this object (the tjp pointer) is passed to an 
inline template function which also receives the JoinPoint structure as a template 
argument (the JoinPoint type).  This inline function will call the real code advice, 
implemented as a template method of a class representing the aspect it belongs. In 
summary, each aspect will be transformed into a C++ class and each code advice 
related to this aspect will be transformed into a template member function. The aspect 
class member functions will be called by code inserted at the affected join points, 
Chapter 3. Aspect-Oriented Programming 
50 
which will pass a pointer to an unique JoinPoint structure carrying the context 
information. Each non-abstract (concrete) aspect results in a singleton object. 
An example of how AspectC++ weaves is shown in Figure 3.4. This figure 
presents how the source code resembles if a before advice is applied at an execution 
join point. The source code was simplified and methods/classes created by AspectC++ 
were renamed and shortened.   
 //----------  base code after weaving 
 
struct TJP_XYZ { 
  //... 
  inline static const char *signature () { 
      return "void ClassA::methodA(int,short int)"; 
  } 
}; 
 
void ClassA::methodA ( int  arg0, short  arg1 ){ 
  TJP_XYZ jp; 
  //... here the jp object is initialized 
   
  AC::invoke_myAspect_ABC<TJP__XYZ> (&jp); 
 
  this->__exec_old_methodA(arg0, arg1); 
} 
 
inline void ClassA::__exec_old_methodA(int aa,short int zz){ 
   // original methodA implementation     
} 
//----------- aspect code after weaving 
 
class myAspect { 
public: 
  static myAspect *aspectof () { 
    static myAspect __instance; 
    return &__instance; 
  } 
 
  template<class JoinPoint> void ADVICE_1(JoinPoint *tjp){ 
     // advice code 
     // here the JoinPoint type and the tjp pointer are seen. 
  } 
}; 
 
namespace AC { 
  template <class JoinPoint> 
  inline void invoke_myAspect_ABC (JoinPoint *tjp) { 
    ::myAspect::aspectof()->ADVICE_1(tjp); 
  } 
} 
Figure 3.4: Example of source code transformation by AspectC++. 
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The upper part of Figure 3.4 presents the base code after weaving. The JoinPoint 
structure TJP_XYP is declared closer to the implementation of the affected method 
(methodA). An object of this type is created inside methodA and its data fields are 
initialized, if any. Then, the before advice is called, using an inline template function 
invoke_myAspect_ABC. After returning from the advice code, the original 
implementation of methodA is called, now renamed by the weaver to 
__exec_old_methodA.  
The aspect code after weaving, shown in the lower part of Figure 3.4, contains the 
definition of the inline template function called by methodA. This function redirects 
the call to ADVICE_1, a template method of the aspect class (myAspect), where the 
advice code is located.  
AspectC++ is not able to advice data member accesses as AspectJ does using the 
get and set pointcut functions. This design decision was made because of the 
possibility of accessing variables with pointers in C++, which cannot be captured as a 
join point by the aspect weaver. However, an extension of AspectC++ described in 
[78] offers this functionality, but without considering pointer accesses.  Another 
unimplemented feature of AspectC++ is template weaving. The weaver is able to 
parse C++ templates but weaving is restricted to non-templated code. However, 
support for template weaving is planned for future versions. 
3.2.4 Performance and memory footprint 
The work in [74] presents a series of micro-benchmarks for the main AspectC++ 
features, based on consumed CPU time (clock cycles), and memory (code/data and 
stack), in a Pentium 3 computer using the GNU g++ 3.3.5 compiler. The work in 
[106] extends the same experiment for the Intel C++ compiler icc 9.0. The results 
show that code advices (before, after or around) applied to parameterless functions 
have a very small runtime overhead (only 2 cycles) and no extra memory 
consumption. Considering functions with parameters and the application of the 
JointPoint pointer (tjp), there is an increase in stack consumption for the tjp pointer 
and the function parameters. However, the runtime overhead to retrieve join point 
specific context is quite low (0 to 6 cycles).  The overheads for dynamic pointcut 
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functions as cflow, that and target (see Table 3.1) are relatively high (6 to 10 cycles), 
as they require the testing of runtime conditions. They also consume more memory, 
with a maximum of 50 bytes in the worst scenario. All overhead data presented here 
was obtained using compiler optimization. The same test cases without compiler 
optimization lead to much worse results.  
Another work regarding AspectC++ performance and cost is presented in [75]. 
This paper reports an experiment comparing three different implementations of a 
weather station embedded software product line: C-based, OOP-based and AOP-
based. The results show that the OOP version requires significantly more memory 
space than its AOP counterpart (up to 138% more), and that AOP requires at most 
10% more memory space than the C version. Moreover, the runtime performance of 
AOP was the same as the C version, while the OOP version overhead was between 4 
and 6.6%. 
3.3 AOP for the operating system 
Coady et al. [29] reported the application of AOP in the FreeBSD operating 
system kernel to modularize the prefetching of virtual memory mapped files. The 
prefetching mechanism implementation was spread in several functions over three 
different layers of the operating system code. After refactoring, the prefetching modes 
were implementing by single aspects, using AspectC, a subset of the AspectJ 
language for the C language, developed by the authors at University of British 
Columbia. The AOP solution presented several advantages over the tangled 
implementation, such as configurability, independent development and better 
comprehensibility. In a follow up work [30], the authors implemented other 
crosscutting concerns in the FreeBSD code, such as page deamon wake up, disk quota 
management and device blocking, analyzing the evolvability of AOP implementations 
in several OS versions. They concluded that AOP brings several benefits, such as 
localized changeability and explicit configurability. Unfortunately, the AspectC 
weaver was not officially released.  
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PURE is an object-oriented (C++) operating system designed for embedded 
applications by the University of Magdeburg [23]. Several works have been reported 
with regard to the separation of crosscutting concerns in PURE using AspectC++. 
Mahrenholz et al. [80] described how aspects can be woven with the operating system 
kernel for monitoring task switches. The work in [79] presented the implementation of 
the interrupt synchronization strategy in PURE using AOP. The same concern was 
implemented in the PURE successor, named CiAO [73], as described in [76]. In this 
work, several interrupt synchronization strategies (e.g. hard synchronization and two-
phase synchronization) were implemented by aspects and could be selected at 
compile-time. The application of mutual exclusion mechanisms at PURE components 
using AOP was described in [105].  
A quantitative analysis of the application of AOP in the ECOS [39] operating 
system is reported by Lohmann et al. [74]. In this work, the ECOS kernel was 
refactored to implement as aspects the following crosscutting concerns: tracing, 
interrupt synchronization and kernel instrumentation. Additionally, the 
implementation of configuration options in the OS was changed from conditional 
compilation (ifdefs) to aspect-oriented mechanisms. Each configuration option was 
encapsulated into a single aspect that applies introductions or code advices to 
implement the optional functionality. The AOP version of the OS showed at average a 
0.9 % higher code size and a 1% better performance. The authors conclude that the 
application of AOP (using AspectC++) for the modularization of crosscutting 
concerns and the implementation of configuration options in operating systems does 
not induce intrinsic overheads.  
In Chapter 6, we describe the utilization of AOP to implement fault tolerance 
mechanisms such as executable assertions at the operating system level 
3.4 AOP for the middleware  
Zhang and Jacobson [124] studied the degree of separation of concerns in the 
internal implementation of CORBA middleware platforms and the advantages of AOP 
in refactoring these systems. They developed an aspect mining methodology 
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supported by a software tool, and reported several new concerns to the platforms 
chosen (JacOrb, ORBacus and OpenOrb), as the dynamic programming interface and 
the support for portable interceptors. They also measured the degree of scattering 
related to normal concerns like logging, synchronization, exception handling and 
pre/post-condition checking. Additionally, they reimplemented some concerns in the 
ORBacus middleware using AspectJ and applied a set of metrics to the original and 
the refactored implementation.  They concluded that AOP lowers the complexity of 
the middleware architecture, increases modularity, maintains the performance, and 
allows a higher level of adaptability and configurability, which is needed to customize 
platforms for particular domains such as real-time, embedded, and fault-tolerant 
systems. 
The application of AOP to a large-scale middleware product line was reported by 
Colyer and Clement [31, 32]. In this work, an IBM commercial middleware with 
more than one million lines of code and hundreds of developers had several of its 
concerns refactored using AspecJ, as tracing/logging, exception handling and 
performance monitoring. The general approach was to develop a single abstract aspect 
for each of these concerns, defining a common policy (when and how), and several 
concrete aspects for defining the scope of application (where). This approach changes 
the way the policy team work: instead of delivering policy documents, they can 
implement the policy by writing the abstract aspects. As a consequence, policy 
compliance is more accurate and any policy evolution can be implemented with less 
efforts.  
Colyer and Clement [32] also reported an experiment with AOP in an application 
that uses a middleware support extensively. They modified an application server 
software in order to separate the usage of Enterprise Java Beans (EJB) from the rest of 
the application. This problem could only be solved by heterogeneous aspects that 
impact on multiple places, but with different behavior in each of these places. The 
base code was refactored by the removal of EJB related code and the creation of hook 
methods that will be affected by advices. The woven application server software 
presented significant improvements in startup time and memory footprint. The main 
problem is that the aspect code is very dependent on the base code and cannot be 
reused in other projects. However, the refactoring simplifies the base code and allows 
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selecting or not EJB support at compile-time. The authors argue that a similar solution 
using plain OOP would be much more complex because of the huge number of 
variation points.  
Ceccato and Tonella [26] described how to migrate an existing non-distributed 
application in a Java Remote Method Invocation (RMI) distributed application, based 
on the AOP application. They state that making an application run in a distributed 
environment involves many modifications that are spread and intertwined with the 
original code. Their solution is able to keep the original application oblivious to the 
distribution concern, which is regarded as a clear advantage in code understandability 
and maintainability.  Aspects are created for the several Java RMI implementation 
issues, as remote interfaces, object factories, method invocation, parameter passing 
and exception handling. Code generation employs TXL [116] and AspectJ.  
An experiment on middleware specialization using AspectC++ was conducted by 
Kaul and Gokhale [59]. Their motivation was to increase the performance and reduce 
the memory footprint of middleware platforms by using aspects to include only the 
needed features and to perform its optimization. They carried out a case study 
involving different concurrency models in the ACE middleware [1]. AOP was used to 
define the thread model and to implement part of its functionality, aiming to improve 
the system performance. Their results show that the AOP version presented smaller 
latency (3 to 4%) and larger throughput (2 to 3%) than the original OOP 
implementation.  
In Chapter 6, we describe how to integrate a fault tolerance framework, which is 
considered an additional middleware, into the operating system code, using Aspect-
Oriented Programming. 
3.5 Fault tolerance using AOP 
This section describes the related work in implementing fault tolerance using 
Aspect-Oriented Programming. Although fault tolerance (fault handling and 
dependability) is considered a non-functional concern and it is commonly cited as one 
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of the problems that AOP can address [56, 62, 73], few works combining fault 
tolerance and AOP have been reported. 
Herrero et al. [53] created a replication model based on aspect-oriented 
techniques. The replication aspect can be defined by the JReplica language or by 
special UML extensions. A visual tool was being developed to generate JReplica code 
from UML. In this work, computational reflection is used to separate the functional 
level from the aspect level, but no information is given about how the final code is 
generated. Input messages to functional objects are intercepted and redirected to the 
aspect level. Output messages from objects are also intercepted and adapted to the 
right middleware (e.g. CORBA or JavaRMI). Only passive replication is supported.  
Replication mechanisms are implemented by aspects that define when state messages 
are exchanged, and the behavior for error detection, notification and recovery. The 
replication aspect can be composed with aspects developed for other concerns, as for 
instance synchronization. 
Gal et al. [46] proposed the use of aspect-orientation in real-time systems for the 
distribution, timeliness and dependability domains. An example of the application for 
each domain is given, using CORBA in a logging application as test case. Aspects are 
implemented in AspectC++. The example for timeliness is based on execution time 
surveillance using a watchdog timer, which raises an error condition if an execution 
time budget is exceeded. The example for fault tolerance is based on the replication of 
the logging messages to several stations, but no fault tolerance strategy is applied. 
Kienzle and Guerraoui [63] question if it is suitable to use AOP techniques to 
separate concurrency control and failure management concerns from the functional 
code. They conclude that the answer is no, because they feel that this separation is 
hard and potentially dangerous. They applied AspectJ in a case study based on 
transactions, analyzing three basic approaches: (1) aspectizing transactions uniformly 
in the whole program, (2) aspectizing transactions homogeneously in selected objects 
and methods, and (3) aspectizing transactions heterogeneously in selected objects and 
methods. They concluded that the first approach is impossible, the second approach 
yields poor performance and that applying the third, heterogeneous aspects result in 
functional code semantically coupled with the non-functional part, and consequently 
any maintenance in the functional code should trigger a modification on the 
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transaction aspects. A comment on this paper written by Kiczales [12] states that the 
AOP goal is not making a concern transparent, but instead making its implementation 
modular. In Kiczales opinion, the performance of critical concerns like distribution, 
failure handling and concurrency cannot be made totally transparent.   
Szentiványi and Nadjm-Tehrani [109] reported a work for improving the 
performance of a FT-CORBA implementation by applying AOP at the application 
level. In this work, the logging of method executions needed for passive replication 
was shifted from the FT middleware to applications using AspectJ. Synchronization 
and method logging aspects are woven with base code update methods. The capability 
of advising data field access (set join point) in AspectJ allows the synchronization of 
variable accesses within the update methods. Using AOP, the overhead for passive 
replication was reduced by around 40%. 
Alexandersson et al. [9] address the question of whether AOP can provide a base 
to implement fault tolerance mechanisms in non-distributed environments, termed 
“node level fault tolerance”. This work presents examples of aspects for single node 
computing, such as time-redundant execution, assertions and Recovery Blocks, using 
AspectJ. An AOP recovery cache mechanism, needed for backward error recovery, 
was implemented using the set join point of AspectJ.  The time-redundant mechanism 
applied in this work is a sequential software-implemented TMR. If the first execution 
results do not agree with the second execution results, a third execution is performed. 
The computation is defined by a class method and the results are the returning object. 
Assertions are implemented by application-specific aspects that check inputs and 
results of the selected methods and raise exceptions in case of failure. Recovery 
Blocks is implemented using one abstract aspect that defines the FT algorithm and 
application-specific concrete aspects that define the selected methods and introduce 
the new methods, such as the acceptance test and the alternative computation. 
Similarly to the time redundant mechanism, failures are handled by exceptions. The 
authors conclude that AOP is well suited to implement node level fault tolerance. 
 The work presented above was later reimplemented using AspectC++ because 
the authors’ research targets embedded safe-critical systems [10]. For using 
AspectC++ they developed some extensions to the official AspectC++ distribution, 
such as the inclusion of set and get join points for primitive data types and their 
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pointers. This extension does not cover object data types because the assignment 
operator can be overloaded or advised by an aspect.   
In Chapter 6, we propose the utilization of AOP to introduce fault tolerance at the 
application-level, based on the FT framework described in Chapter 5.  This approach 
differs from Alexandersson’ (reference) by defining the thread as the basic unit of 
fault tolerance and by targeting distributed environments. 
3.6 Summary 
The separation of concerns concept has been applied in software engineering for a 
long time. New techniques for dealing with crosscutting concerns have been proposed 
recently, such as meta-programming, composition filters and AOP.  
AOP is a new programming technique to support the programmer in cleanly 
separating the functional components from crosscutting concerns, which are 
implemented as aspects, providing a mechanism to compose them and produce the 
overall system. The key concepts in AOP are join points, pointcuts and advices.  
AspectC++ is a language extension to C++ that allows writing aspects and 
weaving them with the base code using source-code transformation. The main 
features of AspectC++ have been discussed, including the description on how aspects 
are composed to the main functionality. Additionally, the research work about 
AspectC++ performance and memory footprint has been presented.  
This chapter has also reviewed the related work regarding the application of AOP 
to operating systems, middleware and fault-tolerant systems. General purpose and 
embedded operating systems have been submitted to AOP implementations of 
crosscutting concerns, such as performance optimization and interrupt 
synchronization, with good results in maintainability and resource utilization. 
Middleware platforms and their applications are the main target of AOP so far. 
Several works have reported middleware refactoring with AOP with excellent results 
in reducing complexity and increasing configurability and maintainability. Finally, the 
few works published about the application of AOP for fault tolerance have been 
presented. 
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Chapter 4 
BOSS operating system 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the main features of the BOSS operating system. A 
brief introduction about BOSS principles, history and applications is 
presented, followed by a detailed description of the BOSS kernel and 
middleware. Finally, the middleware extensions developed in this work are 
presented.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Since 2004, the Embedded Systems Research Group (ESRG) [41] at University of 
Minho and the Fraunhofer Institute for Computer Architecture and Software 
Technology (FIRST) [43] have been cooperating in the field of dependable embedded 
systems, based on the joint research of efficient and adaptable fault tolerance 
technologies applied to real-time operating systems and middleware.  
BOSS is a real-time operating system (OS) developed by FIRST. Its main design 
principle is irreducible complexity, which means that the OS design aims to achieve 
the minimum complexity in delivering a basic set of functionalities [81]. The 
objective is to keep the OS simple and understandable, as complexity is the cause of 
most development faults in software. Another advantage of this approach is to make 
possible the validation of the OS critical parts by formal methods. BOSS targets high- 
dependability applications, such as satellite and medical systems.     
BOSS uses object-oriented technology in C++ extensively; it is fully preemptive 
and presents low interrupt latency and thread switching time. It has been ported to 
x86, PowerPC, Atmel AVR and ARM platforms. Additionally, an on-top-of-Linux 
implementation is available, and it is used mostly for early testing. BOSS simplicity 
makes easier the task of porting it to other platforms. Communication support is 
provided for Ethernet and CAN networks. Furthermore, a non-preemptive version of 
BOSS was developed, named TinyBOSS, targeting platforms with very limited 
resources. 
The BOSS microkernel has mechanisms for resource management and 
synchronization, such as semaphores and signal boxes; for inter-task communication, 
such as messages and mailboxes; for interrupt handling; and for input/output (I/O).  
The basic OS constructs are implemented in BOSS as classes that can be configured 
and extended by inheritance. This represents a great advantage over conventional 
operating systems developed in procedural languages, such as C, which are usually 
hard to understand and modify.  
Middleware communication in BOSS is performed using a publisher-subscriber 
protocol. Threads send messages locally or over the network by using a string as 
subject, or topic. Messages are delivered to all objects which subscribe to the same 
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subject. This loose coupling between senders and receivers makes fault tolerance 
implementation easier because the communication between threads is location- 
transparent and dynamically changeable.   
The main application of the BOSS operating system was in the BIRD (Bispectral 
Infrared Detector) satellite control system [81]. This micro satellite weights 92 kg and 
was launched in 2001 by the German Aerospace Agency (DLR) to detect fires larger 
than 12 m2. In this system, four processor boards (PowerPC 623) running BOSS 
applications are used. One node acts as a worker, doing all the required computation, 
while it is being constantly checked by a supervisor node. In case of failure in the 
worker node, the supervisor assumes as worker. If the failed node is unable to assume 
as supervisor after a re-initialization, one of the two spare nodes is activated and 
becomes the new supervisor node. The system proved its reliability in some bursts of 
solar activity that exposed the system to high energy radiation and particles [24], 
which generated transient faults.  
The BOSS operating system is also applied in CubeSat satellites. CubeSat is a 
standard for a research pico satellite with dimensions 10x10x10 cm3, weighing no 
more than one kilogram.  The Technical University of Berlin is developing a CubeSat 
project named BEESat [22]. TinyBOSS was selected as the operating system for the 
board computer [60, 82], which uses an ARM-7 processor at 60 Mhz.  
Another future application of BOSS is the HiPerCAR project [118].  This project 
is funded by ESA and aims to provide a dependable architecture for space 
autonomous robotics using limited resources. At the hardware level, HiPerCAR 
combines radiation hardened computers with commercial computers for achieving 
fault tolerance with high processing power. This system configuration includes one 
reliable master node and several COTS nodes acting as workers. Each system function 
can run in a worker node, in a nominal version, or in the master node, in the basic 
version. The nominal software version implements the full functionality, but the basic 
version only guarantees the safe operation of the system. After a failure in a worker 
node, the master node must assume his functions promptly and try to reboot the faulty 
node. In case of a permanent failure in the worker node, the master node must 
promote a system reconfiguration using spare worker nodes.  
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DLR has also plans for using BOSS in its new micro satellite bus architecture 
termed Standard Satellite Bus (SSB) [83].  The architecture will be similar to the 
BIRD architecture, using also four nodes and a worker/supervisor with spares scheme.  
4.2 Kernel services 
In this section the BOSS kernel will be described, following a subdivision based 
in related functionalities as task processing, synchronization, inter-task 
communication and timing.  
4.2.1 Task processing 
In BOSS, tasks are implemented by subclasses of the Thread class. Figure 4.1 
shows a class diagram with the main methods involved with task processing.   
BossObject
+ myName:  char*
+ myId:  long
Thread
- priority:  unsigned long
- waitingUntil:  Time
- lastTimeActivated:  Time
- currentNumberOfThreads:  long
- allThreads:  Thread* ([MAX_THREADS])
# run() : void
+ restart() : void
+ exit() : void
+ setPriority(unsigned long) : void
+ getPriority() : long
+ yield() : void
+ suspend() : void
+ suspendUntil(Time) : void
+ suspendFor(Time) : void
+ resume() : void
Scheduler
- runingNow:  Thread*
+ getRunner() : Thread*
+ dispatch() : void
+ disableDispatch() : void
+ enableDispatch() : void
TimeManager
- tickInterval:  Time
+ start() : void
+ timeEvent() : int
+ getTime() : Time
Application 
Thread
+ run() : void
-runningNow
 
Figure 4.1: Task processing related classes. 
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The Thread class, as well as most BOSS classes, inherits from the BossObject 
class, which provides an optional name and identification number. Application 
threads must inherit from the Thread class and implement the run method, which will 
define the thread behavior. 
BOSS uses priority-based preemptive scheduling. The priority attribute of the 
Thread class keeps the thread priority. Larger priority values represent higher priority 
levels. Thread priorities can be changed dynamically using the setPriority method. 
For threads of same priority, the scheduling policy selects the thread with oldest 
activation time, kept by the lastTimeActivated attribute. Time in BOSS is defined as a 
64 bit quantity representing the number of microseconds passed since the system has 
started. The Thread class maintains an array of pointers, named allTreads, to all 
existing threads in the system, including the Idle thread. This array is used by the 
Scheduler class to select the next thread to run after a call to the dispatch method. 
A thread can be in one of the following states: ready-to-run, running and 
suspended, as shown in Figure 4.2. After a thread object is created, the restart method 
prepares it for execution by setting up its stack and context information. The initial 
restart call for a thread is commanded by the operating system, but this method can 
also be called during the thread execution. After restarting a thread, all stack 
information is cleared and a call to the thread run method is performed. A ready-to-
run thread can be selected for execution after a call to the dispatch method of the 
Scheduler class. From the running state, a thread can return to the read-to-run state if 
another dispatch takes places or if it calls the yield method. The suspend method 
causes a thread to go to the suspended state, while the resume method allows a thread 
to be ready to run again.  
ready-to-run
running
suspended
restart
dispatch
yield
resume
suspend
suspend
dispatch
 
Figure 4.2: Thread states. 
Chapter 4. BOSS operating system 
64 
The mechanism of thread suspension or blocking in BOSS is implementing using 
a time variable (the waitingUntil attribute shown in Figure 4.1). If a thread needs to be 
suspended until a specific time, the suspendUntil method should be used. 
Alternatively, a thread can be suspended for a period of time, using the suspendFor 
method. The suspend method will suspend a thread forever, and it is in fact 
implemented by calling the suspendUntil method with the maximum possible value of 
time, which is never reached. The Scheduler class uses the getTime method of the 
TimeManager class to verify which threads are able to execute, depending on their 
time limit for suspension (waitingUntil). The resume method resets the thread 
suspension limit, making a thread ready for execution.  
The dispatch method is called whenever a context switch is needed as, for 
instance, after the execution of suspend, resume or yield. Additionally, the dispatch 
method is called after each system clock tick. The clock tick interval is defined by the 
tickInterval attribute of the TimeManager class, shown in Figure 4.1. Besides, other 
interruption sources may trigger a dispatch, depending on settings defined in the 
related interruption management routines. The scheduler dispatch may be disabled by 
calling the disableDispatch method of the Scheduler class.  
In BOSS, all threads share the same addressing space. Thread stacks are created 
in the system heap. However, the creation of kernel objects uses static memory 
allocation and these objects are never destroyed.  
4.2.2 Synchronization 
Synchronization can be classified into two categories: resource synchronization 
and activity synchronization [96]. Resource synchronization aims to achieve exclusive 
access to a shared resource, as a global variable, a data structure or an I/O device. 
Resource synchronization is also known as mutual exclusion. The section of the code 
that accesses a shared resource is termed critical section. In contrast, activity 
synchronization aims to ensure the correct execution order among cooperating tasks. 
Figure 4.3 contains a class diagram with all kernel classes related to synchronization 
in BOSS.  
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Thread
Scheduler
- runingNow:  Thread*
+ disableDispatch() : void
+ enableDispatch() : void
Semaphore
- counter:  int
- owner:  Thread*
+ enter() : void
+ leave() : void
SignalBox
- signalCounter:  long
- suspendedReceiver:  Thread*
+ getSignalCounter() : long
+ get(long) : bool
+ signal() : void
+ signalFromInterrupt() : void
«utility»
InterruptMng
+ beginAtomar() : void
+ endAtomar() : void
-runningNow
-suspendedReceiver
-owner
 
Figure 4.3: Synchronization related classes. 
The following methods for supporting mutual exclusion are provided:  
• Interrupt locking: this method consists of disabling system interrupts to 
synchronize exclusive accesses to shared resources between tasks and interrupt 
service routines (ISR).  Interrupt locking affects the system interrupt latency and 
can be used to protect small and fast critical sections. Interrupt locking is 
provided by the global functions beginAtomar and endAtomar, which must 
enclose a critical section. Interrupt locking nesting is implemented by 
incrementing a global variable in begingAtomar and decrementing it in 
endAtomar. Interrupts are enabled by endAtomar only when this variable reaches 
its original value. As represented in Figure 4.3, several kernel classes use interrupt 
locking in their implementations, such as the Scheduler and SignalBox.  
• Preemption locking: this method consists of disabling the task scheduler, or the 
dispatch mechanism.  The application of this feature makes the scheduler non-
preemptive as a low priority thread will no more be preempted by a higher 
priority task. However, preemptive locking does not synchronize resource 
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accesses between tasks and ISR. Preemptive locking is provided by the methods 
disableDispatch and enableDispatch of the Scheduler class. Similarly to interrupt 
locking, preemption locking allows nesting by using a global variable to control 
the nesting level. When this variable reaches the original value, the dispatch is 
executed and future dispatches are permitted. The Semaphore and the SignalBox 
classes use preemption locking in their implementation. The use of preemption 
locking for larger critical section affects high priority task reactions. 
• Semaphores: this method of mutual exclusion mechanism causes a thread to be 
suspended upon calling the enter method if there is no resource available. BOSS 
implements mutex semaphores by default. Semaphores have ownership and calls 
to the leave method are only accepted by the owner. No priority inversion 
avoidance mechanism is implemented. When several threads are blocked in the 
same semaphore, the higher priority thread is released first. For equal priority 
threads, the one with oldest activation time is unblocked first. 
The support for activity synchronization is provided by the SignalBox class. A 
signal box is a mechanism similar to a counting semaphore. Initially the signalCount 
attribute is set to zero, and its incremented each time the signal method is called and 
decremented when the get method is called. A thread will be suspended if it calls the 
get method when the signalCount attribute is zero. Differently than Semaphore 
objects, SignalBox objects can be used in synchronizations between ISR and threads. 
However, only threads are supposed to be signaled, as ISR must not be suspended. 
Furthermore, only one thread can be signaled, and a pointer to this thread is stored in 
the suspendedReceiver attribute of SignalBox. 
4.2.3 Communication 
 The communication services of the BOSS kernel consist of passive classes that 
support safe data transfers between tasks and also between ISR and tasks.  Figure 4.4 
shows the main BOSS classes involved in communication services. 
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MailBox
- suspendedReceiver:  Thread*
- messages:  SortedList
+ receive() : SortedChainable*
+ send(SortedChainable*) : void
+ getFirst() : SortedChainable*
SortedChainable
- next:  SortedChainable*
- currentList:  SortedList*
+ getSortField() : long long
+ getNext() : SortedChainable*
SortedList
- first:  SortedChainable*
- last:  SortedChainable*
+ append(SortedChainable*) : void
+ getRemoveFirst() : SortedChainable*
Thread
Application 
Msg
Type:class
len:int
AsyncCommFifo
- buf:  Type ([len+1])
- writeIndex:  int
- readIndex:  int
+ write(Type*) : int
+ read(Type*) : int
-currentList-last-first
-messages
-suspendedReceiver
 
Figure 4.4: Communication related classes. 
The MailBox class provides data communication between threads, similarly to a 
message queue. Several threads may send messages to a single receiver thread, which 
is suspended if it calls the receive method and no messages are available. Sending 
threads are never blocked and messages are stored in linked list data structure 
implemented by the SortedList class. The data message using MailBox, represented in 
Figure 4.4 as Application Msg, must be a subclass of the SortedChainable class, as it 
should have attributes and methods related to linked list node objects. Messages are 
delivered in a First in - First out (FIFO) basis, although SortedList objects are able to 
sort items using a priority field. Data objects sent to mail boxes are stored in a 
SortedList and no data copy is performed. Therefore, the sender and receiver threads 
are responsible for data objects creation and mutual exclusion. 
The AsyncCommFifo class provides FIFO asynchronous non-blocking data 
communication between one sender and one receiver using a producer-consumer 
protocol. Senders and receivers can be either threads or interrupt service routines as 
they are never blocked. AsyncCommFifo is a template class that receives the type of 
the data objects and the internal buffer size as template parameters. The read and 
write methods copy these data objects to and from the internal buffer, respectively.   
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4.2.4 Utility classes 
Besides the classes presented so far, the BOSS kernel provides several utility 
classes for supporting thread timing control, memory management and debugging. 
The main classes for timing control and memory management are presented in Figure 
4.5. 
t:class
poolSize:int
Pool
- freePtrs:  t* ([poolSize])
- vals:  t ([poolSize])
+ alloc() : t*
+ free(t*) : void
TimeControl
- programmedTime:  Time
- cycleTime:  Time
+ startAt(Time) : void
+ every(Time) : void
+ startAtEvery(Time, Time) : void
+ wait() : void
 
Figure 4.5: BOSS utility classes. 
A thread can use one or more TimeControl objects to support the implementation 
of its temporal behavior. Each TimeControl object defines a startup execution time 
(startAt method) and a cycle time (every method). When a thread calls the wait 
method of TimeControl, a new wake up time is calculated and passed to the 
suspendUntil method of the Thread class.   
The Pool class supports the creation and management of objects in static memory. 
It is a template class with two template parameters: the type and number of objects to 
be managed. The alloc method returns a pointer to an unused object, while the free 
method returns it to the pool. If the pool is empty the alloc method will return a null 
pointer. Multiple threads and ISR can share the same pool of objects as Pool methods 
are protected by mutual exclusion mechanisms.  
4.2.5 Hardware interface and management 
BOSS has a small Hardware Dependent Layer (HDL) which implements the 
platform-dependent functionality, as context switching and interrupts management. 
The interface between the BOSS kernel and the HDL is defined by C functions that 
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are implemented in one these layers. C functions are used to simplify calls from 
assembly code in the HDL to the kernel, and vice-versa. However, most HDL code is 
implemented in C and C++.  Figure 4.6 shows the basic layers of the BOSS 
architecture.  
Application
Kernel
HDL
Hardware
BOSS basic architecture
 
Figure 4.6: BOSS basic architecture. 
The main functions of the kernel/HDL interface are presented in Figure 4.7. The 
hwSetUp function is called by the kernel to perform platform specific initialization, as 
setting interrupt vectors and configuring memory management. The interruptsOn and 
interruptsOff functions provide assembly code to enable and disable interrupts. The 
initialization of the clock tick timer is implemented by the initTimer function, which 
receives the clock tick interval as a parameter. The getMicroSeconds function returns 
the time base in microseconds since the system startup. The setup function is called by 
the restart method of the Thread class to initialize the thread stack frame. The context 
switch is performed by the transfer function and the softReset function resets the node 
and it may be used if an irrecoverable error is detected.  
The kernel functions called by the HDL are described as follows. The 
ThreadStartUp function is the entry point of thread execution after stack initialization. 
This function calls the run method of the Thread class, which should not return; 
otherwise a node reset will take place. The interruptPropagator function is called by a 
general interrupt handler in the HDL to allow the execution of interrupt event services 
defined by application threads. The parameter interrutptID is used to identify the 
interrupt source and trigger the execution of the eventServer method of the Thread 
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class. Finally, the dispatchCaller function is called when leaving interrupt handlers if 
a dispatch is required. 
// Kernel --> HDL 
void hwSetUp(void); 
void interruptsOn(void); 
void interruptsOff(void); 
Time initTimer(Time interval); 
Time getMicroSeconds(void); 
long *setup(long *stack, long stackSize, void *classRef); 
void transfer(long **from, long *to); 
void softReset(void); 
 
// HDL --> Kernel 
void ThreadStartUp(void * thread); 
int interruptPropagator(int interruptID); 
void dispatchCaller(void); 
Figure 4.7: Kernel/HDL interface. 
In BOSS there is no provision of mechanisms for installing and managing device 
drivers. The application program can access the hardware directly, making use of 
kernel objects and interrupt management support as needed. 
4.3 Middleware services 
Single node applications can be developed with the BOSS kernel classes 
described so far. However, support for multiple node and distributed fault-tolerant 
applications is provided by extra classes which implement a common communication 
paradigm both for intern and extern threads. This new level of functionality is termed 
middleware. BOSS middleware is based on asynchronous message-oriented 
communication using the publisher-subscriber protocol. In this section, the original 
BOSS middleware implementation will be described.  
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4.3.1 Message to message communication 
The basic unit of middleware communication in BOSS is the Message class, 
shown in Figure 4.8.  
Message
+ send(char*) : void
+ sendLocal(char*) : void
+ listen(char*) : void
+ removeListener(char*) : void
+ copyDataFrom(Message*) : void
+ execute(char*) : void
NameEntry
+ name:  char*
+ object:  void*
NameServer
# entries:  NameEntry ([MAXOBJECTS])
+ registerObject(char*, void*) : int
+ removeEntry(char*, void*) : void
+ forEach(char*, void*) : int
+ iteratorExecute(void*, void*, char*) : void
MiddleWareReceivers
+ iteratorExecute(void*, void*, char*) : void
Application Message
+ copyDataFrom(Message*) : void
+ execute(char*) : void
#entries
 
Figure 4.8: Message class diagram. 
Application messages must inherit from the Message class and include data as 
class attributes. Besides, Message derived classes must implement the copyDataFrom 
method, which defines how the message data is updated with data from other 
message. In addition, it may optionally implement the execute method, which defines 
a specific behavior after message copying.  
Figure 4.9 presents how the publisher-subscriber data structures are implemented.  
A NameServer object maintains an array of NameEntry objects that relates subjects to 
receiving messages. In the Figure 4.9 example, Message1 and Message3 are 
subscribers of the subject1 subject.  The same subject name can be subscribed by 
more than one message. Furthermore, the same message can subscribe more than one 
subject, as Message3 does. 
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Message1
Message2
Message3
subject1
subject2
subject1
subject2
NameServer
name object
 
Figure 4.9: NameServer data structure. 
A message is sent, or published, using the methods send and sendLocal of the 
Message class. For sending a message it is necessary to pass the subject name as an 
argument. The message distribution is performed by copying the data attributes of the 
receiving message to all messages that have subscribed the related subject.  The 
distribution of messages is implemented by the MiddlewareReceivers class as shown 
the sequence diagram of Figure 4.10.  
receiver : Message : MiddlewareReceivers
listen(subject)
registerObject(subject, receiver)
sender : Message
sendLocal(subject)
forEach(subject, sender)
copyDataFrom(sender)
execute() iteratorExecute(...)
 
Figure 4.10: Middleware message distribution. 
Initially, the receiver message registers his subscription to a subject by calling the 
listen method. This is accomplished by the registerObject method of the 
MiddlewareReceivers class, which sets up one entry in the data structure of Figure 
4.9.   When the sendLocal method of the sender message is called, the forEach 
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method of MiddlewareReceivers is executed, starting a search in the NameServer data 
structure for entries with the same subject name.  When a match is found, 
iteratorExecute executes the copyDataFrom method of the receiving message, 
copying the data attributes from the sending message. Additionally, the execute 
method of the receiving message is activated, allowing the execution of the code 
related to message reception, as for instance, resuming a suspended thread.  
The mechanism of overwriting the data of one message with the data of another 
message is referred here as message to message communication. Using this 
mechanism, message data can be written without previous data utilization. This is 
ideal for transmitting state messages, in which only the most recent data is significant. 
However, this mechanism is not suitable for event messages, in which messages 
convey a system event, as events may be overwritten and lost.  
4.3.2 Message to thread communication 
In order to deliver event messages, a thread messaging mechanism is provided. 
This includes support for message buffering and thread synchronization in message 
reception. The IncommingMsgAdministrator class, shown in Figure 4.11, supplies 
mail box functionality for threads. It is a template class that receives as template 
parameters an application message class and the message buffer size. Internally, 
IncommingMsgAdministrator maintains a memory pool of application messages using 
a Pool object, and a MailBox object to provide the mail box functionality. 
The IncommingMessageAdministrator class derives from Message class, and 
therefore it can behave as a receiving Message, exactly as described in Figure 4.10.  
The implementation of its copyDataFrom method is presented in Figure 4.12. When 
this method is called, a pointer to a free message object is retrieved from the pool, a 
copy is performed using copyDataFrom, and the receiving message is sent to the 
MailBox. 
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BasicMsg:class
PoolLen:int
IncommingMessageAdministrator
- mbox:  MailBox
- pool:  Pool<BasicMsg, PoolLen>
- lastRead:  BasicMsg *
+ copyDataFrom(Message*) : void
+ execute(char*) : void
+ receive() : BasicMsg*
+ getFirst() : BasicMsg*
MailBox
- suspendedReceiver:  Thread*
- messages:  SortedList
+ receive() : SortedChainable*
+ send(SortedChainable*) : void
Message
t:class
poolSize:int
Pool
- freePtrs:  t* ([poolSize])
- vals:  t ([poolSize])
+ alloc() : t*
+ free(t*) : void
MiddleWareReceivers
+ iteratorExecute(void*, void*, char*) : void
application message and
size of message buffer
ApplicationThread
-pool
-mbox
 
Figure 4.11: IncommingMessageAdministrator class diagram. 
 
: MiddlewareReceivers: Thread : IncommingMsgAdministrator pool : Pool mbox : MailBox
copyDataFrom(sender)
newEntry : Message
newEntry := alloc()
copyDataFrom(sender)
send(newEntry)
newMessage := receive()
free(lastRead)
newMessage := receive()
 
Figure 4.12: IncommingMessageAdministrator sequence diagram. 
Threads receive messages by calling the receive method of 
IncommingMessageAdministrator, as shown in Figure 4.12. The previous read 
message is freed and sent back to the pool of message objects. Then, the receive 
method of the MailBox object is executed. If the mail box is empty, the thread will be 
suspended until a new message arrives. 
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4.4 Middleware extensions 
The original BOSS implementation received from FIRST did not provide a 
generic mechanism for sending and receiving network messages.  For instance, only 
the sendLocal method of the Message class was implemented by the kernel. The 
implementation of the send method, which is supposed to distribute a message both 
internally and externally, was application-dependent (an application function or 
method should be called).  The same applied for middleware message reception, 
which had to be implemented by an application thread.  
Additionally, the original implementation did not support message identification. 
Message identification is needed to discard duplicate messages and to implement 
voting algorithms. Figure 4.13 presents a TMR fault-tolerant configuration that will 
be used to discuss the reasons for providing message identification. In this 
configuration, three replicas of Task A receive the same input and send their results to 
three identical voters. The voter results are sent to three replicas of Task B. As voter 
output messages are redundant, Task B can process the first message received and 
discard the following messages. But for discarding messages it is necessary to 
recognize that they are related to the same input data. A possible solution is to include 
an identification number in the original input message and to retransmit this 
identification number in the output messages of Task A and Voter A. Besides, message 
identification is also useful for the voters because it provides information that can be 
used to detect if a new voting cycle has started.  
 
Task A
Task A
Task A
Voter A
Voter A
Voter A
input
Task B
Task B
Task B
 
Figure 4.13: TMR configuration. 
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In the following sections, the new extensions to the BOSS middleware developed 
in this work will be presented. 
4.4.1 Message identification and discarding 
The implementation of message identification and discarding of duplicate 
messages by the middleware demanded the modification of the Message and 
NameServer classes. For the Message class, it consisted of the inclusion of the msgID 
attribute. The listen method of the Message class now accepts a Boolean value as a 
parameter, to define whether duplicated messages must be discarded or not. The 
default value for this parameter is false, meaning that no message discard is required. 
This option will be stored in the discard flag of the new NameServer implementation, 
shown in Figure 4.14.  
Message1
Message2
subject1
subject2NameServer
name objectdiscardflag last previous
msgID
true 15 14
false
 
Figure 4.14: NameServer extension for discarding duplicate messages. 
Besides the discard flag, two message identification attributes were added to each 
NameServer entry to store the last and the previous msgID.  In the example shown in 
Figure 4.14, Message1 was registered for discarding messages (discard flag equals 
true), the last delivered message had 15 as msgID and the previous delivered message 
had 14 as msgID. A new incoming message will only be delivered if it has a msgID 
different from 15 and 14. For instance, a new message with msgID of 16 will be 
delivered, and consequently the previous msgID attribute will receive the value of the 
last msgID attribute (15 in this case), and last msgID attribute will receive the msgID 
of the incoming message (16 in this case).  If however, the new message has msgID of 
15 or 14, it would be discarded and no modifications will be done to the last and 
previous msgID attributes.  
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Using the algorithm described above and considering the configuration presented 
in Figure 4.13, Task B would only receive the first message sent by a voter in each 
voting cycle. Any late arriving message from the previous voting cycle would also be 
discarded. 
Message identifications are defined as “unsigned short” variables (usually 16 bits) 
and can be generated sequentially by sending tasks just but incrementing them for 
each new message. No special care is needed when they reach the maximum value 
(e.g. 65535) and return to zero because the discarding algorithm is not based on 
ordering. The only restriction is to avoid start sending messages with the maximum 
identification value because that is the value used to initialize the last and previous 
msgID attributes.   
4.4.2 External messages handling 
This section will describe the middleware extension mechanism to support the 
delivery of external messages. The Message and MiddlewareReceivers classes were 
modified by the introduction of new variables, data structures and methods, as shown 
in Figure 4.15.   
MiddleWareReceivers
- sendMessageBuffer:  char ([SEND_BUFFER_SIZE])
- sendProtector:  Semaphore
+ iteratorExecute(void*, void*, char*) : void
+ sendNet(char*, Message*) : void
+ receiveNet(char*, int, unsigned long) : void
Message
+ msgID:  unsigned short
+ sendNode:  unsigned long
+ className:  char*
+ externalMessages:  Message* ([MAX_EXT_MESSAGES])
+ send(char*) : void
+ sendLocal(char*) : void
+ listen(char*) : void
+ removeListener(char*) : void
+ copyDataFrom(Message*) : void
+ execute(char*) : void
+ registerExternalMessage(Message*) : void
+ findRegisteredMessage(char*) : Message*
+ serialize(char*) : int
+ deserialize(char*) : void
Application Message
+ copyDataFrom(Message*) : void
+ execute(char*) : void
+ serialize(char*) : int
+ deserialize(char*) : void
«global functions»
HDL interface
+ sendPacket(char * , int) : void
+ getMyNode() : unsigned long
Misc
+ serializeShort(...) : void
+ serializeInt(...) : void
+ serializeFloat(...) : void
+ deserializeShort(...) : void
+ deserializeInt(...) : void
+ deserializeFloat(...) : void
 
Figure 4.15: Middleware extensions class diagram. 
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In addition to the msgID attribute, already discussed in the last section, the 
Message class has been augmented by the sendNode attribute, which identifies the 
origin node of a message (e.g. IP number); by the className attribute, which stores 
the name of the subclass of Message that will be sent to an external node; and by the 
static externalMessages array of message pointers, which references auxiliary 
messages used in message reception. The registerExternalMessage method inserts an 
entry in the externalMessages array and the findRegisteredMessage method searches 
for an auxiliary message with a given className attribute in the same array. Serialize 
and deserialize are new virtual functions that must be implemented by external 
messages for marshaling and unmarshaling the message data. These functions may 
use the utility functions of the Misc class in the serialization and deserialization 
process. 
The MiddlewareReceivers class has gained a data buffer named 
sendMessageBuffer to store the outgoing message data after serialization and a 
semaphore to protect it from multiple accesses from sending threads. Two new 
methods were added to MiddlewareReceivers: the sendNet method prepares the 
message for network transmission, eventually calling the sendPacket method of the 
HDL interface; and the receiveNet method distributes incoming messages, taking as 
input the data received by the HDL when a message arrives. 
The process of sending and receiving external messages is shown in Figure 4.16. 
In the sender node, a message is prepared and the send method is called, passing the 
message subject as an argument. After that, the sendNet method of 
MiddlewareReceivers is executed and takes care of the message marshaling, by 
preparing the sendMessageBuffer according to the sequence diagram shown in Figure 
4.17.  
The className information is taken from the sender message object, as well as 
the msgID. The marshaling of the data message is performed by the sender itself, 
using the serialize method. All data is sent in network byte order (big-endian). The 
serialization functions of the Misc class are able to change the byte order for little-
endian platforms. When the buffer is ready for transmission, a pointer to it, as well as 
its data size, are passed to the sendPacket function of the HDL interface, which 
Chapter 4. BOSS operating system 
79 
eventually will send the data over the network. Finally, the message is also sent 
locally using the sendLocal method. 
 
: MiddlewareReceiverssender: Message
send(subject)
sendNet(subject, sender)
serialize(buffer *)
HDL interface
sendPacket(buffer *, size)
receiveNet( ...)
Message
aux := findRegisteredMessage(className)
aux: Message
deserialize(data)
sendLocal(subject)
registerExternalMessage(aux)
receiver
node
sender
node
sendLocal(subject)
 
Figure 4.16: External messages processing. 
 
subject className msgID serialized message data
“temperature” “TempMsg” 245 temperature value
C string C string unsigned short byte array
Message
-myTemp : float
TempMsg
 
Figure 4.17: External message packet description. 
In receiver nodes, the following processing takes place (Figure 4.16). Initially, an 
auxiliary message object of the sender message class must be created and registered 
using the registerExternalMessage. When a message is received by HDL, the 
receiveNet method of MiddlewareReceivers is called. Then, a receiving buffer, passed 
as an argument, is scanned for removing the className information, which is then 
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passed to the findRegisteredMessage in order to retrieve a pointer to the auxiliary 
message object related to the incoming message. If no matching auxiliary message 
exists the incoming message is discarded, otherwise the receiving data is copied to the 
auxiliary message. The deserialize method of the auxiliary message executes the 
unmarshalling of the message data. At this point, the auxiliary message is a replica of 
the original sender message, and it can be sent locally using the sendLocal method. 
The mechanism described above provides fully transparent communication for 
applications. This means that the same application can run on different platforms 
(with possibly different byte ordering), and communicate with other applications 
without knowing in which platform they are running. Message objects can be sent 
locally and over the network using the send method, and only have to implement the 
serialize and deserialize methods. At the receiver’s side, an object of the same 
message class must be created and registered at initialization time. No further 
procedures are needed to handle external messages at the application level. All 
platform and network dependent code is implemented at the Hardware Dependent 
Layer.  
4.5 Summary 
The BOSS operating system is a real-time OS designed for small-scale embedded 
systems with high-dependability requirements. Its object-oriented design aims the 
reduction of the operating systems complexity, which is the cause of most design 
faults. However, it covers all basic functionality needed to develop embedded 
applications, including the communication between nodes, using a publisher-
subscriber protocol.  
This work has improved the BOSS middleware by adding mechanisms for 
message identification and discarding duplicate messages. Furthermore, support for 
handling external messages was developed, making intra-node and inter-node 
communication transparent for applications. The information provided in this chapter 
is necessary for understanding the fault tolerance framework described in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Fault tolerance framework 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the fault tolerance framework developed for 
supporting application fault tolerance atop the BOSS operating system and 
its middleware. As an introduction, the framework objectives and 
constraints are presented. Afterwards, the framework is described in 
various levels of detail ranging from the application programmer 
perspective to specific FT strategy implementations. Finally, the benefits 
and drawbacks of the proposed FT framework are discussed. 
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5.1 Introduction 
The FT framework designed for supporting application fault tolerance to the 
BOSS operating systems has several objectives and constraints. First, it has to be 
easily customizable and extensible, in order to support fault tolerance in a wide 
variety of projects with different dependability requirements and hardware 
availability. Therefore, it should provide mechanisms for hardware and software fault 
tolerance using single or redundant hardware systems with single or multiple software 
versions. Second, it has to be fully compatible with the BOSS operating system, using 
the basic features provided by this OS and the communication infrastructure provided 
by its middleware.  Finally, it has to be simple and efficient to run in small-scale real-
time embedded systems without incurring in too much resource consumption, such as 
processor and memory usage.  
The FT framework described here focus in fault-tolerant computing and does not 
include mechanisms for tolerating communication network errors. In this work, it is 
assumed that the underneath communication is reliable and ordered. 
As seen in Section 2.10, several object-oriented fault tolerance patterns and 
frameworks have been proposed and developed by the research community. In 
general, the unit of fault tolerance is an application object with behavior defined by a 
subclass of an abstract “variant” class. Considering objects as units of fault tolerance 
has also been applied in fault tolerance supporting systems such as FT-CORBA [88] 
implementations, although using replication without diversity. Other systems such as 
ROAFTS [68] use virtual objects (TMO objects in that case) as units of redundancy, 
but method calls are implemented as threads.  
The chosen approach is to use BOSS threads as units of fault tolerance because 
threads and processes are the real units of computation in a multitasking system. 
Consequently, thread restarting can be employed as an effective mechanism of system 
recovery. The same mechanism can not be applied by object methods if, for instance, 
an error condition leads to an infinite loop execution. Besides, using objects (virtual or 
real) as units of fault tolerance increases system implementation complexity, reduces 
performance, and increases memory usage. The same approach was used in FT-RT-
Mach [40] and in the AFT for Spacecraft work [52]. 
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5.2 Fault tolerance thread model  
Not all kinds of application threads can be used as units of fault-tolerant 
computing in the proposed framework. A fault-tolerant thread must comply with a 
specific fault tolerance thread model, shown in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1: Fault tolerance thread model. 
Fault-tolerant threads are supposed to read from input devices or receive input 
messages from other threads, process the inputs and generate an output either by 
writing to an output device or by sending a result message to other threads. The model 
supports both state threads and stateless threads. For state threads, the output result 
will depend both on the input data and on the previous state data. The input phase is 
optional, as a thread can be activated by a timing mechanism and may use no external 
data in the processing phase. However, the ordering of the input, processing, and 
output phases should be preserved.  A thread performing inputs and outputs during the 
processing phase is non-compliant and can not be made fault-tolerant using this 
framework. 
An example of a candidate thread for fault tolerance implementation is presented 
in Figure 5.2. In this example, ExampleThread runs cyclically, reading messages from 
an IncommingMessageAdministrator object, which consists of a mailbox for messages 
of the Msg class. The process method is executed next, and implements some 
computing algorithm using data from the incoming message and possibly from an 
internal state (attributes not shown). Finally the output method prepares the output 
message and sends it locally and over the network, using the string “exampleResult” 
as subject.  
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class ExampleThread : public Thread { 
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg,20> inMessages; 
public: 
  ExampleThread(){ ... // init code} 
   
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = inMessages.receive(); 
      process(); 
      output(); 
    } 
  } 
 
  void process(){ 
    ... // uses msg data and state data 
  } 
 
  void output(){ 
    ... // prepares output message 
    outMsg.send("exampleResult"); 
  } 
}; 
Figure 5.2: Example of candidate thread for FT implementation. 
The thread model explained above is commonly adopted in the design of fault-
tolerant systems [7, 101]. Threads in this model behave like state machines, receiving 
events/data as inputs and, in consequence, changing their internal state and sending 
events/data as outputs. FT threads are not allowed to interact with other threads or to 
perform any input/output during the processing phase.  
5.3 Framework general description 
In this section the fault tolerance framework will be described in the perspective 
of the application programmer. The description approach is based on presenting how 
the framework can be used to modify an existing non-fault-tolerant application thread 
to make it fault-tolerant. The original non-fault-tolerant thread must comply with the 
fault-tolerant thread model presented in the previous section.  
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5.3.1 Framework structure 
Figure 5.3 shows a simplified class diagram of the FT framework. A fault-tolerant 
application thread (e.g. FTApplicationThread) must inherit from the FTThread class 
and select an FTStrategy object that will implement the fault tolerance functionality. 
Three FT strategies have been implemented: RB, DRB and NVP, but others can be 
developed and integrated to the framework.  
Thread
VoterThread
# myVoterType:  VoterType
- maxResponseTime:  Time
# initVoting(VoterType, Time) : void
# executeVoting(unsigned short) : void
# storeSolution() : void
# findEqualSolution() : bool
# sendResult() : void
FTStrategy
+ ftThread:  FTThread*
+ maxResponseTime:  Time
+ setFTThread(FTThread*) : void
+ setMaxResponseTime(Time) : void
+ executeFT() : void
BasicMsg:class
StdVoter
- outputSubject:  char*
- inputSubject:  char*
RBStrategy
FTThread
+ ftStrategy:  FTStrategy*
+ setFTStrategy(FTStrategy*) : void
+ variant1() : void
+ variant2() : void
+ variant3() : void
+ saveCheckpoint() : void
+ restoreCheckpoint() : void
+ acceptanceTest() : bool
+ sendResult() : void
+ onFailure() : void
+ getState(char*) : int
+ setState(int, char*) : void
MiddlewareScheduler
DRBStrategy NVPStrategy
VoterApplicationThread FTApplicationThread
Used for the NVP 
strategy only
 
Figure 5.3: Simplified FT framework class diagram. 
Differently from software structures presented in Section 2.10, where variants and 
adjudicators are represented by classes, here these functionalities are implemented as 
methods of the FTThread hierarchy.  The FTThread class declares several virtual 
functions which must be implemented by the FT application thread, depending on the 
selected FT strategy, such as software variants, checkpointing support functions and 
the acceptance test. This approach has several advantages: (a) it simplifies the 
framework class structure; (b) it allows direct access from these procedures to class 
attributes defined by the application thread; and (c) it reduces runtime and memory 
costs. 
The VoterThread class supports the development of voters, which are required by 
the NVP strategy. A voter application thread (e.g. VoterApplicationThread) must 
inherit from VoterThread and define some virtual functions, such as 
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findEqualSolution. Additionally, a standard voter class (StdVoter) is supplied. This 
predefined voter thread provides exact voting (bit-by-bit comparison) when both 
inputs and outputs are implemented by message passing.  
The MiddlewareScheduler (MS) class controls all FT and voter threads. This 
thread periodically searches for active FT/voter threads and executes part of the 
required control algorithm. Besides, this thread triggers periodic middleware 
messages to perform role definitions and thread state synchronization. 
5.3.2 Fault tolerance introduction 
The modifications required to make an application thread fault-tolerant include: 
• Instantiation and registration of an FTStrategy object that will implement the 
desired fault tolerance strategy, as RB, DRB or NVP. 
• Execution of the executeFT method of the FTStrategy object after the thread 
activation. 
• Implementation of application-specific methods related to the selected fault 
tolerance strategy (as the acceptance test in RB and DRB). Some of them consist 
of new functionality but others will contain the code originally defined in the 
processing and output methods. 
Figure 5.4 shows an example of fault-tolerant implementation for ExampleThread 
of Figure 5.2, using the DRB strategy. The main differences between this version and 
the original code in Figure 5.2 are highlighted. The application thread now inherits 
from the FTThread class, instead of the Thread class. A concrete FTStrategy is 
instantiated as a DRBStrategy (myDRB). In the class constructor, the maximum 
response time for execution is set to 20,000 microseconds and the setFTStrategy 
method is called, assigning the address of the DRBSstrategy object to the ftStrategy 
pointer (see Figure 5.3). In the run method, the original process and output methods 
are replaced by a call to the executeFT method of the FTStrategy class. This method is 
responsible for executing the particular strategy and for activating the application 
specific methods defined in the application thread, as for example, variant1 (primary 
block) and acceptanceTest. Some of these methods correspond to original 
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implementations, but others, like variant2 (recovery block) and saveCheckpoint 
should be defined to allow the execution of the DRB strategy. 
In this example, ExampleThread is stateless; otherwise FTExampleThread should 
also implement the methods getState and setState. These methods are needed to 
provide state initialization between the primary and the shadow nodes in DRB. None 
of these methods are necessary in the original version, as only one ExampleThread 
instance runs in a single node. 
class FTExampleThread : public FTThread { 
   
  DRBStrategy myDRB; 
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg, 20> inMessages; 
public: 
 
  FTExampleThread(){ 
    ... // init code 
    myDRB.setMaxResponseTime(20000);  
    setFTStrategy(&myDRB); 
  } 
 
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = inMessages.receive(); 
      ftStrategy->executeFT();  
    } 
  } 
 
  void variant1(){ 
    ... // same code of original process method  
  } 
 
  void sendResult(){ 
    ... // same code of original output method 
  } 
  // to be defined 
  void variant2(){ ... } 
  void saveCheckpoint(){ ... } 
  void restoreCheckpoint(){ ... } 
  bool acceptanceTest(){ ... } 
}; 
Figure 5.4: Example of FT application thread. 
5.3.3 Application-specific entities 
Each FT strategy instantiation and usage demands the definition of strategy 
attributes and application specific behavior. These requirements are summarized in 
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Table 5.1, Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. Table 5.1 presents requirements for multiple 
version software, Table 5.2 for single version software and Table 5.3 for voters. 
Single version strategies use the same FTStrategy classes used for multiple 
version software, but do not implement their full functionality. If some application 
thread does not implement a given method, a default implementation is inherited. For 
example, the default implementation for save/restoreCheckpoint is empty and for 
acceptanceTest is to return true (success). 
Table 5.1: Multiple version strategies requirements. 
Definition Requirements 
Entity Type 
RB DRB NVP 
FT Strategy  object RBStrategy DRBStrategy NVPStrategy 
Response  time parameter Yes Yes Yes 
variant 1 method Yes Yes Yes 
variant 2 method Yes Yes Yes 
variant 3 method - - Yes 
saveCheckpoint method Yes Yes - 
restoreCheckpoint method Yes Yes - 
acceptanceTest method Yes Yes - 
sendResult method Yes Yes Yes 
onFailure method Optional Optional Optional 
Voter Thread object - - Yes 
getState method - state threads 
only 
state threads 
only 
setState method - state threads 
only 
state threads 
only 
Table 5.2: Single version strategies requirements. 
Definition Requirements 
Entity Type 
Restart  Checkpoint 
and Restart 
PSP TMR 
FT Strategy  object RBStrategy RBStrategy DRBStrategy NVPStrategy 
Response  time parameter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
variant 1 method Yes Yes Yes Yes 
variant 2 method - - - - 
variant 3 method - - - - 
saveCheckpoint method - Yes Yes - 
restoreCheckpoint method - Yes Yes - 
acceptanceTest method - Yes Yes - 
sendResult method Yes Yes Yes Yes 
onFailure method Optional Optional Optional Optional 
Voter Thread object - - - Yes 
getState method - - state threads 
only 
state threads 
only 
setState method - - state threads 
only 
state threads 
only 
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Table 5.3: Voter requirements. 
Definition Requirements 
Entity Type 
Application 
Specific Voter 
Standard Voter 
(StdVoter) 
Thread name parameter Yes Yes 
Coordination method parameter Yes Yes 
Response Time parameter Yes Yes 
Input subject parameter - Yes 
Output subject parameter - Yes 
storeSolution method Yes - 
findEqualSolution method Yes - 
sendResult method Yes - 
 
The simplest single version FT strategy is the Restart strategy. In this technique 
only one variant is defined, and the acceptance test is not implemented. Therefore, the 
only possible error detection mechanism is deadline expiration, which is set by the 
Response time parameter. The Checkpoint and Restart strategy can be implemented as 
a single version simplification of the RB strategy. In this case, only one real variant is 
defined, and the body of variant2 should contain a call to the variant1 method. In a 
similar way, PSP is implemented with the DRB strategy and TMR with the NVP 
strategy. 
The onFailure method in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2 is always optional. It can be 
used to define application-dependent fault handling mechanisms when a failure in the 
strategy execution occurs. After running the code defined in the onFailure method, 
the thread will be restarted by the operating system.  
Table 5.3 displays the requirements for voting threads. These threads are only 
needed when using TMR or NVP. In the general case, a voter is application-specific 
and this thread must implement the VoterThread methods shown in Table 5.3. The 
Coordination method parameter defines if all replica voters will execute the 
sendResult method or if only a master voter will do it. The definition of the master 
voter in a coordinated voting is performed by the FT framework. The Response time 
of a voter is the maximum time allowed for a voting cycle. A cycle begins when the 
voter receives the first solution. Voters try to find a match between two solutions (2 
out of 3), but if only one solution is received and the voting cycle period has finished, 
that solution is considered correct and it is sent as a result.  
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In Table 5.3, the column labed “Standard Voter” lists the requirements for the 
initialization of StdVoter objects. This class provides exact voting using messages for 
receiving solutions and sending the results. Using this standard voter, other 
parameters must be defined, as the subject of input and output messages.  
5.4 Framework general implementation  
This section describes the general FT framework implementation, which consists 
of patterns and mechanisms used in all FT strategy development.  
5.4.1 Timing behavior  
The MiddlewareScheduler (MS) thread runs at the beginning of every clock tick 
interval (e.g. 1ms; see Section 4.2.1 ) and controls the behavior and execution of each 
FT thread and voter. Besides, this thread is also responsible for activating the 
middleware thread that delivers external incoming messages.   
Figure 5.5 shows an example of the execution of a Recovery Blocks (RB) 
strategy. The MS thread runs periodically and releases the message reception thread 
each two activation periods. The message reception thread is not executed in every 
cycle in order to reduce CPU utilization and to provide at least one cycle in two for 
FT threads free execution. In the first cycle, the FTThread receives a message and 
starts the FT execution. This example shows a failure in the primary block and a 
success in the recovery block. 
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Figure 5.5: RB execution timing example. 
Figure 5.6 contains an activity diagram that shows the interaction between the 
FTThread and the MiddlewareScheduler thread in the execution of the RB strategy. 
After being activated, an FT thread sets up a deadline for execution, based on the 
actual time and the maximum allowed response time, the thread suspends. In 
subsequent MS activations, this thread restarts the FTThread if the deadline has 
expired. This situation represents a failure in delivering the correct response on time, 
but after restarting the FTThread is ready to receive the next request. If the deadline 
has not expired, the MS thread commands the next actions to be performed by the 
FTThread thread and schedules it for execution. After executing the right operations 
(save/restore state, run primary/recovery block, run acceptance test) the RB thread 
suspends again and the MS thread checks the acceptance test (AT) result. If the 
FTThread succeeds in the AT, the MS thread allows it to send its results and the 
interaction finishes. If the FTThread fails in both blocks, it is restarted by the MS 
thread. 
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receives message
or wakes up
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Figure 5.6: RB execution activity diagram. 
5.4.2 Class structure 
Any FT strategy is executed in the context of two separate threads: the FTthread 
and the MiddlewareScheduler thread.  The FTThread executes methods in response to 
the control algorithm performed by the MiddlewareScheduler thread. However, all the 
code related to a given FT strategy is defined by its FTStrategy concrete class. Figure 
5.7 shows a class diagram describing the main methods involved in the execution of 
an FT strategy. 
MiddlewareScheduler
+ sendMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
FTThread
+ ftStrategy:  FTStrategy*
FTStrategy
+ ftThread:  FTThread*
+ executeFT() : void
+ executeMSControl() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
+ startPeriodicMsg() : void
Thread
+ myFTType:  FTType
+ isRunningFT:  bool
+ isVoting:  bool
«enumeration»
FTType
+ NONE:  int
+ FT:  int
+ VOTER:  int
VoterThread
+ executeVoting(unsigned short) : void
+ checkTimeoutVoting() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
+ startPeriodicMsg() : void
 
Figure 5.7: FT strategy execution class diagram. 
Every FTStrategy subclass must implement the executeFT method, which 
performs the FT control algorithm that runs in the context of the FT thread (upper part 
of Figure 5.6, excluding message reception). It must also implement the 
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executeMSControl method, which performs the MS control algorithm for that stategy 
(botton part of Figure 5.6). Using this approach, the MiddlewareScheduler class does 
not depend on any FT strategy implementation, and FT strategies can be added to the 
framework transparently. 
The MS thread controls the execution of the voter threads in a similar way. 
However, the MS control is simpler, as it only have to detect if the voting deadline 
has elapsed. The executeVoting method is executed by the VoterThread, while the 
checkTimeoutVoting method is called by the MS thread. 
In contrast with the RB strategy presented so far, other FT strategies involve the 
utilization of multiples instances of the FT thread, running in different nodes. These 
FT threads have to communicate in order to coordinate, establish roles and initialize 
states. In this framework, the required communication between FT threads is executed 
by message passing between the MiddlewareScheduler threads of each node. If an FT 
thread needs to send a message, it calls the sendMiddlewareMessage method of MS.  
The sending message is broadcasted to all other nodes and their MS threads will 
distribute it to the related FT threads in their nodes, if any, by calling the 
processMiddlewareMessage method of the corresponding FT strategy. The same 
applies to VoterThreads that can communicate using the same methods described 
above.  
Another feature performed by MiddlewareScheduler is the activation of the 
startPeriodicMsg of FTStrategy and VoterThreads periodically (e.g. 300ms), in order 
to trigger the execution of periodic tasks as, for instance, role conflicts detection in the 
DRB strategy.  
Finally, the MiddlewareScheduler thread is responsible for changing the FT 
threads priorities according to the Earliest Deadline First (EDF) scheduling. 
Therefore, in each MS activation the FT thread with earliest deadline is found and its 
priority is raised to a maximum among application threads. This feature can be 
enabled or disabled in the framework. 
Figure 5.8 contains a sequence diagram that describes the activities performed by 
MiddlewareScheduler each time it runs. First it reads messages coming from other 
MiddlewareScheduler objects in other nodes. These messages are sent by external 
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FTThreads and VoterThreads and must be delivered to internal objects of the same 
type and name, if any. Therefore, MiddlewareScheduler checks if there is any local 
thread with the name received in the incoming message.  If there is, it determines if it 
is an FT thread or voter, based on the myFTType attribute of the Thread class, and 
calls the processMiddlewareMsg method of the related class (FTStrategy or 
VoterThread). Next, if a predefined number of MiddlewareScheduler activations have 
been executed; periodic messages of FT threads and voters are triggered, using the 
startPeriodicMsg method.  Finally, the control algorithm of active FT threads is 
performed by running the executeMSControl method. Similarly, MS checks the 
timeout for active voting threads by calling the checkTimeoutVoting method. Active 
FT threads and voters are represented by a true value in the isRunningFT and isVoting 
Boolean attributes of the Thread class.  
 
:MiddlewareScheduler :FTStrategy
[myFTType==FT]: processMiddlewareMsg
:VoterThread
[myFTType==VOTER]: processMiddlewareMsg
reads message & finds thread by name
While there are
 new messages
* [myFTType==FT]: startPeriodicMsg
* [myFTType=VOTER]: startPeriodMsg
Each n
 activations
* [isRunningFT]: executeMSControl
* [isVoting]: checkTimeoutVoting
 
Figure 5.8: MiddewareScheduler thread sequence diagram. 
 
Figure 5.8 does not represent FT thread scheduling, but this operation is 
performed, if selected, at the end of each MS activation. 
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5.5 FT strategies implementation 
This section describes the implementation of the fault tolerance strategies which 
were provided by the FT framework: RB, DRB and NVP. These strategies are 
described in Section 2.8. The implementation of an FT strategy consists basically in 
developing an FTStrategy class that contains the algorithm performed by the FT 
technique. Each strategy may also define algorithms for role definitions and state 
coordination. The implementation of these operations is supported by the 
MiddlewareScheduler thread, as presented in the previous section.  
5.5.1 Recovery Blocks strategy 
The Recovery Blocks (RB) strategy, described in Section 2.8.2, consists of the 
sequential execution of software variants, or alternates, using an acceptance test as 
adjudicator. The implementation of RB in this framework is limited to two software 
variants because it is the minimum configuration that is able to tolerate one active 
fault. The utilization of more software variants would require additional development 
efforts and it would increase the memory consumption. 
Figure 5.9 shows a class diagram that only presents classes, attributes and 
methods directly related to the RB strategy operation. The Recovery Blocks technique 
is implemented by the RBStrategy class. This class derives from FTStrategy and 
implements the executeFT method, which defines the FT thread behavior, and the 
executeMSControl method, which defines the MiddlewareScheduler thread behavior. 
Other virtual functions defined in FTStrategy are not implemented, as this strategy 
runs in a single node and does not send messages to other replicas. The waitingForMS 
attribute is used to indicate to the MS thread that the FT thread is waiting for further 
commands.  The passedAT attribute contains the result of the last acceptance test and 
it is used by the MS to define the next commands. These commands are issued 
through the following class attributes: tryBlock, which defines the next variant to run 
and mustSendResult, which defines if a result can be sent.  An example of the RB 
strategy execution has been shown in Figure 5.5 and the coordination between the FT 
thread and MS has been shown in Figure 5.6. 
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RBStrategy
+ waitingForMS:  bool
+ passedAT:  bool
+ tryBlock:  short
+ mustSendResult:  bool
+ executeFT() : void
+ executeMSControl() : void
FTStrategy
+ maxResponseTime:  Time
+ setMaxResponseTime(Time) : void
+ executeFT() : void
+ executeMSControl() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
+ startPeriodicMsg() : void
FTThread
+ variant1() : void
+ variant2() : void
+ saveCheckpoint() : void
+ restoreCheckpoint() : void
+ acceptanceTest() : bool
+ sendResult() : void
+ onFailure() : void
 
Figure 5.9: RB strategy class diagram. 
The execution of the RB strategy is presented in Figure 5.10. Two software 
versions or alternates are applied, defined by the variant1 and variant2 methods. The 
entry point is the execution of the executeFT method of RBStrategy, which sets the 
deadline based on the maxResponseTime attribute and suspends. The MS resumes the 
FT thread, which then executes the checkpointing (saveCheckpoint method), the 
primary block (variant1 method), and the acceptance test (acceptanceTest method); 
after that, the FT Thread suspends again. In the next activation, the MS checks the AT 
result and, if it succeeded, commands the execution of the sendResult method and 
finishes the strategy operation. Otherwise, it will command the checkpoint restoration 
(restoreCheckpoint method), the execution of an alternate block (variant2 method), 
and the reexecution of the acceptance test. If both variant executions fail in the 
acceptance test, or if deadline expiration is detected by the MS thread, no results will 
be sent and the onFailure method will be called (see description in Section 5.3.3). 
After returning from the onFailure method, the thread will be restarted. 
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Figure 5.10: RB strategy execution. 
The maximum response time parameter (maxResponseTime) must include the 
extra time needed to execute the second variant if the first variant fails. The minimum 
value for this parameter is equal to three times the clock tick interval, as shown in 
Figure 5.11, in which the clock tick interval is represented by 20 time units. In the 
first period the FT thread only sets the deadline, in the second period it executes the 
first variant, and in the third period it executes the second variant. When the FT thread 
is sending the results the deadline verification is already disabled.  
The checkpointing mechanism is application-dependent and it must save all static 
variables, global variables and class attributes that can be modified by the first variant, 
in order to be restored to their original values before running the second variant. This 
might include state data and input data that is overwritten during the computation 
process (see Figure 5.1).  Non-static local variables and variables initialized by the 
software variants do not need to be saved. For stateless threads with unmodified input 
data no checkpoint is required, and the application thread may use the default empty 
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implementation defined in the FTThread class. The acceptance test, implemented by 
the acceptanceTest method, is also application-dependent and should return true in 
case of success and false in case of failure. The default implementation of this method 
returns true. 
 
R
B 
no
de MS
Msg rec.
FT thread
idle
input msg
received
starts variant1 variant2 send
result
input msg
delivered
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
 
Figure 5.11: RB timing example. 
The RBStrategy class can also be applied to implement single version software 
techniques, as described in Table 5.2. The Checkpoint and Restart strategy only 
differs to RB because the second variant is equal to the first. Therefore, the 
implementation of the variant2 method should consist of a call to the variant1 
method. As discussed in Section 2.8.1, the Checkpoint and Restart strategy has 
limited software fault tolerance capability. 
The Restart strategy is the simplest configuration.  In that strategy, the default 
acceptanceTest method it used, and therefore, the only error detection mechanism is 
deadline expiration, which causes a thread restart. Despite recovering the faulty thread 
and allowing it to respond to further activations, this strategy can not avoid failures. 
The RB strategy described here is based in sequential execution in a single node. 
Therefore, state consistency mechanisms are not provided. However, it is possible to 
implement fault-tolerant configurations applying multiple replicas of RB threads, if 
these threads are stateless, as shown in Figure 5.12.  
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Node1
:RBThread
Node2
:RBThread
SenderNode
: SenderThread
ReceiverNode
: ReceiverThread
data_in data_out
 
Figure 5.12: Stateless RB threads configuration example. 
In this configuration, both RBThreads receive messages with the string “data_in” 
as subject from SenderThread, and send their results in a message with the string 
“data_out” as subject. The ReceiverThread subscribes to “data_out” messages but sets 
the option for discarding duplicate messages (see Section 4.4.1). Therefore, only the 
first message from RBThreads will be delivered. The RB strategy provides software 
fault tolerance while its redundant execution provides hardware fault tolerance. If the 
RB threads were not stateless, the output messages of the two RBThreads would 
diverge in case of failure in one of them.  
5.5.2 Distributed Recovery Blocks strategy 
The Distributed Recovery Blocks (DRB) strategy, described in Section 2.8.3, 
coordinates the execution of two RB-like threads in distinct nodes, using a 
primary/shadow configuration, in which only the primary thread sends its results. 
Although not defined by the DRB strategy [64], the implementation of DRB in this 
framework provides a mechanism for maintaining the state consistency between 
replicas, in order to support state threads. 
Figure 5.13 shows a class diagram that only presents classes, attributes and 
methods directly related to the DRB strategy operation.  The DRB technique is 
implemented by the DRBStrategy class, which derives from FTStrategy. The class 
structure differences from RBStrategy to DRBStrategy are: 
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• DRBStrategy implements the processMiddlewareMsg method to handle messages 
received from the other replica. 
• DRBStrategy implements the startPeriodicMsg method to trigger the transmission 
of messages used to detect role conflicts between replicas. 
• DRBStrategy contains an enumeration object called myDRBRole to define the 
thread role: primary or shadow. 
• DRBStrategy uses the isPrimaryDone and isShadowDone attributes to keep track 
whether the primary and shadow threads have succeeded in the acceptance test. 
• DRBStrategy uses the isFirstActivation and hasFinishedInitialization attributes to 
support the implementation of state initialization. 
FTStrategy
+ maxResponseTime:  Time
+ setMaxResponseTime(Time) : void
+ executeFT() : void
+ executeMSControl() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
+ startPeriodicMsg() : void
FTThread
+ hasState:  bool
+ variant1() : void
+ variant2() : void
+ saveCheckpoint() : void
+ restoreCheckpoint() : void
+ acceptanceTest() : bool
+ sendResult() : void
+ onFailure() : void
+ getState(char *) : int
+ setState(int, char *) : void DRBStrategy
+ waitingForMS:  bool
+ passedAT:  bool
+ tryBlock:  short
+ mustSendResult:  bool
+ myDRBRole:  DRBRole
+ isPrimaryDone:  bool
+ isShadowDone:  bool
+ isFirstActivation:  bool
+ hasFinishedInitialization:  bool
+ executeFT() : void
+ executeMSControl() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
+ startPeriodicMsg() : void
«enumeration»
DRBStrategy::
DRBRole
+ PRIMARY:  int
+ SHADOW:  int
+myDRBRole
 
Figure 5.13: DRB strategy class diagram. 
The execution of the DRBStrategy is presented in Figure 5.14. The primary thread 
runs variant1 as primary block and variant2 as an alternate.  The shadow thread runs 
these variants in the reverse order.  
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Figure 5.14: DRB strategy execution. 
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At the entry point, the thread checks the need for state initialization based on the 
hasState attribute of FTThread and the isFirstActivation attribute of DRBStrategy, 
which is reset at startup. If state initialization is needed, the thread aborts operation 
and will only execute in the next activation. In the meanwhile, a state message from a 
previously initialized DRB thread should be received. If this message is not received, 
the thread assumes that no other node has been running previously, and therefore the 
default initialization values are taken. In both cases, the deadline is set and the thread 
begins its normal RB-like execution. 
There are different control algorithms for primary and shadow DRB threads. A 
primary thread executes as if it were alone, similarly to the RB strategy execution 
shown in Figure 5.10. However, if it misses the deadline it will be restarted as a 
shadow thread. Additionally, a primary thread sends a message indicating success in 
the acceptance test, and also a state message just after sending its results.  
The shadow thread behaves differently, as it must execute the second variant, 
perform the acceptance test, and wait for the acceptance test message from the 
primary thread. In this implementation, the timeout for waiting this message is equal 
to the execution deadline. Therefore, when this deadline expires, the MS thread in the 
shadow node verifies the isPrimaryDone and isShadowDone variables to decide one 
of the possible outcomes:  
• exit the shadow execution silently, if both threads have succeeded; 
• restart the shadow thread, if it has failed; or 
• change the role of the shadow thread to primary and allow it to send its results, if 
only the former primary has failed. 
As shown in Figure 5.14, three types of messages are exchanged between DRB 
replicas: 
• AT success message: this message is generated by the primary thread to inform 
the shadow thread about the success in executing an acceptance test.  
• State message: this message contains state data needed to initialize a state thread. 
The getState method of FTThread must be implemented for state threads. This 
method serializes the state data that is assembled in the state message. The 
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returning value of getState is the state data size. In the receiving side, the setState 
method deserializes this data to the proper variables. A stateless FT thread should 
not implement the getState and setState methods. In that case, the default 
implementation of getState will return zero as state data size, which will set the 
hasState attribute of FTThread to false. This is accomplished just at initialization 
time. 
• Role message: this message is sent periodically by both the primary and shadow 
nodes to allow the detection and correction of role conflicts (primary/shadow 
definitions). The receiving thread checks if the other replica role is equal to its 
own, and if so, executes a role conflict resolution algorithm based on the node 
identification number (see Section 4.4.2). The priority used in role conflicts is 
inversely proportional to the node identification number. A DRB thread always 
starts executing as shadow and therefore two DRB threads starting at the same 
time will have the same role. That situation will be corrected as soon as the higher 
priority thread receives the first role message from the lower priority thread, and 
changes its role to primary. The period of the role message is defined by the 
MiddlewareScheduler, as described in Section 5.4.2.  Another role conflict 
situation occurs when both the primary and shadow threads fail, and consequently 
are restarted as shadow.  
Figure 5.15 shows a DRB strategy configuration example similar to the one 
presented in Figure 5.12 for the RB strategy. This configuration uses middleware 
messages with subject “FTStatus” to send role, state and AT success messages as 
explained above. Note that only the primary DRBThread sends its results to 
ReceiverThread. 
The minimum value for maximum response time (maxResponseTime parameter) 
in the DRB strategy depends on many factors, such as the message transmission time 
from the primary to the shadow node. Figure 5.16 shows a timing diagram that 
presents the worst situation, in which the primary node starts executing after the 
shadow node and fails in the execution of the first variant. In this figure, one clock 
tick interval is represented by ten units of time. 
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Node1
:DRBThread
Node2
:DRBThread
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: SenderThread
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: ReceiverThread
data_in data_out
FTStatus
primary
shadow
 
Figure 5.15: DRB strategy configuration example. 
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Figure 5.16: DRB timing diagram. 
If we consider a small computing time for each variant execution and the worst 
possible timing between nodes, as they are not synchronized, the following time 
delays should be considered: 
• Difference between DRB threads start times. The starting time of each thread 
depends on the input message delivery to the FT threads, which happens once in 
two MS activations. In the worst scenario, the time difference between FT thread 
activations is equal to two clock tick intervals (2 ∆ck). 
• DRB primary thread execution time. If the computation time of the variants is 
small (e.g. half of a clock tick interval), the total execution time, excluding the 
time spent in sending the results, is equal to three clock tick intervals (3 ∆ck). 
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• Message transmission time. This is the delay in transmitting the AT success 
message between the primary and the shadow node. This time is called ∆M.  
• Message delivery time. This is the time delay between receiving a message in the 
shadow node and delivering it to the MS thread mailbox. In worst case scenario 
this delay is equal to two clock tick intervals (2 ∆ck).  
• Shadow exit delay. This is the time spent from the message delivery to the MS 
mail box to the moment when the FT thread runs again after this AT message is 
read by the MS thread. This delay is about one clock tick interval (∆ck). 
The sum of all the delays described above is equal to 8 ∆ck + ∆M. This represents 
the minimum value of maxResponseTime for DRB execution. For example, if the 
clock tick interval is 2 ms, and the network transmission delay is 10 ms, then 
maxResponseTime should be at least 26 ms. 
The DRBStrategy class can be applied to implement the PSP single version 
software technique, as described in Table 5.2. In that case, the variant2 
implementation should call the variant1 method. As explained in Section 2.8.3, this 
configuration has limited software fault tolerance capability, but is effective against 
hardware permanent and transient faults. 
5.5.3 N-Version Programming strategy 
The N-Version Programming (NVP) strategy, described in Section 2.8.4, consists 
of the concurrent execution of software variants followed by a decision mechanism, 
usually implemented by majority voting. The implementation of NVP in this 
framework is limited to three software variants because it is the minimum 
configuration needed to mask one active fault. The utilization of more software 
versions would require additional hardware resources that are usually not available for 
small-scale embedded systems. 
Figure 5.13 shows a class diagram that only presents classes, attributes and 
methods directly related to the NVP strategy operation.  The NVP technique is 
implemented by the NVPStrategy class, which derives from FTStrategy. This class 
implements the executeFT method, which defines the FT thread behavior and the 
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executeMSControl method, which defines the MiddlewareScheduler thread behavior. 
Additionally, this class also implements the processMiddlewareMsg method for 
processing state messages received from NVP threads in other nodes.  
FTStrategy
+ maxResponseTime:  Time
+ setMaxResponseTime(Time) : void
+ executeFT() : void
+ executeMSControl() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
+ startPeriodicMsg() : void
FTThread
+ hasState:  bool
+ variant1() : void
+ variant2() : void
+ variant3() : void
+ sendResult() : void
+ onFailure() : void
+ getState(char *) : int
+ setState(int, char *) : void
NVPStrategy
+ variantNumber:  short
+ isFirstActivation:  bool
+ hasFinishedInitialization:  bool
+ setVariant(short) : void
+ executeFT() : void
+ executeMSControl() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
 
Figure 5.17: NVP strategy class diagram. 
The NVPStrategy class has an attribute to define the variant that should be 
executed (variantNumber). This attribute is set at initialization time by the setVariant 
method, and it is not supposed to change at runtime. The advantage of having three 
software variants in the same class, instead of defining three different application 
threads, is to smooth the process of deployment. Using this design solution, the same 
software can be loaded in all embedded systems, and the definition about which 
variant a node will execute can be taken at runtime. A possible implementation is to 
define the variant to execute based on some node identification (e.g. IP number).  
Similarly to DRBStrategy, NVPStrategy uses the isFirstActivation and 
hasFinishedInitialization attributes to support the implementation of state 
initialization. 
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If only one software version is available, the NVPStrategy can be used to 
implement a TMR strategy. In that case, only the variant1 method must be 
implemented and the variantNumber attribute must be set to one.  
The execution of the NVP strategy is presented in Figure 5.18.  At the entry point, 
the thread checks the need for state initialization based on the hasState attribute of 
FTThread and the isFirstActivation attribute of NVPStrategy, which is reset at startup. 
If state initialization is needed, the thread aborts operation and will only execute in the 
next activation. In the meanwhile, a state message from a previously initialized NVP 
thread should be received. Then, the deadline is set and the thread selects one variant 
for execution based on the variantNumber attribute. At the end of the variant 
execution, a result message is sent to one or more voter threads. Besides, a state 
message is sent if the hasState attribute is set. 
 
Figure 5.18: NVP strategy execution. 
In this strategy, the MiddlewareScheduler thread only verifies if the deadline has 
expired. If the deadline expires, the onFailure method is called and the thread is 
restarted. 
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The state initialization mechanism is exemplified in Figure 5.19. In this situation, 
the NVP thread #1 was already running when NVP threads #2 and #3 started. In the 
first activation after starting, the joining NVP threads skip any processing and wait for 
a state message to initialize state data. In the next activation they start their normal 
execution. If the joining threads do not receive any state message they still start 
running in the next activation, but in that case they use the default state data. That 
situation happens if all threads start at the same time. This means that state threads 
loose one activation event to perform state initialization.  
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Figure 5.19: NVP state initialization example. 
The NVPStrategy class only takes care of the computation process. The NVP 
technique also depends on one or more voter threads that receive result messages from 
the FT threads and select a result based on majority voting. Figure 5.20 presents three 
possible voting configurations. NVP threads subscribe to the “input_data” subject and 
send their results using “unvoted-data” as subject. One or more voter threads receive 
the result messages and select one result which is sent using “voted_data” as subject. 
The communication between NVP threads (state messages) and voter threads (role 
messages) are not shown in these figures. In Figure 5.20a, only one voter is used and 
therefore a failure in the node where the voter is running will lead to a system failure. 
Figure 5.20b contains a configuration that uses one voter for each NVP thread, usually 
running in the same node. That configuration tolerates permanent failures in one or 
two nodes. The configuration in Figure 5.20c is similar to the one in Figure 5.20c, but 
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only the master voter sends the selected result. That mechanism is termed 
coordinated voting, while the configuration in Figure 5.20b is termed free voting.  
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Figure 5.20: Voting configurations. 
The implementation of voters depends on the middleware support for message 
identification, as described in Section 4.4.1, in order to define when a new voting 
problem or cycle begins. Therefore, NVP threads must send a common identification 
number in their result messages for each voting cycle. One possible solution is to 
include this identification in the input message. However, the activation of NVP 
threads and the output of voter threads can be performed without messages. NVP 
threads can be activated by a timing mechanism but they must agree in the generation 
of the message identification number sent to voter threads. This can be accomplished 
by the state data coordination mechanism provided by the NVP strategy. Similarly, 
voter threads can send or use the selected result by other means, as for instance, 
sending data to hardware devices. If the outputs of the voter threads are sent to 
another BOSS thread, there is no need for coordinated voting, as the middleware is 
able to discard duplicate messages. If otherwise only one message must be sent to the 
successor task or if only one voter must drive a hardware device, then coordinated 
voting should be used.   
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  Voter threads are implemented by means of the VoterThread class, shown in 
Figure 5.21. VoterThread derives from thread and defines the following virtual 
functions that must be implemented by application voters: 
• storeSolution: saves result data (also called “solution”) received from a NVP 
thread. 
• fingEqualSolution: compares the last received data from a NVP thread with 
previous received and stored data, trying to find a match (“equal” solution) using 
an application-specific procedure.  
• sendResult: outputs the selected result. 
The nextSolIndex attribute is initialized with zero at the beginning of a voting 
cycle and should be used by application voters as an index to store and compare result 
data.   
Thread
VoterThread
# nextSolIndex:  short
# myVoterType:  VoterType
# myVoterRole:  VoterRole
- maxResponseTime:  Time
- currentMsgID:  unsigned short
- previousMsgID:  unsigned short
- hasStartedElection:  bool
- higherSlaveCandidate:  bool
# initVoting(VoterType, Time) : void
# executeVoting(unsigned short) : void
# storeSolution() : void
# findEqualSolution() : bool
# sendResult() : void
+ checkTimeoutVoting() : void
+ startPeriodicMsg() : void
+ processMiddlewareMsg(...) : void
«enumeration»
VoterThread::VoterType
+ FREE:  int
+ COORDINATED:  int
«enumeration»
VoterThread::VoterRole
+ MASTER:  int
+ SLAVE:  int
BasicMsg:class
StdVoter
+ inMsg:  IncommingMessageAdministrator<BasicMsg, 20>
- resultData:  char ([MAXSOL][MAX_SERIALIZE_SIZE])
- inputSubject:  char*
- outputSubject:  char*
+ StdVoter(...)
+ run() : void
+ storeSolution() : void
+ findEqualSolution() : bool
+ sendResult() : void
ApplicationVoter
# run(void) : void
# storeSolution() : void
# findEqualSolution() : bool
# sendResult() : void
 
Figure 5.21: VoterThread class diagram. 
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VoterThreads can run free or coordinated, as defined by the myVoterType 
attribute. In coordinated voting, the myVoterRole keeps the role definition: master or 
slave. The maximumResponseTime attribute is used to define the deadline for each 
voting cycle. Both the coordination method and the response time are initialized by 
the initVoting method. The executeVoting method must be called after each voter 
activation (e.g. after receiving a message) and it must receive an identification number 
as a parameter. The currentMsgID and previousMsgID attributes keep track of the 
recent identification numbers and are used to detect a new voting cycle and also late 
arriving messages from previous cycles. The hasStartedElection and 
higherSlaveCandidate attributes are used to perform the master election in 
coordinated voting. The deadline of a voting cycle is verified periodically by the 
MiddlewareScheduler thread, using the checkTimeoutVoting method. Other methods 
called by the MS thread are startPeriodicMsg, which triggers a role message 
transmission in case of coordinated voting and processMiddlewareMsg, which 
processes incoming role messages. 
The StdVoter class defines a standard application voter that performs inputs and 
outputs using messages and executes exact voting, as described in Section 5.3.3. This 
class embeds a mail box for receiving messages of a type defined by a template 
parameter (BasicMsg). The memory used to store incoming results from NVP threads 
is defined by the resultData attribute. The subjects of the input and output messages is 
kept by the inputSubject and ouputSubject attributes. The initialization of these 
attributes, as well as others, as coordination method and response time is performed 
by the class constructor. 
A voting execution diagram is presented in Figure 5.22.  The entry point is the 
execution of the executeVoting method of VoterThread. The detection of a new voting 
cycle is performed by comparing the received identification number of the current and 
previous cycle’s identification numbers. If a new voting cycle is detected, the 
storeSolution method is called and a deadline is set. If otherwise, the received 
identification is compared to the previous cycle’s identification to detect a late 
arriving message, which will cause the discarding of the result data. The result data is 
also discarded if a result has been previously selected by the voter. If none of these 
discarding situations occur, the storeSolution and findEqualSolution methods are 
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called. If the findEqualSolution method return true, indicating that a match between 
different stored result data (“equal” solution) was found, and the voter is allowed to 
send outputs (free voter or master), the sendResult method is called.  
 
Figure 5.22: Voting execution diagram. 
While a voting cycle is still running (no result has been selected), the MS thread 
keeps checking the VoterThread deadline. When this deadline expires, two situations 
could have happened: 
• Only one result data have been received – in that case this solution is considered 
correct, and the voter selects it for output. 
• Two or three solutions have been received but they haven’t matched – in that case 
no output is produced by the voter.  
The master election algorithm used in coordinated voting is represented by the 
state diagram in Figure 5.23.  At the beginning of an election process in a voter, the 
initial state of the algorithm will be Master or Master Candidate, depending on the 
present role of the voter, master or slave, respectively.  
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Figure 5.23: Master election state diagram. 
 Transitions in this state diagram are triggered by the reception of role messages 
from other nodes that satisfy the conditions shown in the figure. For instance, if a 
slave voter starts the election as a Master Candidate and further receives a message 
from a master voter or from a higher priority slave voter, then it changes its state to 
Slave. A voter priority is inversely proportional to its node identification number. 
Role messages are sent periodically, triggered by the MS thread, as described in 
Section 5.4.2.  The duration of an election process is twice as big as the role message 
period. At the end of the election, the final state of a voter determines its role. A role 
change is performed if one of the following situations occurs: 
• A master voter ends the election in the Slave state; or  
• A slave voter ends the election in the Master Candidate state.  
When a voter thread starts it assumes a slave role. Therefore, a lower priority 
master voter will keep its role regardless of the arriving of new higher priority voters. 
This design decision aims to minimize role changes between coordinated voters.  
The master election algorithm is executed continuously, meaning that a new 
election period starts immediately after the previous election finishes. If a master 
voter fails, the worst possible scenario occurs when it happens just after sending its 
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role message and when this message arrives to the highest priority slave at the 
beginning of an election period, as shown in Figure 5.24.   
Election k Election k+1 Election k+2
mastermastermaster
Election k+3
slave slave slave slave slave slave master master master
failure
 
Figure 5.24: Master voter failure worst scenario. 
Figure 5.24 presents a sequence of elections carried out by the higher priority 
slave voter. The last master voter role message is received at the beginning of the k+1 
election. Therefore, this voter only detects the master failure and assumes as master at 
the end of the k+2 election. The worst case recovery time from a master failure is 
equal to two election periods. For example, in a system with clock tick interval of 2 
milliseconds and running periodic messages each 100 MiddlewareScheduler 
activations, the election period would be equal to 400 milliseconds, and so the worst 
case recovery time would be equal to 800 milliseconds.  
5.6 Discussion 
The utilization of the proposed FT framework for the development of embedded 
fault-tolerant systems has several benefits: 
• It simplifies the application level programming, as programmers don’t have to 
implement fault tolerance mechanisms, but just have to provide application- 
specific parameters and procedures. The same happens regarding other distributed 
mechanisms, such as state initialization and output coordination. 
• The application program follows a standard structure in which changing the FT 
strategy becomes easy and straightforward.  This reduces efforts in strategy 
selection, configuration and testing. 
Chapter 5. Fault tolerance framework 
115 
• It facilitates the creation and integration of new fault tolerance strategies. The 
proposed framework is easily extendable by adding new FTStrategy and 
VoterThread derived classes, as described in Section 5.4.  
• Provides a means of implementing adaptive fault tolerance [52], as changing the 
FT strategy can be performed at runtime by simply calling the setStrategy 
method. The strategy can be modified based on the reliability requirements of 
each mission phase, or even for other factors as resource availability and power 
consumption. 
The drawback of the proposed FT framework is the increase in the OS memory 
footprint and runtime overhead. The FT framework is fully integrated into the 
operating system code. Therefore, even for non-fault tolerant applications some extra 
resources will be used, as it will be presented in Chapter 7. A possible solution to this 
problem is providing two versions of the operating system: with and without the FT 
framework. However, this solution demands the utilization of more than one version 
of some operating system classes, which makes software development and 
maintenance more difficult. In Chapter 6 it will be presented a solution to this 
problem using AOP. 
5.7 Summary 
A framework to support application-level fault tolerance was designed and 
implemented. This framework is easily customizable and extensible, providing 
mechanisms for hardware and software fault tolerance. The design goals were 
simplicity and efficiency, in order to run in small-scale real-time embedded systems. 
 The units of fault tolerance in this framework are the BOSS threads. This 
approach provides better mechanisms for system recovery, such as thread restarting. 
The thread model for fault-tolerant threads supports both state threads and stateless 
threads, and it is commonly used in the design of fault-tolerant systems. 
The application of fault tolerance in an existing system is straightforward. An FT 
object must be created and registered. Additionally, some parameters and methods 
must be provided by the application program. The framework is responsible for 
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executing the selected FT strategy and for exchanging messages needed in the 
implemention of these strategies, such as the ones related to role definitions and state 
consistency.  
Three main fault tolerance strategies were implemented: RB, DRB and NVP, but 
other single version strategies may be derived from them. Detailed descriptions of 
each strategy class structure and execution algorithm were presented. Furthermore, 
worst case scenarios in terms of execution times for each FT strategy have been 
exhibited. The development and integration of new FT strategies into the framework 
is simple and do not imply modifications in other framework classes.  
The utilization of the proposed FT framework featured several advantages over 
ad-hoc implementations, simplifying the application-level programming and 
improving the system configurability and extensibility.  
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Chapter 6 
Applying AOP for fault tolerance 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the application of AOP to support the 
implementation of fault tolerance. In this work, AOP was applied for three 
different purposes: (1) modularize the fault tolerance code at the 
application level; (2) integrate the FT framework into the operating 
system; and (3) implement fault tolerance at the operating system level. 
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6.1 Application-level fault tolerance 
The FT framework described in the last chapter can be used to convey fault 
tolerance to an existing application. In order to build a fault-tolerant application, the 
source code of critical threads must be modified. For instance, the source code shown 
in Figure 6.1 presents a non fault-tolerant thread, while Figure 6.2 shows the source 
code of the same thread after fault tolerance introduction. The main differences 
between these source codes are highlighted. This modification can lead to the 
introduction of coding errors and also can make maintenance more difficult, as two 
software versions now exist: the original and the fault-tolerant. These versions should 
remain compatible throughout their evolution, aiming to allow configurability and 
reuse. As a mean to improve fault tolerance integration and maintenance, AOP 
techniques were applied to modularize all fault-tolerant code, keeping the original 
source code intact. In this work, AOP was mainly used to automatically generate the 
source code of fault tolerant threads (e.g. Figure 6.2) by weaving the original non 
fault-tolerant thread source code (e.g. Figure 6.1) with FT aspects.  
 
class ExampleThread : public Thread { 
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg,20> inMessages; 
public: 
  ExampleThread(){ ... // init code} 
   
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = inMessages.receive(); 
      process(); 
      output(); 
    } 
  } 
 
  void process(){ 
    ... // uses msg data and state data 
  } 
 
  void output(){ 
    ... // prepares output message 
    outMsg.send("exampleResult"); 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.1: Example of thread source code before fault tolerance introduction.  
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class FTExampleThread : public FTThread { 
   
  DRBStrategy myDRB; 
  Msg* recMsg; 
  Msg outMsg; 
  IncommingMessageAdministrator<Msg, 20> inMessages; 
public: 
 
  FTExampleThread(){ 
    ... // init code 
    myDRB.setMaxResponseTime(20000);  
    setFTStrategy(&myDRB); 
  } 
 
  void run () { 
    while(1) { 
      recMsg = inMessages.receive(); 
      ftStrategy->executeFT();  
    } 
  } 
 
  void variant1(){ 
    ... // same code of original process method  
  } 
 
  void sendResult(){ 
    ... // same code of original output method 
  } 
  // to be defined 
  void variant2(){ ... } 
  void saveCheckpoint(){ ... } 
  void restoreCheckpoint(){ ... } 
  bool acceptanceTest(){ ... } 
}; 
Figure 6.2: Example of thread source code after fault tolerance introduction. 
6.1.1 Code generation 
The process of generating the executable code using this approach is shown in 
Figure 6.3. Inputs and outputs of weavers, compilers and linkers are represented by 
continuous lines, while application source code dependencies are represented by 
dashed lines. The operating system, already integrated to the fault tolerance 
framework, is compiled and an OS library is generated. Abstract Strategy Aspects are 
developed for each FT strategy in the system. They define virtual pointcuts and 
standard advices used for all related Concrete Strategy Aspects. A concrete aspect 
must be defined for advising each future fault-tolerant application thread, as it will be 
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later discussed. The weaving process using AspectC++ generates a fault-tolerant 
application that is eventually compiled and linked to the OS code. 
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Figure 6.3: Code generation process using AOP at the application level. 
Using this process, all fault-tolerant code is defined inside the aspect code, and 
the non-FT application remains unchanged. The fault tolerance concern is 
consequently separated from the main functionality. 
6.1.2 AspectC++ restriction 
AspectC++ has a restriction related to the introduction of base classes that had an 
impact on this work. In AspectC++, base classes can be included but they can never 
replace an existing base class (as AspectJ does). The introduction of a base class in 
AspectC++ can lead to multiple inheritance if the target class of the introduction has 
already one base class. In Figure 6.4 we can see that the application of a base class 
introduction in the original code of Figure 6.1 does not result in the FT code of Figure 
6.2. Instead, it adds FTThread as a base class of ExampleThread in a multiple 
inheritance mechanism. 
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// Figure 6.1
class ExampleThread : public Thread {
  ...
}
// what we get 
class ExampleThread : public Thread, public FTThread {
  ...
}
aspect SomeAspect {
   advice "ExampleThread": slice class: public FTThread;
  ...
}
// what we need (Figure 6.2)
class ExampleThread : public FTThread {
  ...
}
 
Figure 6.4: AspectC++ base class introduction example. 
In AspectJ, the introduction of a base class by an aspect is always performed by 
substitution, as Java does not allow multiple inheritance. As C++ allows both single 
and multiple inheritance, AspectC++ should provide support for two kinds of base 
class introduction: by substitution and by addition. The suggestion to include the base 
class substitution functionality in AspectC++ has been sent to the AspectC++ mailing 
list [14, 15] in January and April of 2007. We hope that new versions of AspectC++ 
can support that feature.  
Some workarounds can be applied to deal with this AspectC++ restriction, but all 
involve modifications in the FT framework and cause performance or memory 
footprint penalties. The selected solution was to eliminate the FTThread class from 
the FT framework and include all its attributes and methods into the Thread class, as 
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shown in Figure 6.5 (compare with Figure 5.3). This solution avoids the usage of the 
base class introduction shown in Figure 6.4, and consequently does not incur in the 
performance overheads related to multiple or virtual inheritance. However, it 
increases the memory footprint of the final application, as non-FT threads have their 
memory size enlarged.  
VoterThread
# myVoterType:  VoterType
- maxResponseTime:  Time
# initVoting(VoterType, Time) : void
# executeVoting(unsigned short) : void
# storeSolution() : void
# findEqualSolution() : bool
# sendResult() : void
FTStrategy
+ ftThread:  Thread*
+ maxResponseTime:  Time
+ setFTThread(FTThread*) : void
+ setMaxResponseTime(Time) : void
+ executeFT() : void
BasicMsg:class
StdVoter
- outputSubject:  char*
- inputSubject:  char*
RBStrategy
Thread
+ ftStrategy:  FTStrategy*
+ setFTStrategy(FTStrategy*) : void
+ variant1() : void
+ variant2() : void
+ variant3() : void
+ saveCheckpoint() : void
+ restoreCheckpoint() : void
+ acceptanceTest() : bool
+ sendResult() : void
+ onFailure() : void
+ getState(char*) : int
+ setState(int, char*) : void
MiddlewareScheduler
DRBStrategy NVPStrategy
VoterApplicationThread
FTApplicationThread
 
Figure 6.5: FT framework modified for AOP application. 
6.1.3 AOP implementation 
This section describes the implementation of abstract and concrete aspects that 
introduce fault tolerance to threads. As an example, the ExampleThread class shown 
in Figure 6.1 will be made fault-tolerant, using the DRB and NVP strategies.  
Figure 6.6 shows the abstract aspect related to the DRB strategy. This aspect is 
general and can be applied by all threads using this strategy and other single version 
strategies related to it. Similar abstract aspects were developed for the RB and NVP 
strategies. Initially this aspect declares three virtual pointcuts (lines 2-4) that will be 
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defined by concrete aspects. These pointcuts represent the thread class under 
modification (DRBClass) and the original methods for processing (ProcessMethod) 
and output (OutputMethod). The integer maxResponseTime (line 5) keeps the 
maximum response time for execution, which must be defined by concrete aspects. 
The introduction of the DRBStrategy object definition is carried out using the 
AspectC++ slice construction (line 7), which is used to extend the static structure of a 
program. The initialization of this object, as well as its registration, is performed by 
the advice in line 13, which uses the constr pointcut (line 11), similarly as done in the 
constructor code of the non-AOP version in Figure 6.2. 
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aspect DRBStrategyAbstract { 
  pointcut virtual DRBClass() = 0; 
  pointcut virtual ProcessMethod() = 0; 
  pointcut virtual OutputMethod() = 0; 
  int maxResponseTime; 
 
  advice DRBClass(): slice class {   
    private: 
      DRBStrategy myDRB;             
  }; 
  pointcut constr() = construction(DRBClass()); 
 
  advice constr(): after(){ 
    tjp->target()->myDRB.setMaxResponseTime( maxResponseTime ); 
    tjp->target()->setFTStrategy(&(tjp->target()->myDRB)); 
  } 
 
  pointcut compute()= call(ProcessMethod()) && 
     target( DRBClass() ) && !within( "% ...::variant%(...)" ); 
 
  advice compute(): around(){ 
    tjp->target()->ftStrategy->executeFT(); 
  }  
  pointcut result()= call(OutputMethod()) && 
   target( DRBClass() ) && !within( "% ...::sendResult(...)" ); 
 
  advice result(): around(){ 
  }  
}; 
Figure 6.6: DRB strategy abstract aspect. 
The compute pointcut (line 18) defines a condition in which the processing 
method of the non-FT thread is called in the original code.  The around advice related 
to this pointcut (line 21) will replace this call by the activation of the executeFT 
method of the FTStrategy class. Similarly, the result pointcut (line 24) defines a 
condition in which the output method of the non-FT thread is called in the original 
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code. The around advice related to this pointcut (line 28) will just suppress this call, as 
the activation of the thread output is going to be controlled by the FTStrategy object. 
The concrete aspect to make ExampleThread fault-tolerant is shown in Figure 6.7. 
The aspect inherits from the DRBStrategyAbstract aspect and initially defines its 
virtual pointcuts (lines 3-5). In this case, the target thread is “ExampleThread”, the 
processing method is “process” and the output method is “output”, as seen in Figure 
6.1. 
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aspect DRBExampleConcrete: public DRBStrategyAbstract { 
 
  pointcut DRBClass() = "ExampleThread"; 
  pointcut ProcessMethod()= "% ...::process()"; 
  pointcut OutputMethod() = "% ...::output()"; 
 
  DRBExampleConcrete(){ 
    maxResponseTime = 20000; 
  } 
 
  advice DRBClass() : slice class {   
    public: 
      void variant1(){ process(); } 
      void sendResult(){output(); } 
      
      // methods to be defined 
      void variant2(){ ... } 
      void saveCheckpoint(){ ... } 
      void restoreCheckpoint(){...} 
      bool acceptanceTest(){...} 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.7: DRB strategy concrete aspect example. 
The maximum response time for this strategy is set to 20.000 microseconds in the 
aspect constructor (line 8), by initializing a base abstract variable. After that, several 
methods are introduced in the target thread. The virtual method variant1 (line 13) is 
responsible for running the primary block in DRB, and in this case it must execute the 
original processing of ExampleThread. Similarly, the virtual method sendResult (line 
14) must call the original output method. Here it can be noticed that the calls to 
process and output in the introduced methods variant1 and sendResult will not trigger 
the execution of the advices defined by the compute and result pointcuts in the 
DRBStrategyAbstract aspect of Figure 6.6 because the within scope pointcut function 
is being applied. Finally, the application-specific methods are defined for this strategy 
(lines 17-20), such as variant2 (recovery block) and saveCheckpoint. After the 
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weaving process, the new ExampleThread code becomes functionally equivalent as 
the non-AOP version of Figure 6.2. 
Figure 6.8 presents the abstract aspect to implement the NVP strategy using a 
StdVoter class. The differences to the abstract aspect for the DRB strategy of Figure 
6.6 are highlighted.  
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aspect NVPstdStrategyAbstract { 
  pointcut virtual NVPClass() = 0; 
  pointcut virtual ProcessMethod() = 0; 
  pointcut virtual OutputMethod() = 0; 
  int maxResponseTime; 
  int variant; 
  char inputSubject[20]; 
 
  advice NVPClass(): slice class {   
    private: 
      NVPStrategy myNVP;             
  }; 
  pointcut constr() = construction(NVPClass()); 
 
  advice constr(): after(){ 
    tjp->target()->myNVP.setMaxResponseTime( maxResponseTime ); 
    tjp->target()->myNVP.setVariant(variant); 
    tjp->target()->setFTStrategy(&(tjp->target()->myNVP)); 
  } 
 
  pointcut compute()= call(ProcessMethod()) && 
     target( NVPClass() ) && !within( "% ...::variant%(...)" ); 
 
  advice compute(): around(){ 
    tjp->target()->ftStrategy->executeFT(); 
  }  
  pointcut result()= call(OutputMethod()) && 
   target( NVPClass() ) && !within( "% ...::sendResult(...)" ); 
 
  advice result(): around(){}  
 
  pointcut sendMessage()= call(“%Message::send(...)”) && 
    that( NVPClass() ) && within ( OutputMethod() ); 
 
  advice sendMessage(): before(){ 
    *tjp->arg<0>() = inputSubject; 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.8: NVP strategy with StdVoter abstract aspect. 
The variant attribute (line 6) keeps the variant number executed by this node, and 
it is defined by the concrete aspect. The variant number is set in NVPStrategy object 
in line 17, inside the advice of the target thread constructor. The most remarking 
difference to the DRB strategy is the need to advise the call to the send method of the 
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Message class inside the output method of the target thread, as defined by the 
sendMessage pointcut (line 32). This happens because the fault-tolerant thread now 
has to send its results to a voter thread instead of the final destinations, and so the 
subject of the output message has to change. In the advice in line 35, the input 
argument to the Message::send method is changed to the subject of input messages to 
the voter (line 7), which is defined by the concrete aspect. 
An example of NVP concrete aspect (using StdVoter) applied to the same 
ExampleThread of Figure 6.1 is shown in Figure 6.9.  The main differences to the 
DRB concrete aspect of Figure 6.7 are highlighted.  
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aspect NVPExampleConcrete: public 
                             NVPstdStrategyAbstract { 
 
  pointcut NVPClass() = "ExampleThread"; 
  pointcut ProcessMethod()= "% ...::process()"; 
  pointcut OutputMethod() = "% ...::output()"; 
  StdVoter<Msg> myVoter; 
 
  NVPExampleConcrete() 
    : myVoter(“voter”, VoterThread::COORDINATED, 15000, 
            “toTheVoter”, “exampleResult”) 
  { 
    maxResponseTime = 20000; 
    variant = defineMyVariant(); 
  } 
 
  advice NVPClass() : slice class {   
    public: 
      void variant1(){ process(); } 
      void sendResult(){output(); } 
      
      // methods to be defined 
      void variant2(){ ... } 
      void variant3(){ ... } 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.9: NVP strategy with StdVoter concrete aspect example. 
The StdVoter object is defined in line 7. This object cannot be an attribute of the 
abstract aspect because it depends on the type of the Message object used to exchange 
the results (e.g. Msg), and this is application-dependent. The StdVoter constructor is 
called by the aspect constructor (line 10). The parameters taken by this constructor are 
described in Table 5.3. In this example, coordinated voting is selected and the 
maximum response time for a voting cycle is set to 15.000 microseconds. The subject 
of input messages to the voter is defined arbitrarily as “toTheVoter” and the subject of 
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output messages from the voter is defined compulsorily as “exampleResult”, the same 
used by the output method of ExampleThread. 
The variant attribute set in line 14 will define which variant method (1, 2, or 3) 
will be called for processing. In this example, all nodes will be able to run any variant, 
and the definition about what variant they will run will be taken at runtime, using the 
defineMyVariant function. A possible implementation of this function can be to define 
the variant based on some non-volatile identification of the node. Finally, the 
application-specific methods are defined for this strategy (lines 23-24). The NVP 
strategy requires an extra variant in relation to the DRB strategy (line 24), but in 
contrast does not require the implementation of checkpointing or acceptance tests. If 
only TMR is implemented, there is no need to define variant2 and variant3, and the 
variant attribute should be set to 1(one) in line 14. 
6.1.4 Discussion 
The basic goal of the AOP implementation shown in the previous sections was to 
modularize all fault tolerant code used at the application thread level, keeping the 
original code unchanged. The advantages of this approach are: 
• It is less prone to errors in porting a non-FT system to a FT one. The task of 
changing an existing system to introduce fault tolerance capabilities may insert 
software faults in the original code. Using AOP the original code is preserved. 
• The programmer can initially write applications without fault tolerance in mind, 
and concentrate his efforts in the development of the functional code. Using AOP, 
fault tolerance can be applied in a second stage, after validating the core 
functionality. 
• It facilitates the evaluation and comparison of several FT configurations, as the 
developer may easily select what set of application threads will be made fault 
tolerant and on which strategy.  
• It contributes to product line development, as single or redundant systems may be 
generated by introducing or not fault tolerant aspects. 
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• It contributes to code reuse because the same functional code can be applied in 
other projects with different dependability requirements. 
Using this approach, the base code remains oblivious to the fault tolerant concern, 
but on the other hand, the aspect code is very dependent on the base code it applies to. 
This fact is related to the nature of fault tolerance domain, where for each FT 
instantiation we may need to define specific deadlines, error detection, alternative 
procedures, checkpoints, state coordination, voting specifications, and so on. For that 
reason, concrete aspects are normally heterogeneous and can target only one 
application thread. However, depending on the characteristics of the application 
process and the selected fault tolerant strategy, less application-specific code may be 
needed. In our opinion, a complete homogeneous fault tolerance injection is very hard 
to achieve.  
The main drawback of using AOP for application-level fault tolerance 
introduction is related to the very limited availability of aspect-oriented weavers and 
tools for embedded development. The AspectC++ compiler used in this work is still in 
beta testing and has some restrictions, such as the one described in Section 6.1.2. In 
Section 6.4 we discuss the need to use special configuration tools for AOP 
development. 
We conclude that AOP is very useful in the fault tolerance domain because it 
reduces efforts and errors in making a legacy system fault-tolerant, simplifies system 
development by allowing the validation of the functional part in advance, facilitates 
the evaluation and comparison of various FT configurations, and contributes to 
product line development and code reuse. 
6.2 FT framework integration 
The FT framework implementation is intertwined with some of the BOSS 
operating system classes. For instance, the Thread class of BOSS includes additional 
attributes and methods related to the fault tolerance implementation, as seen in Figure 
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6.5. Even in the former implementation of the FT framework2, the original BOSS 
Thread class had to be modified to include some attributes, as seen in Figure 5.7.  
Ideally, the utilization of an FT framework should not affect the OS development. 
The application of AOP techniques can provide the complete physical separation of 
the FT framework from the OS code. Therefore, the development of these concerns 
can be made separately and be composed, if needed, at weaving/compilation time. 
6.2.1 Code generation 
The process of weaving the FT framework with the operating system and further 
generation of the executable code is shown in Figure 6.10.  
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Figure 6.10: Code generation process when using AOP at the OS level. 
The weaving process now also applies to the original operating system code. The 
weaving process at the application level occurs simultaneously with the weaving 
                                                 
2 The former implementation of the FT framework is the one presented in Chapter 5. The current 
implementation of the FT framework is the one shown in Figure 6.5, which avoids multiple inheritance 
when using AspectC++, as described in Section 6.1.2. 
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process at the operating sytem level. The FT framework is injected into the OS by one 
or more aspects. There are no modifications in abstract and concrete FT aspects used 
at the application level. Using this approach it is possible to reduce the code size for 
non-FT implementations and also to apply aspects for other concerns at the operating 
system level, as logging, synchronization and middleware customization.  
Figure 6.11 shows an alternative code generation process, where two executions 
of AspectC++ weaving are performed: the first for weaving at the OS code and the 
second for weaving at the application code. This configuration avoids the regeneration 
of the OS library each time the application code is changed. However, it can not be 
applied if the same aspect has to advice both the OS and the application.  AspectC++ 
was designed to allow weaving on a pre-woven source code, which is the case in this 
configuration, as the include files related to the OS were modified by the first weaving 
process. 
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Figure 6.11: Alternative code generation process with double weaving. 
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6.2.2 AOP implementation 
This section describes the AOP implementation that integrates the FT framework 
into the BOSS operating system. Two aspects were used. The first one, shown in 
Figure 6.12, modifies the TimeManager class to activate the MiddlewareScheduler 
(MS) thread at the beginning of each clock tick interval. The timeEvent method is 
called from the clock tick ISR. This aspect adds an after advice to this method 
execution (line 5), which resumes the MS thread (resetting waitingUntil) if this thread 
is not waiting a resource (e.g. semaphore). 
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aspect FTFramework_1: { 
  pointcut MSActivation()=  
         execution(“%...:: TimeManager::timeEvent()”); 
 
  advice MSActivation(): after(){ 
     if(middlewareScheduler.waitingForSignalFrom == NULL){ 
        middlewareScheduler.waitingUntil=0; 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.12: MiddlewareScheduler activation aspect. 
The second aspect is presented in Figure 6.13. This aspect introduces FT 
attributes and methods to the Thread class, and also advises its constructor (line 33). 
The named slice class FTThreadSlice defines a set of data members and member 
functions that will be added to the Thread class (line 31). Most methods are virtual 
functions and have empty or default implementations (see Table 5.1). Others, such as 
initFTThread and setFTStrategy are non-inline functions whose implementations are 
defined in lines 26 and 27.  
As a result of the aspect code defined in Figure 6.13, AspectC++ will append 
FTThreadSlice to the Thread class declaration (in Thread.h), but the implementation 
of initFTThread and setFTStrategy will be added to the Thread implementation file 
(Thread.cc). 
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slice class FTThreadSlice { 
public: 
  enum FTType{NONE, FT, VOTER}; 
  FTType myFTType; 
  bool isRunningFT;  
  bool isVoting;   
 
  FTStrategy * ftStrategy; 
  bool hasState; 
 
  virtual void variant1(){}   
  virtual void variant2(){} 
  virtual void variant3(){}   
  virtual void saveCheckpoint(){} 
  virtual void restoreCheckpoint(){}  
  virtual bool acceptanceTest(){return true;}  
  virtual void sendResult(){} 
  virtual void onFailure(){} 
  virtual int getState(char * stateBuff) {return 0;} 
  virtual void setState(int size, char * stateBuff){} 
 
  void initFTThread(); 
  void setFTStrategy();   
}; 
 
slice void FTThreadSlice::initFTThread() {...}; 
slice void FTThreadSlice::setFTStrategy() {...}; 
 
aspect FTFramework_2{ 
 
  advice “Thread” : slice FTThreadSlice; 
 
  advice construction(“Thread”): after() {  
    tjp->target()->initFTThread();  
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.13: Aspect for introducing FT attributes and methods in the Thread class. 
6.2.3 Discussion 
The application of AOP to integrate the FT framework into the operating system 
allows a complete physical separation of the FT framework from the OS code. This 
approach solves the problem described in Section 5.6 in regard to the maintainance of 
more than one version of the same operating system class, in order to optionally build 
the operating system without FT support.   
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6.3 Operating system fault tolerance 
The application of fault tolerance at the operating system level requires the 
implementation of error detection mechanisms, as presented in Section 2.3. These 
mechanisms involve the execution of extra processing at pre-defined points of the OS 
code, also termed executable assertions. Assertions can check if preconditions and 
post conditions are fulfilled when performing a given OS functionality. Error 
detection mechanisms can also apply structural checks to detect errors in variables 
and data structures. Information redundancy is commonly used in order to allow the 
detection of errors in data structures.  
The application of error detection mechanisms at the operating system level 
results in resource costs, such as memory size and runtime overhead. Therefore, fault 
tolerance at the OS level is normally avoided in resource constrained embedded 
systems. However, for systems demanding high level of dependability, such as safety-
critical applications, the implementation of FT mechanisms in the OS can be of great 
importance.  
In this section we presented how to implement error detection mechanisms at the 
operating system level using AOP. The examples shown are inspired by the work with 
fault containment wrappers [13, 100]. Wrappers are used to implement the interface 
between the application code and the OS, monitoring the flow of information and 
applying error detection and error handling mechanisms. The proposed wrappers were 
meant to be used to detect errors in off-the-shelf microkernels whose source code is 
not available for modifications. However, the application of wrapper with no 
information on the internal OS state has limited error detection capability. 
Consequently, the proposed wrappers require access to some selected internal OS data 
by means of a meta-interface, which is accessed by meta-level programming.  The 
same predicates, or invariants, defined in [100] for semaphore error detection are 
implemented here in the BOSS operating system using AOP.  
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6.3.1 Semaphore error detection 
Semaphores in BOSS were described in Section 4.2.2. As shown in Figure 4.3, 
the Semaphore class has two main methods (enter and leave) and a counter attribute 
to keep track of the number of resources available.  
Two predicates are defined for the semaphore operation [100]. The first predicate 
defines a condition in which the counter attribute is consistent with the number of 
calls to the enter and leave methods, as stated in equation (1). The current value of the 
counter attribute should be equal to the its initial value minus the number of calls to 
method enter and plus the number of calls to method leave: 
counter = init_value - #enter + #leave    (1) 
The implementation of this predicate as an execution assertion demands the 
introduction of three new attributes to the Semaphore class (init_value, #enter and 
#leave).     
The second predicate defines a condition in which the value of the counter 
attribute is consistent with the number of suspended threads waiting for the 
semaphore.  This predicate is represented by Equation (2), where the number of 
suspended threads should be equal to the maximum between zero and the negated 
value of the current counter attribute. For instance, if the counter attribute is -3 there 
should be 3 suspended threads waiting for this semaphore, but if the counter attribute 
is greater or equal than zero no thread is suspended. 
#Suspended = max(0, -counter)  (2)  
The implementation of this predicate as an execution assertion demands the 
implementation of a search procedure for counting the number of suspended threads 
waiting for the semaphore. 
The predicates described above can be applied as preconditions or post-conditions 
of the semaphore operation in calls to the methods enter and leave. 
In Section 6.3.3 we present how to implement the verification of the above 
predicates in the Semaphore class of the BOSS operating system, using Aspect-
Oriented Programming.  
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6.3.2 Code generation 
The code generation process applied to introduce fault tolerance at the OS level is 
the same described in Section 6.2.1. The aspects used for OS fault tolerance are 
represented in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 as “OS Aspects”, similarly to the aspects 
for integrating the FT framework into the OS. 
6.3.3 AOP implementation  
Figure 6.14 shows the aspect code to implement the first predicate for semaphore 
error detection, described by Equation (1) in Section 6.3.1.  
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slice class CounterSlice { 
  int initialCounter;   
  int enterCounter; 
  int leaveCounter;  
  void checkCounter(); 
}; 
 
slice void CounterSlice::checkCounter(){ 
  int calculatedCounter = initialCounter  
                          - enterCounter + leaveCounter; 
    
  if(counter != calculatedCounter) 
     doErrorHandling(); 
} 
 
aspect SemaErrorDetect1{ 
 
  advice "Semaphore": slice CounterSlice; 
 
  advice construction("Semaphore"): after(){ 
    tjp->target()->initialCounter = tjp->target()->counter; 
    tjp->target()->enterCounter = 0; 
    tjp->target()->leaveCounter = 0; 
  } 
 
  advice execution("% Semaphore::enter(...)") : before()  { 
    tjp->target()->checkCounter(); 
    tjp->target()->enterCounter += 1; 
  } 
 
  advice execution("% Semaphore::leave(...)") : before()  { 
    tjp->target()->checkCounter(); 
    tjp->target()->leaveCounter += 1; 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.14: Semaphore error detection aspect for the first predicate. 
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CounterSlice defines the new attributes (lines 2-4) for the Semaphore class that 
are needed for the execution of the first predicate, as well as the checkCounter method 
(line 4), which implements Equation (1) in lines 9-10 and calls an error handling 
routine if the assertion fails (line 13). As it is hard to diagnose and correct the system 
state after this kind of error, a possible error handling procedure can be to reset the 
node. The SemaErrorDetect1 aspect applies CounterSlice to the Semaphore class (line 
18) and defines three advices. The fist advice (line 20), initializes the introduced 
attributes at the Semaphore class constructor. The second advice (line 26), checks the 
predicate before the execution of the enter method and then increments the 
enterCounter attribute. The third advice (line 31) checks the predicate before the 
execution of the leave method and then increments the leaveCounter attribute.  
The implementation of the predicate in Equation (2) is presented in Figure 6.15. 
This aspect code uses a slice (SuspendedSlice) that defines two new methods to the 
Semaphore class: checkSuspended and numberOfSuspended. The first method 
implements the predicate (line 6) using the second method (line 13) as a utility 
function that returns the number of threads suspended by the semaphore. The 
implementation of the numberOfSuspended method is not shown. The 
SemaErrorDetect2 aspect introduces SuspendedSlice into the Semaphore class and 
defines advices to execute checkSuspended before the execution of the enter and leave 
methods. 
The AOP implementations presented in Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15 apply the 
predicates as preconditions to the semaphore operations. Implementations considering 
the predicates as post-conditions can be performed by using after advices. 
The configuration of the semaphore functionality, i.e., if no fault tolerance is 
used, or if one or more error detection mechanisms are used, can be decided at 
compile time, by including or not the above aspects. AOP allows a complete 
modularization of the fault tolerance code, keeping the original semaphore 
implementation unchanged. 
However, the AOP implementations presented to this point have a serious flaw: 
there is no mutual exclusion between the error detection procedure and the semaphore 
normal operation. A race condition can occur, for instance, if a thread is suspended 
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during the execution of an error detection procedure and another running thread 
executes an operation in the same semaphore. In this situation it is possible that the 
error detection mechanism results in a false indication. In order to solve this problem, 
synchronization primitives must be employed in the aspect code. 
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slice class SuspendedSlice{ 
  void checkSuspended(); 
  int numberOfSuspended(); 
}; 
 
slice void SuspendedSlice::checkSuspended(){ 
  int calculatedSuspended =(counter >= 0 ? 0 : counter*(-1)); 
   
  if( mumberOfSuspended != calculatedSuspended) 
     doErrorHandling(); 
} 
 
slice int SuspendedSlice::numberOfSuspended(){...} 
 
aspect SemaErrorDetect2{ 
 
  advice "Semaphore": slice SuspendedSlice; 
 
  advice execution("% Semaphore::enter(...)") : before()  { 
    tjp->target()->checkSuspended(); 
  } 
 
  advice execution("% Semaphore::leave(...)") : before()  { 
    tjp->target()->checkSuspended(); 
  } 
}; 
Figure 6.15: Semaphore error detection aspect for the second predicate. 
 The aspect shown in Figure 6.16 solves the synchronization problem described 
above. This aspect injects the mutual exclusion mechanism (disabling dispatching) in 
the semaphore implementation.  In preparation for the application of this aspect, the 
Semaphore methods enter and leave were modified in order to expose their critical 
sections, which were enclosed by the new methods enter_in and leave_in. 
Additionally, the original calls to mutual exclusion procedures were removed. The 
SemaSyncronize aspect defines the execution of enter_in and leave_in as a pointcut 
for synchronization advices (lines 3-4). The before advice in line 6 disables the 
dispatch of other threads, by calling the disableDispatch method of Scheduler (see 
Section 4.2.2), while the after advice in line 10 enables the dispatch again by calling 
enableDispatch. The SemaErrorDetect1 (Figure 6.14) and SemaErrorDetect2 (Figure 
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6.15 ) aspects must be modified to advise over methods enter_in and leave_in, instead 
of methods enter and leave. 
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aspect SemaSyncronize{ 
 
  pointcut sync()= execution(% ...::Semaphore::enter_in(...) || 
                   execution(% ...::Semaphore::leave_in(...); 
 
  advice sync(): before() { 
    scheduler.disableDispatch(); 
  } 
 
  advice sync(): after() { 
    scheduler.enableDispatch(); 
  } 
 
  advice sync(): order(“SemaSyncronize”, “SemaErrorDetect1”); 
  advice sync(): order(“SemaSyncronize”, “SemaErrorDetect2”); 
  advice sync(): order(“SemaErrorDetect1”, “SemaErrorDetect2”); 
}; 
Figure 6.16: Synchronization aspect applied to the Semaphore class. 
The precedence of the several before advices that affect the sync pointcut is 
defined by advice ordering declarations in lines 14-15. Three aspects can inject code 
at these join points (execution of the enter_in and leave_in methods): 
SemaErrorDetect1, SemaErrorDetect2 and SemaSyncronize, all them advising before 
the join points. The given ordering declarations establish the following precedence, 
from higher to lower:  SemaSyncronize, SemaErrorDetect1 and SemaErrorDetect2. 
Therefore, the synchronization aspect is the first before advice to be executed and 
disables dispatch for the whole period concerning error detection and critical 
semaphore operation. The after advice restoring the dispatch mechanism is executed 
after the exit of the semaphore critical section.   
A sequence diagram representing the enter method behavior after weaving is 
shown in Figure 6.17. In this example of operating system FT implementation, we 
could see how AOP was able to compose three crosscutting concerns: semaphore 
basic functionality, fault tolerance and synchronization. In special, the 
synchronization aspect SemaSyncronize can be modified to apply this kind of mutual 
exclusion mechanism in other operating system functionalities, just by adding the 
desired join points to the sync pointcut in Figure 6.16.  This experiment has been 
performed in the context of this work and has been reported in [4].  
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:Semaphore : SemaSyncronize
enter()
before advice
: SemaErrorDetect1 : SemaErrorDetect2
before advice
before advice
enter_in()
after advice
return
dispatch
disabled
 
Figure 6.17: Semaphore enter method sequence diagram. 
6.3.4 Discussion 
The examples presented in the previous section show that AOP can be used 
effectively to introduce fault tolerance at the operating system level. In the context of 
this work, this approach has not been further explored, as our main target of fault 
tolerance introduction was the application level.  The examples shown here were 
inspired in fault containment wrappers, but other fault tolerance mechanisms can be 
applied. 
6.4 Project configuration using AOP  
As discussed in the previous sections, the application of AOP in projects 
involving an operating system, frameworks and applications can make use of diverse 
code generation processes. Additionally, using AOP the project configuration depends 
on the set of aspects to be woven into the base code, which must be defined prior to 
code generation. AspectC++ only considers in the weaving process the aspects 
contained in files with the .ah extension. Thus, the simpler way to disable an aspect is 
to rename the aspect file with a different extension (e.g. .ah_off). Other option is to 
copy the selected aspect files from a repository to the project directory. 
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An important project configuration issue is dealing with two or more versions of a 
base source code. The following types of base code software versions can coexist in a 
project: 
• The original version. This version may have one or more functionalities that can 
be introduced by aspects.  An example of this situation is the original version of 
the Semaphore class in BOSS, which uses synchronization features, as described 
in Section 6.3.3.  
• A refactored version for applying AOP functionality. Some refactoring in the 
source code may be needed to allow the AOP application, as for instance, the 
creation of new methods to expose joint points to the aspect code, as described for 
the Semaphore class in Section 6.3.3. 
• A modified version without a previous implemented functionality. This consists 
of a modified version that had some functionality removed from the base code in 
order to be introduced by aspects. 
Therefore, if a project can be configured to implement a given feature with or 
without AOP, more than one version of the base source code must be maintained, 
which impacts software maintenance and evolution. Possible related scenarios include 
projects where AOP is being evaluated as an alternative implementation or projects 
where AOP is applied just for debugging and is not employed in final versions. In 
these cases, the management of more than one version of the same source code file 
may be required.  
In the context of this work, project configuration had to be very flexible, in order 
to evaluate AOP implementations against pure OOP implementations. The 
configuration was entirely based on bash scripts running from the Linux’s command 
line. Scripts were used to: (a) define if AOP is applied; (b) define the AOP code 
generation process; (c) enable or disable individual aspects; and (d) select base source 
code files to be used in the code generation process. Ideally, aspect-oriented projects 
should have its configuration supported by special graphic tools used for product line 
software development, such as pure::variants [95]. An alternative approach might be 
the adoption of the configuration language used for building the Linux kernel and a 
buildroot system with graphical support like xconfig and gconfig. 
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6.5 Summary 
This chapter has described how to apply Aspect-Oriented Programming to 
support the implementation of fault tolerance at various software levels and purposes.  
The main target of AOP application is the introduction of fault tolerance at the 
application level, using the FT framework described in the previous chapter. This 
approach can be used to convey fault tolerance to an existing application without 
modifying its source code. Additionally, it modularizes the fault-tolerant code with 
advantages in flexibility and maintenance. The implementation is based on the 
definition of general abstract aspects for each FT strategy and application-specific 
concrete aspects that define the target thread and the required parameters and 
additional methods for the FT strategy execution. Abstract and concrete aspects have 
been explained based on an example of FT application using DRB and NVP. 
The utilization of AOP to apply fault tolerance at the application level has several 
benefits: it reduces errors in introducing fault tolerance to legacy systems; it allows 
the validation of the functional part in advance; and it contributes to product line 
development and code reuse. The main drawback of AOP application for embedded 
systems development is the limited support in terms of aspect weavers and tools. 
The integration of the FT framework into the operating system has also been 
discussed. Previously integrated to the operating system, the FT framework has been 
completely separated from the OS code, allowing its optional integration to be 
postponed to weaving/compilation time.  This modularization reflects in easier 
software maintenance and reduced memory footprint for non-FT applications. 
This chapter has also described the application of AOP to implement fault 
tolerance in the OS, by adding fault tolerance error detection mechanisms 
implemented as executable assertions that verify predicates or invariants related to the 
OS basic functionality. The FT functionality is introduced by aspects that can be 
optionally selected. The application of AOP for this purpose, as well as the 
relationship between the fault tolerance and the synchronization concerns has been 
exemplified using the semaphore functionality in BOSS. 
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Although AOP aims to simplify software maintenance, there may be projects in 
which AOP and pure OOP versions must coexist. In this situation several versions of 
the base code should be maintained, impacting software maintenance and evolution 
and increasing the complexity of the project configuration process; therefore the 
utilization of a graphic product line configuration tool is recommended.  
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Chapter 7 
Case studies and evaluation 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter describes the case studies developed to test the proposed FT 
framework and compares performance and costs of several configurations 
and implementations. Two case studies are presented: a sorting application 
and a radar filtering application. The description of the development and 
test environment applied in this work is initially presented.  
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7.1 Development and test environment 
This section describes the development and test environment, including the target 
and host systems and related software tools.  
7.1.1 Target systems 
The target board selected for the testing environment was the STK823L starter kit 
board from TQ Components [113]. The board uses a MPC823 microprocessor, which 
integrates a high performance PowerPC embedded processor with a Communication 
Processor Module (CPM) and a System Interface Unit (SIU).  This microprocessor 
has a 32-bits RISC architecture with 2 KB instruction cache and 1 KB data cache. The 
CPM provides support for Ethernet, serial communications including USB, I2C and 
SPI. The SIU contains a memory controller, a real-time clock and a PCMCIA 
interface. The microprocessor is mounted in a TMQ823L module that provides 8 MB 
of flash memory and 16 MB of SDRAM. A clock of 80 MHz is used in this module, 
which results in a processing power of about 100 MIPS. This module is connected to 
the STK823L main board that provides power DC conversion and several connectors 
for I/O and debugging.  
The communication among PowerPC boards in the testing environment was 
performed using an Ethernet network.  Figure 7.1 shows a testing configuration using 
three PowerPC 823 boards and a notebook computer connected by Ethernet 
interfaces.  
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the BOSS operating system has a version that runs 
on top of the Linux operating system. Therefore, any hardware running Linux is a 
potential target for BOSS applications. In fact, notebooks and desktop computers were 
used extensively as targets in the development and testing phases of this work. In 
order to improve the real-time behavior of the BOSS applications running over Linux, 
a modification in Linux version of BOSS was implemented, changing the scheduling 
priority of the BOSS process to the highest in the system.  In the configurations of the 
case studies presented later in this chapter, a notebook computer was used to act as a 
sensor or actuator. However, the utilization of personal computers (PC) to implement 
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fault-tolerant applications was avoided, because this work aims to deliver fault 
tolerance to embedded systems.   
 
 
Figure 7.1: Test environment. 
7.1.2 Host system 
The host system used in this work consisted of a PC running Linux and a cross- 
compiler based on GNU gcc versions 3.2.3 or higher. Several Linux distributions 
were used, such as Fedora Core 3/4/5, and Ubuntu 5.04. The AspectC++ weaver 
version was 1.0pre3. 
The cross-compiler toolchain received from FIRST uses an old version of GNU 
gcc (2.9) that is not compatible with current AspectC++ versions. Therefore, in this 
work, several other toolchains were tested, including a built from scratch. Eventually, 
the MPC8xx POMP cross-compiler toolchain [33] was selected because of its better 
compatibility with the PowerPC libraries received from FIRST.  
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7.1.3 Porting BOSS to the target board 
The BOSS operating system had been previously ported to a PowerPC 823 based 
board (transCON module from Yacoub Automation [123]) by the FIRST institute. 
However, the TQ board selected as target had a different configuration in terms of 
clock frequencies and memory configuration. Consequently, the initialization code 
and the PowerPC libraries received from FIRST had to be modified in order to run in 
the new board. Differently from the original port, in this port the monitor program 
received from the board vendor is kept in flash memory and starts the board 
initialization, transferring control to the OS code in a specific flash memory position 
(if a jumper is removed).  The OS initialization code concludes the board initialization 
and finally loads the OS and application code to SDRAM and jumps to it. This 
configuration allows the utilization of the board supplier’s monitor software for 
loading programs in SDRAM or flash memory if the mentioned jumper is not 
removed.  The interface to the target board for loading and debugging programs is 
based on EIA-232 communication at 115 kbps. 
7.2 Case study I: sorting application 
The first case study developed to evaluate the application of the FT framework 
was a sorting application. This application aims to sort an array of integer numbers 
generated at random using different algorithms as variants: Insertion Sort, Selection 
Sort and Bubble Sort. We chose a sorting application because they are commonly 
used as test cases for software fault tolerance strategies, such as the one described in 
[120].   
7.2.1 Testing configurations 
In this case study the following configurations were employed: non-fault-tolerant 
(non-FT), RB, DRB and NVP. Figure 7.2, Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4 show these 
configurations for Non-FT/RB, DRB and NVP respectively. In these figures, 
broadcast messages are represented by buses with the message subject on top. 
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Figure 7.2: Case study I - non-FT or RB configuration. 
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Figure 7.3: Case study I - DRB configuration. 
The Producer thread is a BOSS thread that runs over Linux in the notebook 
computer and generates 200 integer numbers that are sent by an external message to 
the network using the string “unsorted” as subject.  The Producer thread sends this 
message periodically (each 2 seconds).  
The Sorter thread is a BOSS thread that runs in the PowerPC boards and sorts the 
incoming numbers using different sorting algorithms. In the non-FT configuration, 
only one algorithm is executed and no FT mechanism is applied. In RB and DRB 
configurations, Insertion Sorts runs as the primary block and Selection Sort runs as 
the recovery block. In the NVP configuration, each node runs a different algorithm: 
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Insertion Sort as variant 1, Selection Sort as variant 2 and Bubble Sort as variant 3.  
The sorted array of integers is sent out by a message using “sorted” as subject in all 
configurations except NVP, in which the subject “unvoted” is used. In case of the 
NVP configuration, each node has an additional Voter thread that defines the final 
result based on incoming “unvoted” messages. For this particular NVP configuration 
free voting is applied, and therefore all voters send theirs results concurrently.  
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«NVP var 1»
Sorter
«NVP var 2»
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«NVP var 3»
Sorter
Voter
Voter
Voter
unsorted sortedunvoted
 
Figure 7.4: Case study I  - NVP configuration. 
The Consumer thead is a BOSS thread that runs over Linux in the notebook. It 
receives messages with “sorted” as subject and displays its data on the computer 
screen for verification. Additionally, it computes the total execution time of the 
sorting application, considering the time interval from the moment that the Producer 
thread is about to send a message to the moment that the resulting message is received 
by this thread.  As discussed in Section 4.4.1, redundant messages from voters can be 
discarded automatically by the BOSS middleware based on message identification 
generated by the Producer thread and propagated by Sorter and Voter threads.  
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In this case study, Sorter threads are stateless, and therefore the FT versions of 
these threads do not need to implement the getState and setState methods described in 
Section 5.3.3 and referred to in Table 5.1. 
7.2.2 Execution time measurements 
In this experiment, the execution times of the configurations described in the 
previous section were measured. A total execution time is defined as the time 
interval between sending a message with “unsorted” subject (by the Producer thread) 
and receiving the message with “sorted” subject (at the Consumer thread). A local 
execution time is defined as the time interval between receiving a message with 
“unsorted” subject (at a Sorter thread) and sending the message with “sorted” subject 
(by a Sorter or Voter thread).  Consequently, local execution times exclude any 
communication overhead between the notebook computer and the PowerPC boards. 
The execution times for several configurations and failure conditions are shown in 
Table 7.1 and Table 7.2. Table 7.1 presents local execution times, while Table 7.2 
presents total execution times. The results shown in these tables consist of an average 
of 10 executions. Table 7.3 presents the time settings used in this case study for the 
several configurations, as they have effect in some measured execution times. 
Table 7.1: Case study I - local execution time. 
Failure conditions 
Configuration 
No failure Failure in variant 1 
Failure in 
one node 
Failure in 
two nodes 
Insertion sort 1743 - - - 
Selection sort 3511 3511 - - 
Bubble sort 3123 3123 - - 
RB 4250 8249 - - 
DRB 4781 8701 20375  - 
NVP 9444 12716 10792 24175  
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Table 7.2: Case study I - total execution time. 
Failure conditions 
Configuration 
No failure Failure in variant 1 
Failure in 
one node 
Failure in 
two nodes 
Insertion sort 9704 - - - 
Selection sort 12495 12495 - - 
Bubble sort 10918 10918 - - 
RB 12353 17105 - - 
DRB 12690 17339 27932 - 
NVP 18815 21345 19907 32504  
Table 7.3: Case study I - time settings. 
Setting  Value (microseconds) 
Clock tick interval  2,000 
RB maximum response time 10,000 
DRB maximum response time 20,000 
NVP maximum response time 6,000 
Voter maximum response time 20,000 
 
For each configuration, four failure conditions were applied. The first one was a 
condition with no failures in any variant or node.  The Insertion Sort algorithm 
presents the shortest execution time, and therefore it was selected to run as variant 1 
(primary block in RB/DRB). As seen in these tables, the FT configurations have 
longer executions times because of the coordination with the MiddlewareScheduler 
thread, as described in Chapter 5. The clock tick interval definition, set in this case 
study to 2,000 microseconds, affects the execution time of all FT strategies. This 
setting also affects the communication times between nodes, as the distribution of 
external incoming messages to threads are performed with a period of two clock ticks 
(4,000 microseconds). In special, the NVP configuration is supposed to be the 
slowest, as additional time for results dissemination and voting is needed. 
Consequently, the maximum response time in a NVP configuration is bound to the 
sum of the maximum response time of NVP and Voter threads.  
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Figure 7.5 presents a graphical comparison of the several configurations for the 
no-failure condition. The left part of the graph is related to local execution times while 
the right part of the graph is related to total execution times. The lines above the bars 
represent the standard deviation in 10 measurements. Configurations that depend on 
message communications present the largest standard deviations. 
 
Figure 7.5: Case study I - no-failure condition. 
The second failure condition presented in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 is related to the 
failure of variant 1. An error was simulated by introducing an out of order integer to 
the results of the Insertion Sort algorithm. The error is detected by the acceptance tests 
of the RB/DRB strategies, which triggers the execution of variant 2 (Selection Sort). 
This error is masked by the voting mechanism in NVP, as variants 2 and 3 generate 
identical results. Figure 7.6 shows a comparison of local execution times between the 
no-failure condition and the variant 1 failure condition. The extra time spent by 
RB/DRB configurations is due to the execution of the second variant, while the longer 
execution time for NVP is explained by the fact that local execution times are 
measured in the node that runs variant 1, and therefore the voting decision was taken 
only after receiving the results of the other two nodes.  
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Figure 7.6: Case study I – comparison between no-failure and variant 1 failure conditions. 
The third failure condition presented in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 is related to a 
silent failure of a node. In that case, non-FT configurations fail as well single node FT 
configurations as RB. This failure was simulated by switching off the first node (the 
one running variant 1). Before turning it off, this node is acting as a primary node in 
the DRB configuration. Measurements of local execution times were taken in the 
second node (running variant 2).  
A comparison of local execution times between the no-failure condition and the 
one node failure condition is shown in Figure 7.7. The NVP execution time is not 
affected much, as the voter in the second node will get to a decision after receiving a 
message from the local NVP thread and the external message from the NVP thread of 
the third node. However, for the DRB configuration, the failure of the primary node 
has to be detected by the shadow node and consequently the DRB maximum response 
time of 20,000 microseconds is taken into account (see Table 7.3). This larger 
execution time for the DRB configuration only applies for the first activation after a 
primary node failure because the shadow node will change its role to primary and the 
execution time will drop to the same value of the no-failure condition. The RB 
configuration does not survive to a node failure and consequently its execution time is 
not represented in Figure 7.7 for this condition. 
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Figure 7.7: Case study I - comparison between no-failure and one node failure conditions. 
Finally, the last failure condition presented in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 is related to 
the silent failure of two nodes. If that situation occurs, only the NVP configuration 
succeeds. In that case, the NVP execution time depends on the deadline for voting, 
which is determined by the maximum response time of the Voter thread (see Table 
7.3).  
7.2.3 Runtime costs 
The execution times results achieved in this case study are in accordance with the 
FT framework implementation details described in Figure 5.5 and validate the correct 
functionality of the framework. However, a more demanding configuration was 
defined in order to measure runtime overheads imposed by the FT framework, 
considering different version implementations, using or not AOP (Section 6.1) and FT 
scheduling (Section 5.4.2).  
The measurement of runtime overheads in these experiments is based on CPU 
utilization. The BOSS idle thread computes the sum of CPU utilization of all other 
threads (including OS and application threads) based on its inactive periods. 
This test configuration consisted of the same sorting application, but now being 
executed concurrently by 8 Sorter threads in a single target board as shown in Figure 
7.8.  The Producer thread runs periodically in the target board and generates 5 
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random integer numbers that are sent to the Sorter thread using a local message. Two 
versions of Sorter threads are implemented: non-FT and RB. In both versions, no 
error is simulated and these versions always execute the Insertion Sort algorithm. At 
the end of their processing, the Sorter threads prepare the output message with the 
sorting results, but this message is not sent so as to decrease the CPU utilization.     
PowerPC 823  
«#1»
Sorter 
«#2»
Sorter 
«#8»
Sorter 
Producer
...
unsorted
 
Figure 7.8: Case study I - CPU utilization configuration. 
In this experiment, five different software versions were evaluated: 
• Non-FT #1: in this version the Sorter threads do not apply any fault tolerance and 
the application program was linked to a version of the OS without the FT 
framework. 
• Non-FT #2: same as above, but linked to a version of the OS integrated to the FT 
framework. 
• FT: in this version the Sorter threads apply the RB strategy. 
• FT-AOP: same as FT, but using AOP to implement fault tolerance. 
• FT-Sched: same as FT, but implementing FT scheduling. 
The CPU utilization results related to each version for several activation 
frequencies of the Producer thread are shown in Figure 7.9 and represent an average 
CPU utilization over a period of one minute, using maximum compiler optimization 
(O2).  
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Figure 7.9: Case study I - CPU utilization results. 
In Figure 7.9, a zero frequency indicates a condition where the Producer thread is 
always suspended and therefore no sorting is performed. Other frequencies plotted in 
this graph correspond to the following activation periods of the Producer thread: 46, 
22, 10 and 6 milliseconds. As it can be noticed, CPU utilization is directly 
proportional to the activation frequency. The minimum activation frequency selected 
for this experiment was 6 ms, which is a multiple of the clock tick interval of 2 ms. It 
has been verified that this period is sufficient for delivering all input messages to the 
Sorter threads in the first clock tick period, to execute the sorting/acceptance test in 
the second period and to prepare the results for sending in the last period.     
The difference in CPU utilization between the Non-FT #1 and Non-FT #2 
versions ranges from 3 to 4.3%.  This overhead is related to the activation of the 
MiddlewareScheduler (MS) thread at the beginning of each clock tick period, even if 
no FT threads exist. The CPU utilization spent by MS is similar to the utilization of 
the Non-FT #1 version with no application threads running (about 3%).  In this no-
load condition, the only BOSS thread running is the one that checks for new external 
messages, which is activated each two clock tick periods. If this thread is released in 
every clock tick period, the no-load utilization for the Non-FT #1 version rises to 6%. 
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As can be noticed in Figure 7.9, the FT version has a higher CPU utilization than 
Non-FT versions. This overhead is caused by the acceptance test executed at the end 
of the sorting algorithm and also by the coordination between the MS thread and the 
FT thread, as described in Section 5.4.1.  
The FT-AOP version introduces a small overhead compared to the FT version 
(non-AOP). The same happens with the FT scheduling version. These overheads are 
dependent on the activation frequency and the number of FT threads. In the worst case 
scenario, a large number of FT threads execute with a high activation frequency, 
which in this experiment corresponds to 8 FT threads and 167 Hz (6ms period). 
Figure 7.10 presents a graphical representation of the CPU utilization results for such 
situation, considering two different compiler optimizations: O2 (maximum) and O0 
(none). As it can be noticed, the optimized code reduces CPU utilization, especially in 
the case of AOP implementation (about 11%).   
 
Figure 7.10: CPU utilization comparison for AOP and FT scheduling versions. 
In comparison with the FT version, the FT-AOP version implies in a higher 
runtime overhead of 0.34% per FT thread for non-optimized programs and 0.11% per 
FT thread for optimized programs. This corresponds to an extra runtime of 21 and 6 
microseconds respectively, in each FT thread activation.  
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The comparison of the version using FT scheduling with the standard FT version 
shows a higher runtime overhead per FT thread of 0.30% for non-optimized programs 
and 0.42% for optimized programs.  
It should be noticed that the runtime overheads presented above are directly 
dependent on the activation frequency and this experiment was conducted as a worst 
case scenario. Consequently, real applications will probably have smaller overheads 
as usually lower activation frequencies are employed.  
7.2.4 Memory costs 
The same configuration used to measure runtime costs was applied to determine 
memory costs. The results were obtained using the size utility. Table 7.4 shows the 
memory footprint sizes in bytes for code (text), data and unitialized data (bss), 
considering the O2 compiler optimization option. Besides considering the program 
versions described in the previous section, this table also includes the memory 
footprint of the original BOSS operating system and the BOSS version integrated to 
the FT framework. The results for these two versions were obtained by compiling an 
empty application using the corresponding versions of the OS library. 
Table 7.4: Memory footprint results. 
version text data bss total 
BOSS  53,795 3420 158,888 216,103 
BOSS + FT framework 61,047 4020 183,568 248,635 
Non-FT #1 57,027 3708 177,664 238,399 
Non-FT #2 64,263 4428 202,504 271,195 
FT 64,863 4440 202,952 272,255 
FT-AOP 65,067 4440 202,968 272,475 
FT-Scheduling 65,247 4440 203,080 272,767 
 
Figure 7.11 compares total memory sizes of the two operating system versions 
(with and without FT framework) and their respective sorting applications (with and 
without FT), based on data from Table 7.4. The application footprint is much smaller 
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than the operating system footprint in both cases (about 10%). The inclusion of the FT 
framework into the OS code increases its total memory footprint in 32KB (15%). 
Besides, the introduction of fault tolerance into the application code increases its 
memory footprint in 1.3KB (6%). The total memory cost of the FT implementation in 
relation to the non-FT implementation in this experiment is 34KB (14.2%).  
 
Figure 7.11: Comparison of FT and non-FT memory footprints. 
Figure 7.12 presents a graphical representation of memory footprints related to 
the several sorting application versions described in the previous section.  
 
Figure 7.12: Case study I - detailed comparison of memory footprint. 
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In Figure 7.12 we can notice that the memory footprint differences among the 
versions are very small, with exception to the Non-FT #1 version, which does not 
include any fault tolerance at the OS and application levels. That difference is about 
14.2% for the total memory size, as presented earlier. 
Table 7.5 shows the additional memory costs of the AOP version and the FT 
scheduling version in relation to the standard FT version.  The FT-AOP 
implementation consumes more 204 bytes of code and 16 bytes of unitialized data 
than the normal FT implementation. This increase in code size is caused by inlining  
after and around advices that make use of the AspectC++ jointpoint data structure. 
The extra memory for bss is related to the creation of aspect objects and pointers, and 
is not affected by the number of FT threads in use. 
Table 7.5: Additional memory costs for AOP and FT scheduling versions. 
 
The FT scheduling implementation also demands additional code and unitialized 
data memory: 384 and 128 bytes respectively. The extra code is due to 
implementation of the EDF scheduling by the MS thread. The additional data is 
related to the inclusion of new attributes in the Thread and MiddlewareScheduler 
classes. The memory cost of FT scheduling related to bss depends on the number of 
application threads. The results shown in Table 7.5 consider 8 FT threads. If only one 
FT thread is used the additional bss memory for FT scheduling reduces to 72 bytes. In 
contrast, the code memory cost is not affected by the number of application threads. 
7.2.5 FT scheduling tests  
The test configurations described in the previous sections were designed to run 
without deadline violations even when not applying the FT scheduling mechanism 
provided by the FT framework. For instance, the configuration used to measure 
runtime overhead described in Section 7.2.3, despite having 8 RB threads with equal 
differences text data bss total 
FT-AOP to FT 204 0 16 220 
FT-Scheduling to FT 384 0 128 512 
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priority and high activation frequencies, was able to finish all computations within the 
maximum response time of 4,000 microseconds, as each FT thread had a small 
processing time and no errors were simulated in the primary variant.  
In order to test the outcomes and benefits of FT scheduling, two special test 
configurations were designed. These configurations were also based on a single board 
target running concurrent sorting applications, as shown in Figure 7.8, but using a 
small number of FT threads with different processing times and deadlines.  
Table 7.6 presents the settings for these configurations. The first configuration has 
two FT threads and the second has three FT threads. Both configurations run the RB 
strategy. The number of integers sorted by each thread, as well its maximum response 
time is shown in this table. The measured processing time for variants 1 and 2 
(primary and recovery blocks) in each thread is also shown. 
The configurations presented in Table 7.6 were implemented in two software 
versions: with and without FT scheduling. The FT scheduling version was successful 
in meeting the deadlines in both configurations, even when a failure in variant 1 of all 
threads is simulated. In contrast, the standard FT version only is able to meet the 
deadlines for all threads if no failures are simulated. The results are summarized in 
Table 7.7. 
Table 7.6: FT scheduling test configurations. 
Settings Configuration # 1 Configuration # 2 
Number of RB threads 2 3 
200 200 
100 100 Number of integers 
- 100 
1,840 3,242 1,840 3,242 
441 885 441 885 
Variants 1 and 2 
processing times 
(microseconds) - - 441 885 
10,000 14,000 
6,000 8,000 Maximum response time (microseconds) 
- 6,000 
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Table 7.7: FT scheduling test results. 
Version Failure 
condition 
FT 
Thread
Config 
#1 
Config 
#2 
1 OK OK 
2 OK OK No failures 3 - OK 
1 OK OK 
2 failure failure 
FT 
Failure in 
variant 1 3 - failure 
1 OK OK 
2 OK OK No failures 3 - OK 
1 OK OK 
2 OK OK 
FT scheduling 
Failure in 
variant 1 3 - OK 
 
This test results show that the FT scheduling mechanism can be useful for 
eliminating deadline violations in situations where multiple FT threads with different 
computing times and deadlines are activated simultaneously. 
7.3 Case study II: radar filtering application 
The second case study developed to evaluate the application of the FT framework 
was a radar filtering application. Radar filtering is a real-time application commonly 
used in Command and Control (C2) systems. In contrast with case study I, this case 
study applies single version fault tolerance techniques and FT state threads.  
In this application a notebook computer simulates a radar system and periodically 
generates detection data of several planes. The data generation includes simulated 
errors in bearing and distance, typical of this kind of equipment. The radar data is sent 
to the target systems, which filter the planes’ position, using an alpha-beta filter, and 
calculate the planes’ course and speed.  
Chapter 7. Case studies and evaluation 
162 
7.3.1 Testing configurations 
Three configurations were applied, as shown by the UML deployment diagrams 
of Figure 7.13, Figure 7.14 and Figure 7.15. The first configuration uses a single node 
version of the filtering application, without any fault tolerance mechanism. The other 
configurations implement the PSP and TMR strategies.  In these figures, broadcast 
messages are represented by buses with the message subject on top. 
Notebook
Radar Display
radar_data filter_data
PowerPC 823  
Filter
 
Figure 7.13: Case study II - non-FT configuration. 
Notebook
PowerPC 823  
PowerPC 823 
Radar Display
«PSP primary»
Filter
«PSP Shadow»
Filter
radar_data filter_data
FTStatus
 
Figure 7.14: Case study II - PSP configurtion. 
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Notebook
PowerPC 823
PowerPC 823
PowerPC 823 
Radar Display
«TMR»
Filter
«TMR»
Filter
«TMR»
Filter
«Master»
Voter
«Slave»
Voter
«Slave»
Voter
radar_data filter_dataunvoted_data
 
Figure 7.15: Case study II - TMR configuration. 
 The Radar thread is a BOSS thread that runs in the notebook computer. It 
generates radar simulated detection data (bearing and distance) of 4 planes, including 
typical radar measuring errors, and periodically sends this data using the string 
“radar_data” as subject. The period of this message depends on the selected antenna 
rotation period of the simulated radar. In this case study, a period of 2 seconds was 
selected (30 RPM). The planes have initial courses generated at random, but all have 
the same speed of 100 m/s. When they reach a given distance from the simulated 
radar its course is reverted, so as to keep them at a 10 kilometers range.  
Filter is the BOSS thread that runs in a PowerPC board and filters the radar data, 
removing the measurement errors in plane’s position and also calculating its course 
and speed. The filtering algorithm is an alpha-beta filter using two variable parameters 
that depend on the number of planes positions received previously. This case study 
uses a single version of the filtering algorithm, even when executing fault-tolerant 
configurations. 
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The planes’ filtered position, as well as its course and speed are sent back to the 
notebook computer using “filter_data” as subject. Then, they are presented in the 
command line by the Display thread. Additionally, a graphical display program 
written in Java was developed. Figure 7.16 shows an example of display output for 
the TMR configuration. In the left part of the screen four airplanes are represented. 
Planes positions received from radar are plotted as small circles, while filtered 
positions are plotted as squares. A line associated with each filtered position indicates 
the plane’s course (line direction) and speed (line size). The current values of course 
and speed are displayed on the right of each plane’s position, as well as an 
identification number. On the right side of the screen several data are presented, as the 
IP numbers of nodes sending unvoted data (for TMR only) and result data. A table 
containing information about all planes (course, speed, bearing and distance) is also 
presented. 
 
 
Figure 7.16: Case study II - display output example. 
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7.3.2 Fault tolerance implementations and testing 
For the PSP configuration in Figure 7.14, both Filter threads receive the radar data 
and execute the computation, but only the primary thread sends its results. In the 
TMR configuration of Figure 7.15, all Filter threads send their results with 
“unvoted_data” as subject, which are received by the voter threads. In this particular 
configuration, coordinated voting is used and so only the master voter thread sends 
the final results to the Display thread. Status and coordination messages exchanged 
among FT threads and voters are sent with “FTStatus” as subject, as shown in Figure 
7.14 (omitted in Figure 7.15).  
In FT configurations, hardware faults were simulated by turning PowerPC boards 
off and software faults were simulated by introducing value errors in the filter 
calculation.  In the PSP configuration, a hardware fault in a board running as primary 
causes a switch to primary in the other node. A software fault is detected by the 
acceptance test, and a rollback and retry is performed with the same algorithm. If the 
simulated fault is still present, the PSP thread will restart. For the TMR configuration, 
a hardware fault in the board with the master voter will imply in a new master voter 
board after the next master election. A software fault in one of the boards will be 
masked by the voter mechanism. 
If a board is initialized, or if an FT thread is restarted, a state initialization is 
needed, as the filter output depends on the planes’ last position and alpha-beta 
parameters. This initialization algorithm is performed by the corresponding 
FTStrategy object, transparently to the application program, which has only to define 
the getState and setState methods, as described in Section 5.3.2.  
7.3.3 AOP implementations 
The non-FT version of the Filter thread was modified using AOP to create the FT 
implementations using PSP and TMR. The definition on what version of the Filter 
thread (non-FT, PSP and TMR) will be applied is taken at compile time, using the 
same original non-FT version as the base code, and enabling the appropriate set of 
aspects, as described in Section 6.1.1.  
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AOP versions of the PSP and TMR filters have been tested in the same conditions 
as their respective plain object-oriented versions, performing identically and 
demonstrating the same functionality. A comparison of execution times between AOP 
and non-AOP versions led to equal outcomes.  
7.3.4 Runtime costs 
The radar simulation periodically sends planes’ data every 2 seconds. This 
corresponds to the rotation period of the radar antenna. In order to test the system 
under more severe timing conditions and compare the runtime overhead of the test 
configurations the radar simulation period was reduced by factors of two. Figure 7.17 
shows performance results in terms of CPU utilization for several configurations and 
simulation frequencies ranging from 0.5 Hz (2 seconds) to 32 Hz (31.25 ms). 
 
Figure 7.17: Case study II – CPU utilization results. 
The curves labeled “Non-FT” are related to the non-fault tolerant single node 
version shown in Figure 7.13. The “Non-FT #1” version employed the original BOSS 
operating system with no FT framework, while in the “Non-FT #2” version the FT 
framework was integrated. We can notice that the utilization of the FT framework in 
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this case study implies a runtime cost ranging from 3.8 to 5.2%. These results are 
similar to the ones presented in Section 7.2.3 for case study I.  
The PSP and TMR configurations resulted in higher runtime overhead than non-
FT configurations as expected. The reason is the extra processing time associated with 
FT coordination, application-specific procedures and message communication. The 
TMR configuration achieved the worst results as it demands more threads for voting 
and more message exchanges.  
7.4 Evaluation 
This section evaluates the application of the FT framework, described in Chapter 
5, and the AOP implementation, described in Section 6.1, based on the results 
obtained in case studies I and II.  
7.4.1 FT framework  
The utilization of the FT framework for application-level fault tolerance results in 
costs in time performance (execution time), runtime overhead (CPU utilization) and 
memory.  In case study I, the execution time of non-FT configuration was compared 
to the execution time of several FT configurations (Section 7.2.2). The results 
presented in Figure 7.5 (no-failure condition) show that FT implementations have 
much longer execution times than their non-FT counterpart. For instance, the NVP 
implementation of the sorting application has a local execution time 5 times bigger. 
The execution time of FT configurations is affected by the coordination between the 
MS thread and the FT thread. Additionally, for the NVP strategy, the execution time 
is affected by the extra communication between NVP and voter threads. 
In terms of runtime overhead, Figure 7.9 (case study I) and Figure 7.17 (case 
study II) show that difference of CPU utilization between non-FT and FT 
configurations depends linearly on the activation frequency. For low activation 
frequencies, the runtime overhead introduced by an FT configuration may have no 
significance while for high activation frequencies it may have a huge impact. The 
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utilization of FT scheduling also imposes a small runtime overhead, although not 
greater than 0.5% per FT thread.  
Concerning memory costs, it was verified in case study I (Section 7.2.4) that the 
memory footprint of the FT version is about 15% bigger than the corresponding non-
FT version. This difference is mostly due to the memory size of the FT framework 
rather than to the increase in memory size of the application.  
We conclude that the performance penalties and resource costs of the proposed 
fault tolerance framework are still acceptable, considering the benefits in system 
dependability. However, for systems demanding very short execution times or already 
presenting a high CPU utilization or a reduced free memory, the introduction of fault 
tolerance might be a problem, and special care must be taken, including in the 
selection of the FT strategy. 
7.4.2 Aspect-oriented implementation 
The utilization of AOP for introducing fault tolerance at the application level does 
not increase the application execution time, as described in Section 7.3.3.   
Regarding runtime overhead, the extra processing time related to the AOP 
implementation depends on the activation period of the FT thread. In Section 7.2.3, 
this overhead was measured for a high activation frequency (167 Hz – 6 ms) and it 
resulted in a 0.11% higher CPU utilization per FT thread for optimized programs. 
This overhead corresponds to an additional runtime of 6 microseconds for each FT 
thread activation. 
The increase in memory footprint of the AOP implementation is very low. In case 
study I it consumed more 204 bytes of code and 16 bytes of unitialized data than the 
normal FT implementation, which correspond to less than 0.1% of the total memory 
footprint. 
Based on these experiments we conclude that the utilization of AOP for 
application-level fault tolerance implementation does not imply a significant increase 
in runtime overhead or memory footprint. 
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7.5 Summary 
This chapter presented two case studies designed to evaluate the fault tolerance 
introduction at the application level. The first case study was a sorting application 
using stateless multiple version fault tolerance. The second case study was a radar 
filtering system using single version fault tolerance and state threads.  
Both non-fault-tolerant and fault-tolerant configurations were applied in the two 
case studies. Fault-tolerant configurations made use of several FT strategies, such as 
RB, DRB, PSP, TMR and NVP.  Non-fault tolerant configurations employed 
operating systems versions with and without the proposed FT framework.  
The performance in terms of execution time, plus the costs related to runtime 
overhead and memory footprint were measured for these configurations.  The results 
show that the application of the FT framework causes significant costs, but those are 
still acceptable for embedded systems aiming high dependability.  In contrast, the 
extra costs imposed by the AOP implementation proved to be negligible.  
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Chapter 8 
Conclusions 
 
 
 
 
 
This chapter sumarizes the objectives, contributions and conclusions of 
this thesis. It also proposes possible directions for future research. 
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8.1 Conclusions 
The objective of this work is to provide fault-tolerance support for real-time 
embedded applications by integrating a fault tolerance framework into the operating 
system. Using this approach, the application software can be made fault-tolerant with 
a high degree of transparency regarding fault tolerance strategies and their associated 
mechanisms, such as state initialization and replica coordination.  Special attention 
was taken to allow the coexistence of fault tolerance with real-time constraints, by 
providing an additional scheduling mechanism for FT threads.  
The proposed fault tolerance framework employs the application thread as the 
unit of fault-tolerant computing. This solution uses a thread model which allows both 
state and stateless threads running in a distributed environment. Several FT strategies 
were implemented as RB, DRB and NVP. The inclusion of new FT strategies or the 
modification of the existing strategies can be easily performed by creating new 
FTStrategy classes or deriving classes from the existing ones.  
As this work targets small-scale embedded systems, the proposed solution was 
tested using embedded PowerPC boards, similar to the previously used in the BIRD 
satellite. The resource costs in terms of execution time, runtime overhead and memory 
usage were measured and compared for several configurations in two case studies 
presented in Chapter 7. These case studies were selected to allow the application of a 
wide range of fault tolerance strategies using single and multiple version software. 
The results of these tests showed that this approach is feasible, but that the resource 
costs are significant, especially in terms of execution time and runtime overhead. 
However, these costs are considered acceptable for systems demanding high 
dependability. 
The fault tolerance support described in this thesis presents several benefits. The 
main benefit is to simplify the application level programming because fault tolerance 
mechanisms are implemented at the operating system level. The application program 
merely has to define parameters and method implementations required by the chosen 
FT strategy. Other benefits include easiness of configuration and high flexibility both 
at compile and runtime.  
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  In addition to the proposal and evaluation of a FT framework integrated into a 
real-time operating system, this work also evaluated the application of aspect-oriented 
techniques to the development of fault-tolerant software. In this work, AOP was 
applied for three different purposes: (1) integrate the FT framework into the operating 
system; (2) implement fault tolerance at the operating system level; and (3) 
modularize the fault tolerance code at the application level. 
The integration of the FT framework into the operating system using AOP 
enables a complete separation of the FT framework from the OS code. It allows an 
optional integration of the framework into the operating system at 
weaving/compilation time. This modularization reflects in easier software 
maintenance and reduced memory footprint for non-FT applications. 
The introduction of fault tolerance in the operating system using AOP adds fault 
tolerance error detection mechanisms. These mechanisms are implemented as 
executable assertions that verify predicates or invariants related to the OS basic 
functionality. This kind of FT functionality may be introduced selectively by aspects 
at weaving time.  
The main target of AOP application was the introduction of fault tolerance at the 
application level. This approach was used to convey fault tolerance to existing 
applications without modifying their source code. The modularization of the fault 
tolerance code at the application level using AOP has several benefits. First, it reduces 
efforts and errors in making a legacy system fault-tolerant. It also simplifies system 
development by allowing the validation of the functional part in advance. 
Additionally, it facilitates the evaluation and comparison of various FT 
configurations, and contributes to product line development and code reuse. However, 
the availability of aspect-oriented weavers and tools for embedded systems 
development is very limited. The AspectC++ compiler used in this work is still in beta 
testing and has some restrictions as described in Section 6.1.2. 
Regarding resource costs, implementations using application-level fault tolerance 
introduced by AOP were submitted to the same case studies described in Chapter 7. 
The results show that the extra costs imposed by AOP techniques are insignificant. 
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In summary, we conclude that the provision of operating system support to fault 
tolerance by means of an integrated FT framework is feasible and acceptable, bringing 
many benefits to the development of fault-tolerant embedded systems. Futhermore, 
our experiments indicate that the application of Aspect-Oriented Programming to 
introduce fault tolerance at the application level is advantageous and cost effective. 
8.2 Future work 
There are two possible diretions of future work regarding fault tolerance 
framework design: inwards or outwards the operating system. The inwards approach 
would be to promote a further integration between the fault tolerance framework and 
the operating sytem. An example of evolution regarding this approach is the 
modification of the operating system scheduler to include the assessment of FT thread 
deadlines. In the current implementation, this task is performed by the 
MiddlewareScheduler thread, and consists in a second scheduling algorithm. This 
work could improve the systems’ real-time behavior and reduce the scheduling 
runtime overhead. However, as the interconnection between the OS and the FT 
framework increases, it would become harder to keep their development apart and just 
combine them, if needed, by applying AOP.  
The second direction, the outward approach, would be to completely separate the 
FT framework from the OS. Using this approach, it could be designed a standard 
service interface between the OS layer and the FT framework, in order to facilitate the 
porting of the framework to other real-time operating systems. In this case, the 
operating system should be able to provide a minimum number of services to the FT 
framework, such as precise thread activation, thread priority management and basic 
communication mechanisms. The FT framework would have to implement the 
publisher-subscriber protocol to exchange FT related messages. This approach 
improves the framework portability but may have impact on real-time performance 
and resource costs. 
Another possible future work is to include new fault tolerance strategies to the FT 
framework as, for instance, sequential NVP/TMR [7]. In addition, the fault tolerance 
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strategies currently implemented could be improved. The following improvements are 
suggested: 
• The implementation of a mechanism for correcting state divergencies in FT 
threads running the NVP strategy. 
• The implementation of a recovery cache for the RB and DRB strategies, using 
aspect-oriented techniques [10]. 
• The modification of the coordination behavior between the MS thread and the FT 
threads, in order to reduce the execution times.  This can be performed by 
modifying the implementations of FTStrategy derived classes and does not 
depend on the MiddlewareScheduler class implementation.  
Regarding the application of AOP in the fault tolerance domain, a possible 
research work is to execute more experiments with the introduction of fault tolerance 
at the operating system level. This work should include the definition of predicates for 
most operating system functionalities and the implementation of error detection 
mechanisms based on these predicates. The fault coverage of these mechanisms 
should be assessed using fault injection. It should also be evaluated if this approach is 
cost effective for embedded applications. 
A future research may also include the application of AOP for middleware 
customization. In this work, the communication between the nodes employed UDP 
and broadcast. Other middleware versions could include point-to-point 
communication and different transport protocols. The configuration of what kind of 
middleware facility as well as other features such as fault tolerant communication can 
be defined selectively by aspects.   
Further investigation on the combination of operating system object-oriented 
design, framework technologies and aspect-oriented techniques can lead to 
development of more customizable, evolvable and dependable embedded systems.  
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